COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED NOVEMBER 21, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-1005
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
ANDREW J. KOJIS,
and MARGARET A.
MUNDIGLER,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
JERRY ROSNOW,
and GWEN ROSNOW
Defendants-Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Shawano County:
EARL W. SCHMIDT, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Jerry and Gwen Rosnow appeal a judgment awarding
Andrew Kojis and Margaret Mundigler disputed property by adverse
possession. They argue that the trial
court's decision does not specifically rule on the statutory elements for
adverse possession, that the evidence does not support the findings and that
the property line chosen by the court is unclear, arbitrary and clearly
erroneous. We reject these arguments
and affirm the judgment.
The Rosnows are the
owners of Lot 2 of a plat located on Shawano Lake. They bought the property in 1971 from Ed and Betty Kurtz. Andrew Kojis and his sister, Margaret Mundigler,
acquired Lot 3 as tenants in common from their father, Andrew Kojis, Sr., who
had owned Lot 3 since 1948. A survey
determined that the Kojis cabin was partially located on Rosnows' lot. The trial court redrew the boundary between
Lots 2 and 3, awarding the Kojises a part of Lot 2 based on adverse
possession. The Rosnows concede that
the part where the cabin was located was adversely possessed, but challenged
the findings as to the additional property awarded in the judgment.
While the trial court
did not make specific findings as to all of the elements of adverse possession,
it heard argument regarding all of the elements and found that adverse
possession had occurred. This court
will therefore assume that the trial court has determined all issues in favor
of adverse possession. See Sohns
v. Jensen, 11 Wis.2d 449, 453, 105 N.W.2d 818, 820 (1960).
The Kojises presented
adequate evidence to support their claim of adverse possession. To constitute adverse possession, physical
possession of the property must be hostile, open and notorious, exclusive and
continuous for twenty years. Leciejewski
v. Sedlak, 116 Wis.2d 629, 636, 342 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1984). The Kojises presented evidence that their
father and the Kurtz family considered a line of trees to be the boarder
between Lots 2 and 3. In 1949 or 1950,
the predecessors in title placed outhouses back-to-back along this line. The outhouses remained in those positions
until the early 1970s. The Kojis family
planted trees and placed a one-inch metal stake along that line. The Kojises also placed a sandbox on what
they believed was their side of the tree line and at times stored items in that
area. Kurtz put up a no trespassing
sign on a chain across a private road at a point that would indicate his belief
that the tree line separated the two lots.
The record shows that
the Kojises' occupation of the disputed land was hostile, open and notorious,
exclusive and continuous. "Hostile
intent" does not mean deliberate, wilful, unfriendly animus. Burkhardt v. Smith, 17 Wis.2d
132, 139, 115 N.W.2d 540, 544 (1962).
Even one who takes possession innocently through mistake satisfies the
hostile intent element if he occupies the land to the exclusion of the true
owner. Northwoods Dev. Corp. v.
Klement, 24 Wis.2d 387, 393, 129 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1964). "Open and notorious" use of the
land means that the adverse claim is open and obvious both as to the fact of
possession and its real adverse character so as to apprise the owner of the
possessor's intent to usurp control. See
Allie v. Russo, 88 Wis.2d 334, 343-44, 276 N.W.2d 730, 735
(1979). "Exclusive use" must
be of such a nature as to give notice of the adverse possessor's exclusive
dominion to the owner or the public. Id.
at 336, 276 N.W.2d at 736. "Continuous
physical possession" for the statutory twenty years may be met by
activities that are seasonal in character and that correspond with the natural
uses of the particular property. Laabs
v. Bolger, 25 Wis.2d 17, 23, 130 N.W.2d 270, 274 (1964). Here, the Kojis family occupied the disputed
strip with a part of their cottage and an outhouse, planted and maintained a
row of trees and placed a marker that sufficiently showed the Kurtz family and
the Rosnows that they believed they owned the property up to the tree line.
The Rosnows argue that
they engaged in activities that are inconsistent with the Kojises' ownership of
the disputed property. They placed
fieldstone in the disputed area, trimmed trees, and installed sewer pipe in the
disputed area. All of these activities
occurred after the twenty-year limitation set out in § 893.25, Stats., had expired. The Rosnows presented no witnesses to
counter the Kojises' evidence of adverse possession from approximately 1950 to
1970. Even after the Rosnows purchased
Lot 2, but before the survey disclosed the true boundary, the activities of the
Rosnows in the disputed area were not sufficient to interrupt the Kojis
family's continuous exclusive use of the property. The explanations of Gwen Rosnow's mowing habits are consistent
with common sense and reasonable neighborliness and do not indicate any belief
that the boundary to Lot 2 extended beyond the tree line.
Finally, the boundary
line chosen by the trial court is sufficiently clear and supported by the record. The court accepted a line drawn by a witness
on a map demonstrating the witness's understanding of the boundary from the
time he was a child. Because the line
of trees was not perfectly straight, any line drawn by the court would have
been subject to the same criticism. The
finding that the red line drawn on exhibit 1 is "very close to where
everybody thought [the boundary] was" is supported by adequate evidence
and constitutes an equitable resolution of this boundary dispute.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.