COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 6, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1063-FT
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DENNIS R. MUELLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Winnebago County:
ROBERT A. HAASE, Judge. Affirmed.
BROWN, J. Dennis
R. Mueller's motor vehicle operating privileges were revoked for one year after
he refused to submit to chemical testing.
He appeals an order finding his refusal unreasonable. Mueller argues that the Informing the
Accused form that was read to him on the night of his arrest is ambiguous. We disagree and affirm.
Mueller was stopped and
arrested in the city of Oshkosh under suspicion that he was driving while
intoxicated. The officer took him to
the station house and read him the Informing the Accused form. Mueller refused to take the chemical
test. The trial court subsequently
found that this refusal was unreasonable and suspended Mueller's operating
privileges.
Before the trial court,
Mueller argued that paragraph five of the form is ambiguous and therefore
interfered with his ability to exercise the choice of whether to submit to
chemical testing.[1] He now renews this argument on appeal. This is a question of law which we review de
novo. See Pulsfus Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Town of Leeds, 149 Wis.2d 797, 803-04, 440 N.W.2d 329,
332 (1989).
In his briefs to this
court, Mueller sets out a detailed discussion of how the language within
paragraph five, when read together with the statutory sections to which it
refers, “creates a serious ambiguity that cannot easily be resolved by this
Court, let alone by an accused individual on the night he is arrested.” He further cites State v. Piskula,
168 Wis.2d 135, 483 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1992), and cautions that we should not
view Mueller's claims simply to determine if there was substantial compliance
with the objectives of the implied consent law. See id. at 140-41, 483 N.W.2d at 252.
Nevertheless, we need
not address Mueller's specific theory because we find that the supreme court's
decision in Village of Oregon v. Bryant, 188 Wis.2d 680, 524
N.W.2d 635 (1994), forecloses any claim that this form is ambiguous. There, ruling on three consolidated cases,
the court found that Wisconsin's current Informing the Accused form is not
contradictory or confusing on its face.
Id. at 692, 524 N.W.2d at 640. Although the court was specifically addressing a claim involving
paragraph four of the form, see id. at 685, 524 N.W.2d at
637, its analysis touched on all five paragraphs and covered all the rights
afforded drivers under the implied consent law. See id. at 691-94, 524 N.W.2d at
639-40. We therefore hold that
Mueller's specific concerns about paragraph five have no merit.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)(4), Stats.
[1]
Paragraph five of the form provides:
If you have a prohibited alcohol concentration or you refuse to submit to chemical testing and you have two or more prior suspensions, revocations or convictions within a 10 year period and after January 1, 1988, which would be counted under s. 343.307(1) Wis. Stats., a motor vehicle owned by you may be equipped with an ignition interlock device, immobilized, or seized and forfeited.