COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED April 4, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0605
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
J. P. MACH, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WAYNE STEWART, d/b/a
CIRCLE S. FARMS,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Portage County:
JOHN V. FINN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Gartzke, P.J., and Dykman, J.
PER
CURIAM. J. P. Mach, Inc., appeals from an order
dismissing his complaint against Wayne Stewart. The issue is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over
Stewart, a Florida resident. We review
the question as a matter of law and decide it without deference to the trial
court. Marsh v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 179 Wis.2d 42, 51, 505 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Ct. App. 1993). We reach the same conclusion as the trial
court, however, and therefore affirm.
Mach is a potato
wholesaler headquartered in Wisconsin.
Stewart grows potatoes commercially on his 300-acre farm in
Florida. Through telephone and fax
communications, Stewart contracted to sell Mach some potatoes, which Mach would
pick up at the farm. Mach commenced
this action, in Wisconsin, when Stewart allegedly failed to deliver under the
contracts.
During the course of
negotiations, Stewart called Mach officials in Wisconsin on several
occasions. On occasion he called other
Wisconsin potato dealers as well. He
signed the three contracts at issue in this case while in Florida, and faxed
them to Wisconsin. Mach asserts
jurisdiction in Wisconsin solely on these contacts, as Stewart admittedly had
no other connection to this state.
Stewart lacks the
requisite contacts with this state to establish jurisdiction. Mach contends that the telephone and fax
contacts are sufficient under any one of three jurisdictional statutes: §
801.05(1)(d), Stats. (local
presence or status); § 801.05(4), Stats.
(local injury: foreign act); and § 801.05(5)(e), Stats. (local services, goods or contracts). We disagree. For the court to have had jurisdiction under § 801.05(1)(d),
Stewart must have engaged in substantial activities here at the time the action
was commenced. Sub-Zero Freezer
Co. v. R. J. Clarkson Co., 159 Wis.2d 230, 234, 464 N.W.2d
52, 54 (Ct. App. 1990). However, there
is no evidence that Stewart conducted any business with Wisconsin dealers for a
year and one-half before commencement of this action. Nor can Mach assert jurisdiction under § 801.05(4) because
that section is limited to tort actions.
Nagel v. Crain Cutter Co., 50 Wis.2d 638, 643, 184 N.W.2d
876, 878 (1971). Finally,
§ 801.05(5)(e) does not convey jurisdiction unless the resident plaintiff
receives goods of value from the nonresident defendant. Capitol Fixture & Woodworking
Group v. Woodma Distrib., 147 Wis.2d 157, 161, 432 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Ct.
App. 1988). The only thing Mach
received from Stewart were faxed contracts.
Those were not things of value under the statute.
Our decision that none
of the statutory grounds for jurisdiction exist makes it unnecessary to
determine whether a Wisconsin proceeding would violate Stewart's due process
rights.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.