PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 95-1398
Complete Title
of Case:
CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CLIFTON HAMPTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted on Briefs: March 6, 1996
Oral Argument: ---
COURT COURT
OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: July 31, 1996
Opinion Filed: July 31, 1996
Source of APPEAL Appeal
from a judgment
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Milwaukee
(If "Special", JUDGE: KITTY K. BRENNAN
so indicate)
JUDGES: Wedemeyer,
P.J., Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSFor
the defendant-appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs of James A.
Walrath and Hannah C. Dugan of Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee,
Inc.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSFor
the plaintiff-respondent the cause was submitted on the briefs of Grant F.
Langley, city attorney, and M. Joseph Donald, assistant city
attorney, of Milwaukee.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED July 31, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1398
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CLIFTON HAMPTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
KITTY K. BRENNAN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
SULLIVAN,
J. Clifton Hampton appeals from a judgment of forfeiture for
violating the City of Milwaukee's ordinance against carrying a concealed
dangerous weapon. See Milwaukee Code of Ordinances
105-34. He argues that the ordinance
violates his procedural due process and equal protection rights under the
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, and conflicts with Wisconsin law and
public policy. We reject his arguments
and affirm.
I.
Background.
The parties stipulated
to the following facts. City of
Milwaukee police conducted a traffic stop of a car driven and owned by
Hampton. The police found a folding
lock-blade knife with a three-and-three-quarter-inch blade in the car's glove
compartment. The glove compartment door
was closed, but within Hampton's reach.
Hampton told police that it was his knife and that he used it to cut
boxes at work. Police found other tools
in the car's trunk. The traffic stop
occurred at 3:00 p.m., and Hampton stated that he had last worked at 6:00 a.m.
on the day of the stop. Police cited
Hampton for carrying a concealed weapon under 105-34 of the Milwaukee Code of
Ordinances.
Ordinance 105-34,
provides, in relevant part:
Carrying Dangerous Weapons. 1. PROHIBITED. a. It shall be
unlawful for any person except a peace officer to go armed with a concealed and
dangerous weapon within the city of Milwaukee.
....
2. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this section:
a. “Dangerous
Weapon” means any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or
great bodily harm, ... or any other device or instrumentality which, in the
manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce
death or great bodily harm. The
following are dangerous per se: ... any other knife having a blade 3 inches or
longer. Instruments not herein
specifically enumerated are none the less considered weapons when they fall
within the terms of this definition.
Hampton contested the
citation, but the City of Milwaukee Municipal Court found Hampton guilty of
violating the ordinance and ordered him to forfeit $269 or spend ten days in
jail. Hampton petitioned the Milwaukee
County Circuit Court for a trial de novo, which the trial court
granted. Hampton then filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the “dangerous per se” language of the ordinance created
an irrebuttable mandatory presumption, thereby violating the due process and
equal protection provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions
and conflicting with state law and public policy.
The trial court rejected
Hampton's constitutional claims, found him guilty of violating the ordinance,
and entered a forfeiture judgment for $269 or ten days in jail. Hampton now renews his constitutional
arguments on appeal.
II.
Analysis.
Hampton claims that the
ordinance is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable mandatory
presumption that a knife with a blade length of three inches or longer is a
dangerous weapon, and that this presumption violates his rights to procedural
due process and equal protection under the federal and state
constitutions. He also claims that the
ordinance conflicts with state statutes governing presumptions and state policy
regarding the treatment of knives as dangerous weapons. We address each claim seriatim.
A. Standard of Review.
Whether an ordinance is
constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo. City of Milwaukee v. Nelson,
149 Wis.2d 434, 446, 439 N.W.2d 562, 566, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858
(1989). Further, we begin with the
presumption that an ordinance is constitutional and “must be upheld unless
proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State,
199 Wis.2d 791, 802, 546 N.W.2d 424, 430 (1996). Indeed, we “`will not interfere with a municipality's exercise of
police power unless it is clearly illegal.'”
City of Milwaukee, 149 Wis.2d at 446, 439 N.W.2d at 566
(citation omitted). “Every presumption
must be indulged to sustain an ordinance's constitutionality if at all
possible. Where doubt exists as to the
constitutionality, it must be resolved by finding the legislative enactment
constitutional.” Id.
