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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED SEPTEMBER 6, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0581
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
JASON LIEDER, by his
Guardian ad Litem
TIMOTHY B. MELMS,
PETER LIEDER, and
BARBARA LIEDER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Plaintiff,
v.
TIMOTHY STANFIELD,
FRED
STANFIELD, and MARYANN
STANFIELD,
Defendants,
GERMANTOWN MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent,
BENEFIT TRUST LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Nominal-Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Oneida County:
ROBERT E. KINNEY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Jason Lieder appeals a summary judgment
dismissing his action against Germantown Mutual Insurance Company. Lieder was injured when Germantown's
insured, Timothy Stanfield, struck him with a tire iron causing injury to his
face and head. The trial court
concluded that the insurance policy did not provide coverage for Stanfield's
intentional act. Lieder argues that
outstanding issues of material fact preclude summary judgment because
Stanfield's intent remains at issue. He
also argues that Stanfield's parents were negligent in supervising their
son. We reject these arguments and
affirm the judgment.
The supporting papers,
construed in the light most favorable to coverage, establish that Stanfield
believed his car had been vandalized by Lieder. After reporting the incident to the police, Stanfield got a tire
iron out of the trunk and drove around in search of Lieder. When Stanfield found Lieder standing on a
corner with some friends, he got out of the car and approached Lieder holding
the tire iron. Lieder pushed Stanfield
and Stanfield swung at and hit Lieder in the arm with the tire iron. Stanfield again swung at Lieder, hitting him
in the head. Stanfield's affidavit
states that he swung at Lieder's body, and only struck him in the head because
Lieder ducked.
Intent to cause injury
exists where the actor subjectively intends to cause injury or where injury is
substantially certain to occur from the actor's conduct. Gouger v. Hardtke, 167 Wis.2d
504, 512, 482 N.W.2d 84, 88 (1992). As
long as the actor intends to inflict personal injury, the requisite intent is
established even though the actor did not intend the particular injury that
occurred. Pachucki v. Republic
Ins. Co., 89 Wis.2d 703, 712, 278 N.W.2d 898, 903 (1979). Stanfield struck Lieder several times. He never claimed to be acting in
self-defense. He pled guilty to
criminal charges of aggravated battery and intentionally causing bodily harm to
a child,[1]
both of which have an element of intent.
See §§ 940.19(2) and 948.03(2)(b), Stats. From this
evidence, the trial court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of
material fact or competing inferences regarding Stanfield's intent and that
summary judgment was appropriate. See
Tomilson v. Mid-America Life Ins., 168 Wis.2d 92, 95, 483 N.W.2d
234, 236 (Ct. App. 1992).
Stanfield's parents were
not negligent in supervising their sixteen-year-old son as a matter of
law. At the time Lieder was injured,
Stanfield's parents believed he was at the movies. They did not consent to his actions, nor were they aware that he
was planning to search for Lieder and injure him. They did not know, or have reason to know, of Stanfield's
probable conduct. Under these
circumstances, Stanfield's parents are not negligent as a matter of law. See Bankert v. Threshermens
Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis.2d 469, 474, 329 N.W.2d 150, 152 (1983).
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.