COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September
14, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62,
Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1136-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GREGORY
L. HOWERTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for La Crosse
County: DENNIS G. MONTABON, Judge. Affirmed.
DYKMAN,
J. This is a single-judge appeal
decided pursuant to § 752.31(2)(f), Stats. Gregory L. Howerton appeals from a judgment
convicting him of misdemeanor theft, contrary to § 943.20(1)(a), Stats., and from an order denying his
postconviction motion for relief. The
single count of theft was based upon multiple acts of theft occurring over an
eight-month period. Howerton seeks a
new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We reject his claim and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
Gregory
L. Howerton began working as a bartender at Smith's Night Club, a sports bar in
La Crosse, in September 1992. He left
the bar in July 1993 after the owner and manager confronted him about stealing
from the bar and told him that they had recorded him on videotape using a
surveillance camera.
At
trial, Kenneth P. Smith, the bar owner, testified that he had decided to
videotape Howerton's shifts after noticing that the cash register frequently
came up short after Howerton worked.
Customers testified that they saw Howerton handling money and working
the cash register in such a way that would allow him to put the bar's receipts
into his own pocket. Customers also
testified that Howerton drank and ate the bar's alcohol and food on the job
without paying for it, a practice against bar rules. Finally, Howerton admitted that he gave out free drinks to
customers, another practice against bar rules.
The prosecution also showed the videotapes of Howerton's shifts to
demonstrate how Howerton took money from the cash register and consumed drinks
without paying for them.
Before
trial, counsel made various strategic decisions to aid Howerton. First, he moved in limine to restrict
the scope of the trial to the two days shown in the videotapes instead of
November 1992 through July 1993, as alleged in the complaint. The State moved to broaden the scope of the
trial by adding September and October 1992 to the time period during which time
Howerton allegedly stole from the bar.
The trial court denied both motions and kept the relevant time period as
alleged in the complaint.
Secondly,
Howerton and counsel discussed the option of requesting more specificity in the
State's charges against him. Counsel
recommended and Howerton agreed, however, that defending against the single
charge of theft that included taking money from the cash register, drinking and
eating the bar's alcohol and food, and giving out free drinks was a better
strategy for them to pursue: while it
appeared to them that the State's case on the issues of taking money, alcohol
and food was weak, they felt that it would be difficult to win a separate
charge of giving away free drinks. By
leaving the charge as a single count, counsel hoped that the jury would doubt
Howerton's guilt in the weaker allegations of taking money, alcohol and food
and that the jury would dismiss the giving away of free drinks as a common
practice of bartenders, undeserving of a criminal conviction. Counsel believed that if the single charge
were broken down into three separate counts, the jury would have been forced to
convict Howerton on the stronger count of giving away free drinks. If the jury found him guilty on the other
counts as well, he could have faced two to three times the penalty he faced
with only one charge.
Howerton
claims that his counsel's representation was ineffective in two respects. First, counsel performed deficiently because
he failed to request a jury instruction, such as Wis J I—Criminal 517, which provides that when the jury is
presented with various acts constituting the crime charged, it must be
unanimous on which act the defendant committed in order to convict. Howerton believes that without this
instruction, he was denied his right to unanimity in a guilty verdict. Secondly, he claims that counsel was
ineffective in failing to call three potentially helpful witnesses.
INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
For
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
adopted the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
In order to show that counsel's performance constituted ineffective
representation, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis.2d
628, 633, 369 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1985).
We need not address the two prongs in any particular order, "[i]f it
is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice ...." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697. In examining counsel's
failure to request Wis J I—Criminal
517, we will address the prejudice prong first.
In
order to prove prejudice, Howerton must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. Pitsch, 124
Wis.2d at 642, 369 N.W.2d at 718. That
is, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the decision reached would
reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
696. Finally, "[t]he assessment of
prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is
reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern
the decision." Id.
at 695.
Counsel's
failure to request a jury instruction specifying the need for unanimity on the
particular means of committing theft did not result in any prejudice to
Howerton because such an instruction would have had no affect on the jury's
verdict. Howerton testified that he
knowingly gave drinks to customers for which neither he nor they paid. He also stated that he knew that giving out
free drinks was against the bar owner's rules.
In effect, Howerton's admission satisfied each of the elements that the
State had to prove to convict him of theft.
Under
these facts, if Howerton's jury acted reasonably (and we must assume it did),
then it must have found unanimously that Howerton gave away free drinks and
committed theft. A jury instruction
such as Wis J I—Criminal 517
would have done nothing to alter that finding.
For that reason, counsel's failure to request this jury instruction was
not prejudicial and does not constitute ineffective assistance.
Howerton
also claims that counsel's failure to present all available witnesses in his
defense constituted ineffective assistance.
This claim of ineffectiveness fails because it does not meet the
"deficient performance" prong of the Strickland
test. In order to show that counsel's
performance was deficient, "the defendant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
688.
Counsel
believed that the three witnesses in question would not have helped and could
in fact have hurt the defense. One
witness was not called because the initial story he told to counsel would not
have proved exculpatory. A second
witness was not called because her testimony would have directly conflicted
with Howerton's own testimony. And,
while the final witness's testimony was discovered to be potentially helpful,
this discovery occurred after the jury had begun its deliberations. Not calling these witnesses was a reasonable
trial tactic. Because counsel's actions
were reasonable, Howerton does not meet the deficient performance prong of the Strickland
test, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue must
fail as well.
By
the Court.—Judgment and order
affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.