B. Procedural Due
Process.
An ordinance violates
procedural due process if it creates a conclusive presumption, in other words,
an irrebuttable mandatory presumption, that shifts the burden of persuasion for
an element of the ordinance onto the offender.
See Muller v. State, 94 Wis.2d 450, 473-77, 289 N.W.2d
570, 582‑83 (1980). Hampton
argues that the “dangerous per se” language in 105-34(2)(a) creates an
irrebuttable mandatory presumption that any knife with a blade length of three
inches or longer is a dangerous weapon under the ordinance. Hence, he argues
that the City is relieved of its burden to show that his knife was a dangerous
weapon. We disagree.
When an ordinance is
challenged as unconstitutional on its face, reviewing courts “must make a
logical and sensible construction in a reasonable sense.” See State v. Starks, 51
Wis.2d 256, 259, 186 N.W.2d 245, 246 (1971).
Further, when an ordinance is susceptible to two meanings, it must be
construed to avoid an unreasonable or unconstitutional result. State v. S & S Meats,
Inc., 92 Wis.2d 64, 71, 284 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 1979). This court must interpret ordinances in a
way that avoids absurd results. See
Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis.2d 673, 679, 500 N.W.2d 649, 652
(1993).
We conclude that a
reasonable interpretation of the ordinance exists that would sustain its
constitutionality, and therefore, we must interpret the ordinance in such
fashion. This requires a careful
reading of the ordinance.
Offenders violate the
ordinance only if they go armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon. See Ordinance 105-34(1). Subsection (2)(a) defines “dangerous weapon”
as “any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great
bodily harm ... or any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner it
is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or
great bodily harm.” Thus, the ordinance
defines “dangerous weapon” as one compound element that must be proven; the
ordinance does not require proof of two independent elements. Nonetheless, in order to show that an item
is a “dangerous weapon” under the ordinance, the item must be both dangerous and
a weapon.
Subsection (2)(a) then
defines as “dangerous per se” a list of items including “any other knife having
a blade 3 inches or longer.” The
“dangerous per se” language lists objects that clearly are “capable of
producing death or great bodily harm.”
In short, the ordinance states the obvious—all knives with a blade three
inches or longer are “capable of producing death or great bodily harm”—the
ordinance's definition of dangerous.
The ordinance, however,
does not define the listed items as weapons per se. Hence, a “knife having a three inch blade or longer” is not by
the ordinance's definition automatically a “dangerous weapon,” even though it
is by definition “dangerous.” The City,
in order to show that an offender carrying a three-inch bladed knife has
violated 105-34, must still show that the knife is a weapon; that is, that it
is either a “device designed as a weapon” or is “any other device or
instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” If the City met this burden, the offender
could rebut it by presenting evidence that the knife was not a weapon as
defined by the ordinance.
For example, if a postal
carrier were cited for violating 105-34 after police uncovered a concealed
letter opener with a four-inch blade in his or her mail bag, the individual
could rebut the state's evidence that he or she was carrying a “dangerous weapon”
by showing that it was not a weapon—that is, that it was neither designed as a
weapon nor was it used or intended to be used in a manner calculated or likely
to produce death or great bodily harm.
The fact-finder would then have to weigh the evidence and determine
whether the postal carrier had violated the ordinance.
It is clear that the
ordinance did not violate Hampton's procedural due process rights. The ordinance's language did not relieve the
City of proving that Hampton was carrying a concealed “dangerous weapon.” Hampton was free to challenge the City's
contention that the knife in his glove compartment was a “dangerous
weapon.” Although Hampton's knife was
“capable of producing death or great bodily harm”—that is, dangerous—it was not
necessarily a weapon. Once the City
presented evidence that the knife was indeed a “weapon,” Hampton could present
his defense that the knife was not a weapon, but a tool for work.
C. Equal Protection.
Hampton also claims the
“dangerous per se” language of Ordinance 105‑34 creates an arbitrary
classification that denies him equal protection under the law. Hampton claims that when a person is cited
for carrying a concealed knife with a blade less than three inches, the City
must prove that the knife was dangerous; whereas, when a person is cited for
carrying a knife with a blade three inches or longer, the City is relieved of
this burden. He argues that this
distinction creates an arbitrary and irrational classification that violates
Hampton's right to equal protection. We
disagree.
