COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED DECEMBER 12, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1369-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JANE M. RONEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Brown County:
DONALD J. HANAWAY, Judge. Reversed.
CANE, P.J. The State appeals the trial court's order
suppressing Jane Roney's written statement where she admitted to stealing money
from her employer. The trial court
concluded that because the officer's statement to Roney was inherently coercive
and violated fundamental fairness, her written admissions must be
suppressed. The order is reversed.
The facts are
undisputed. Officer Michael Van Rooy
went to Roney's home to interview her about some money missing from her
employer, the Bridal Chateau. Roney
invited the officer into her home, and they sat in her kitchen where Van Rooy
explained to her that she was not under arrest and that he just wanted to talk
to her about some inconsistencies in the bridal shop records. Roney concedes that she was not placed under
arrest and that Miranda[1]
warnings were not required. She also
agrees that the officer made no improper threats or promises to induce the written
statement. However, she argued
successfully to the trial court that when Van Rooy admitted that in order
to get a statement from Roney, he told her that she seemed like a good person
and asked her if she just borrowed the money with the intent to pay it back,
this police strategy was inherently coercive and violated fundamental
fairness. Consequently, the trial court
ordered that Roney's written admissions to stealing money from her employer
were inadmissible.
The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution prohibits involuntary statements because of
their inherent unreliability and the judicial system's unwillingness to
tolerate illegal police behavior. State
v. Pheil, 152 Wis.2d 523, 535, 449 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Ct. App.
1989). As our supreme court stated in State
v. Hunt, 53 Wis.2d 734, 740, 193 N.W.2d 858, 863 (1972), "The
essential question, in determining the voluntariness of a confession, is
whether the confession was coerced, or the product of improper pressures
exercised by the police. To be
admissible into evidence, a confession must be the voluntary product of a free
and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice."
Roney argues that the
issue is not one of a coercive atmosphere, but whether Van Rooy's subtle strategy
in obtaining a confession was an improper strategy rendering the written
confession inadmissible. Because the
underlying facts relative to the taking of the statement are undisputed,
whether the police conduct rendered the statement involuntary presents an issue
of law this court reviews independently of the trial court's
determination. See State
v. Clappes, 136 Wis.2d 222, 235, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987).
At a suppression
hearing, the State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a statement
by a preponderance of the evidence. State
v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis.2d 1, 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401, 407 n.7
(1990). When determining voluntariness,
courts examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement,
weighing the defendant's personal characteristics against the pressures imposed
upon the defendant by the police, in order to induce a response to the
questioning. Clappes, 136
Wis.2d at 236-37, 401 N.W.2d at 766. In
Clappes, our supreme court stated:
The relevant personal characteristics of
the confessor include his age, his education and intelligence, his physical and
emotional condition, and his prior experience with the police. These factors must be balanced against the
police pressures and tactics which have been used to induce the admission, such
as the length of the interrogation, any delay in arraignment, the general
conditions under which the confessions took place, any excessive physical or
psychological pressure ... any inducements, threats, methods or strategies
utilized by the police to compel a response, and whether the individual was
informed of his right to counsel and right against self-incrimination.
Id.
(Citation omitted.)
In State v.
Albrecht, 184 Wis.2d 287, 300, 516 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Ct. App. 1994), we
recognized that in the battle against crime, the police, within reasonable
bounds, may use misrepresentations, tricks and other methods of deception to
obtain evidence.
A review of the
circumstances surrounding Roney's written confession does not suggest any
improper policy strategy constituted an inherently coercive approach or
violated fundamental fairness. Here,
the interview lasted for approximately thirty minutes at Roney's home. She is forty-seven years old and has two
years of college education. She was not
in custody or under arrest. The
discussion about the inconsistencies in the bridal shop receipts and whether
she took any money took place in the kitchen while Roney dyed and rinsed her
hair. There was no physical pressure
placed on Roney. Although Van Rooy told
Roney that he did not think she stole the money, he never made any promises or
threats against her. Roney has no
characteristics that would suggest she is unusually susceptible to
psychological pressure. When reviewing
Roney's testimony at the suppression hearing, conspicuously absent is any
statement or suggestion from her that Van Rooy's strategy of telling her
that she must have borrowed the money without any intent to steal it caused her
to make any incriminating statement.
The thrust of her testimony was that she did not make the incriminating
statements contained in the written confession. That is a matter left for the trier of fact at trial.
Under these
circumstances, this court concludes that Van Rooy's conduct was within the
permissible bounds of interviewing Roney, an individual suspected of stealing
from her employer. The officer's
strategy was not the type of conduct or pressure that is inherently coercive or
a violation of fundamental fairness.
Therefore, the trial court's order suppressing Roney's incriminating
statements is reversed.
By the Court.—Order
reversed.
This opinion will not be
published. Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.