COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED May 23, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1245
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE EX REL. SAM
MULIPOLA,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
GARY McCAUGHTRY,
Superintendent,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Dodge County:
THOMAS W. WELLS, Reserve Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman and Sundby, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Sam Mulipola appeals from an order affirming two
prison disciplinary decisions. Mulipola
contends that procedural errors occurred in both cases. We reject his contentions and affirm.
In the first case, the
conduct report charged Mulipola with violating disciplinary rules against group
resistance, conspiracy, possessing and manufacturing weapons, and attempting to
incite a riot. The incident description
within the report detailed information received from three confidential informants
who reported that Mulipola manufactured shanks for a gang planning a prison
uprising. It also contained a report on
an interrogation of Mulipola in which he confessed to making and keeping a
shank taped under a table in his work place.
A search revealed the shank and evidence that others had been hidden in
the same spot.
The disciplinary
committee found Mulipola guilty on all four charges based on the incident
description and the conduct report, the statements of the three confidential
informants, the confiscated weapon, and the testimony of the reporting
officer. On reconsideration, the
committee dismissed the group resistance charge because it was a lesser
included offense of attempting to incite a riot. On certiorari review, the trial court then dismissed the
conspiracy charge. Mulipola's appeal
concerns the remaining two charges.
Mulipola first argues
that the conduct report did not provide sufficient notice of the times and
dates that the informants overheard he and his alleged accomplices making their
inculpatory remarks. All Mulipola
learned from the conduct report was that in mid-November 1993, informant number
one overheard two inmates implicating Mulipola in the planned riot, that
informant number two once heard Mulipola admit he was supplying shanks to the
gang, and that informant number three overheard inmates discussing Mulipola's
involvement in the second and last weeks of December 1993 and on January 18,
1994.
It is well established
that due process requires that inmates must be provided with sufficient notice
of disciplinary charges to clarify the charges, marshall facts and prepare a
defense. Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1974). However,
prison officials have the discretion to balance individual due process rights
with security and safety concerns. Id.
at 569. That discretion allows
officials to withhold notice of specific times and dates if doing so
jeopardizes the identity of confidential informants. McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir.
1982).
Additionally, it is not
readily apparent that knowing the precise dates and times would have benefited
Mulipola. He and the inmates who were
allegedly overheard discussing the riot plans denied the existence of such
plans. The committee rejected that
testimony on credibility grounds.
Knowing the specific dates of the alleged discussions would not have
improved the inmates' credibility.
Mulipola next argues
that the committee violated Wis. Adm.
Code § DOC 303.86(4) by allowing into evidence the confidential
informants' statements. That rule
requires that the statements be made under oath, that the committee make a
finding that requiring witnesses to testify would subject them to a significant
risk of bodily harm, and that the statements be corroborated as required by the
rule. State ex rel. Staples v.
DHSS, 115 Wis.2d 363, 370, 340 N.W.2d 194, 198 (1983). A statement may be corroborated under the
rule by a confidential statement of another informant, by other evidence which
substantially corroborates the facts alleged in the statement or by evidence of
a very similar violation by the same person.
Section DOC 303.86(4).
Here, all three criteria were satisfied. First, the informants' statements were made under oath. Second, although the committee did not
specifically find that requiring the informants to testify would put them at
risk, that inference is inescapable.
The information they provided implicated Mulipola and his accomplices in
a plan involving an armed, violent prison uprising by a prison gang. Revealing the informants' names would
undeniably place them in serious jeopardy.
Finally, the informants' statements corroborated each other sufficient
to make each admissible. Additionally,
Mulipola's admission and the results of a search of his work area substantially
corroborated the statements through other circumstantial evidence. As a result, the committee did not violate
the rule when it considered the informants' statements.
Mulipola's second
conduct report charged him with aiding and abetting a battery, disruptive
conduct and disobeying an order. The
written incident description stated that Mulipola blocked the way of two
officers who were trying to go to the assistance of a third who was under
assault from an inmate. Mulipola
refused an order to move out of the way and subsequently began yelling
accusations that the officers were abusing an inmate. The officers allegedly blocked were Hautamaki and Longseth. Mulipola requested that both attend his
hearing as witnesses, but only Hautamaki appeared. The request for Longseth was denied because he was not the
reporting officer. The committee found
Mulipola guilty of disobeying orders and disruptive conduct and he was punished
accordingly.
The only issue Mulipola
raises with regard to this proceeding is the claimed violation of his due
process right to call Longseth as a witness.
Mulipola has raised this issue for the first time in this judicial proceeding. It is therefore waived. See Saenz v. Murphy,
162 Wis.2d 54, 65-66, 469 N.W.2d 611, 616 (1991).
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.