Unless a challenge to an
ordinance affects a person's fundamental right or creates a classification
based on a suspect class, this court uses the “rational basis test” in
determining whether the ordinance withstands the equal protection
challenge. Szarzynski v. YMCA,
Camp Minikani, 184 Wis.2d 875, 886, 517 N.W.2d 135, 139 (1994). Hampton has made no argument that the
ordinance violates a fundamental right or that it is based on a suspect
classification—therefore, the “rational basis test” applies.
Under the “rational
basis test,” we must uphold a legislative classification if there exists any
reasonable basis to justify that classification. To decide if there is any reasonable basis, the court is
obligated to find or construct, if possible, a rationale that might have
influenced the legislature and that reasonably upholds legislative
determinations. K.C. v. DHSS,
142 Wis.2d 906, 916, 420 N.W.2d 37, 40 (1988).
Here, the Milwaukee
Common Council could reasonably conclude that a knife with a three inch blade
or longer is obviously dangerous—that is, “capable of producing death or great
bodily harm”—whereas, a knife with a shorter blade is not necessarily
dangerous. The classification is
reasonable and does not violate Hampton's equal protection rights under the
federal and state constitutions.
D. State Statutes
and State Policy.
Hampton's last argument
is that the “dangerous per se” language of the ordinance is in conflict with
state law and state policy. We reject
his argument.
Hampton claims the
“dangerous per se” language in 105‑34 conflicts with the state statute
governing evidentiary presumptions. See
Rule 903.01, Stats.[1] Hampton argues that Rule 903.01 governs proceedings in municipal courts in
Wisconsin, see § 800.08(4), Stats.
(“Municipal courts shall be bound by the rules of evidence specified in chs.
901 to 911.”), and that it forbids irrebuttable mandatory presumptions. He then repeats his argument that the 105-34
“dangerous per se” language creates just such a presumption, and that this
conflicts with Rule 903.01. We rejected his argument on this issue
above, and therefore, we see no conflict with state law on this point. Further, Rule 903.01,
Stats., does not even address
irrebuttable mandatory presumptions.
Hampton also argues that
the 105-34 “dangerous per se” language conflicts with the spirit of state law
and general state policy “with regard to carrying ... instruments or devices
that may have multiple uses.” He argues
that this policy is evidenced by § 941.23, Stats., the state carrying a concealed weapon statute, and
its definition of “dangerous weapon” in § 939.22(10), Stats.[2] We disagree.
Under § 62.11(5), Stats., the Wisconsin Legislature gave
the City of Milwaukee a general grant of power “to act for the government and
good order of the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the health, safety,
and welfare of the public.” Further,
the City was allowed to “carry out its
powers by license, regulation, suppression, [and] fine.” We will uphold an ordinance adopted by the
City unless it is in direct conflict with a statute on the same subject, is
unreasonable, or is arbitrary. Johnston
v. City of Sheboygan, 30 Wis.2d 179, 184, 140 N.W.2d 247, 250
(1966). Plus, local ordinances may
impose stricter standards than similar state regulation when the two do not
conflict. Konkel v. Town of
Raymond, 101 Wis.2d 704, 709, 305 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Ct. App. 1981). Our review of the ordinance and the state
statutes reveals no conflict between them.
Further, as discussed above, the ordinance is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Hampton's argument fails.
In sum, we reject all of
Hampton's arguments challenging the City of Milwaukee's ordinance. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
[1]
Rule 903.01, Stats., provides:
Presumptions in general. Except as provided by statute, a presumption recognized at common law or created by statute, including statutory provisions that certain basic facts are prima facie evidence of other facts, imposes on the party relying on the presumption the burden of proving the basic facts, but once the basic facts are found to exist the presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.
[2]
Sections 941.23, and 939.22(10), Stats.,
provide:
941.23 Carrying concealed weapon. Any person except a peace officer who goes armed with a concealed
and dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
939.22 Words and phrases defined. In chs. 939 to 948 and 951, the following words and phrases have
the designated meanings unless the context of a specific section manifestly
requires a different construction or the word or phrase is defined in
s. 948.01 for purposes of ch. 948:
....
(10) “Dangerous weapon” means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295(4); or any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.