COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED July 27, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0533
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
THOMAS R. KELSO,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Dane County:
ROBERT DeCHAMBEAU,
Judge. Affirmed.
EICH, C.J.[1] Thomas Kelso appeals from an order declaring
his refusal to submit to a test of his blood-alcohol content to be unjustified
and revoking his driving privileges for one year.
He raises a single
issue: whether the trial court erred in determining that Kelso had been placed
under arrest prior to being requested to submit to testing. We see no error and affirm the order.
The facts are not in
dispute and were brought forth through the testimony of the arresting officer,
Middleton Police Officer Michael Ash, at the hearing on Kelso's refusal to
permit his breath to be tested.
Ash stopped Kelso's car
in the early morning hours of August 16, 1994, after observing that the car's
taillights were not working. Kelso
stumbled and fell twice upon leaving the vehicle, and Ash noted that his breath
had the odor of intoxicants, his speech was slurred and his eyes were
bloodshot. Kelso acknowledged consuming
intoxicants that evening.
Ash asked Kelso to
perform several field sobriety tests.
Attempting to recite the alphabet, Kelso slurred the letters and swayed
back and forth. He could not follow
Ash's instructions with respect to the "horizontal gaze" test, and
stumbled while attempting to perform the "heel-to-toe" walking
test.
The prosecutor asked Ash
what he did after administering the sobriety tests to Kelso, and Ash responded:
"At that point I arrested Mr. Kelso for operating while
intoxicated." Kelso's counsel
objected and moved to strike the answer, arguing that whether a person is
"arrested" is "a matter of objective fact not [] the officer's
opinion." The court overruled the
objection, stating that while the testimony "may not be particularly
relevant," it would be allowed "as a foundational question as to what
he did."
Ash then testified that
he proceeded to handcuff Kelso, placed him in the squad car (having to overcome
Kelso's resistance to do so) and took him to the Middleton police station where
he issued him a citation for driving while intoxicated, contrary to a Middleton
ordinance enacted in conformity with the state drunk-driving statute,
§ 346.63(1)(a), Stats. Ash then advised Kelso of his rights
and obligations under the implied consent law, giving him a copy of the
form. Finally, when Ash asked him to
submit to a chemical test of his breath, Kelso refused.
At the conclusion of the
hearing, Kelso argued that § 343.305(3), Stats.,
requires that a defendant be placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated
before he or she may be asked to submit to a chemical test for blood-alcohol
content,[2]
and that the evidence--particularly Ash's conclusory testimony--was
insufficient to establish that fact.
The trial court disagreed, concluding that, under the totality of the
circumstances, an arrest within the meaning of the statute had occurred. We agree.
Kelso's argument on
appeal may be summarized as follows: (1) under § 343.305, Stats., the state must prove at a
refusal hearing that the officer arrested the defendant for violation of the
drunk driving laws; (2) Ash's statement at the hearing that he had
"arrested" Kelso is insufficient to establish that such an arrest had
occurred;[3]
and (3) the state failed to establish compliance with § 343.305(3)
because there was no evidence that Ash had specifically informed Kelso that he
was being arrested "for drunk driving" (or some "equivalent
communication"), although he had handcuffed him and taken him to the
police station.
Explaining the basis for
the argument, Kelso states in his brief:
Absent
such a showing [that he was told he was under arrest for drunk driving], the
defendant could not know that the provisions of the Implied Consent Law applied
to him. Thus, [he] could not know that
he was legally obligated, in fact, to submit to testing, both frustrating the purpose
of the [law] and sandbagging the defendant by giving him a lesser incentive
than is legally required to submit to testing.
Determining from the
undisputed facts whether an arrest has been made is a question of law which we
review ab initio, owing no deference to the trial court's decision. State v. Swanson, 164 Wis.2d
437, 445, 475 N.W.2d 148, 152 (1991).
And we employ an objective test in making that determination:
The standard ... is whether a reasonable person
in the defendant's position would have considered himself or herself to be
"in custody," given the degree of restraint under the
circumstances. The circumstances of the
situation[,] including what has been communicated by the police officers,
either by their words or actions, shall be controlling under the objective
test.
Id. at
446-47, 475 N.W.2d at 152 (citations omitted).
The issue in Swanson
was whether the defendant, Swanson, had been arrested so as to justify a charge
of escape from custody. Two police
officers had observed Swanson drive onto a sidewalk and stopped his car. While his physical coordination and speech
appeared normal, there was an odor of intoxicants about Swanson's person, and
the officers asked him to perform some field sobriety tests. As he approached the squad car, one of the
officers performed a pat-down search, discovering a bag of marijuana in his
pocket. At that point, the officers
received an emergency radio call, arrested Swanson for possession of marijuana,
placed him in the squad car and took off on the emergency call. When they reached the scene and were dealing
with the emergency, Swanson fled.
Swanson moved to dismiss
the escape charge on grounds that he was not legally in custody at the time he
left the squad car--and that issue depended on whether he had been placed under
arrest prior to the pat-down search.[4] The trial court granted the motion and the
supreme court affirmed, concluding that "a reasonable person in Swanson's
position would not have believed that he was under arrest or in legal custody
prior to the search ...." Id.
at 448, 475 N.W.2d at 153. The court
grounded its decision on the fact that all Swanson had been asked to do prior
to the search was to perform some field sobriety tests (which never were
administered); and, additionally, that he had never been informed that he was
under arrest and the officers had not employed any force or threats prior to
the search. Id. at 448,
475 N.W.2d at 153.
In this case, Kelso
maintains that he had to have been under arrest prior to being asked to submit
to a breath test at the Middleton police station. By that time, the following events had occurred: (1) he had been asked
to perform several field sobriety tests (and failed them); (2) he was
handcuffed and placed in the squad car, physically resisting the officers'
efforts to do so; (3) he was taken to the police station and issued a citation
indicating that he was being charged with "operating while intoxicated"
in violation of a Middleton ordinance adopting § 346.63(1)(a), Stats., and (4) he had been read and
provided with an "Informing the Accused" form indicating that, under
the implied consent law, he was deemed to have consented to a chemical test for
the purpose of "determin[ing] the presence or quantity of alcohol or other
drugs in [his] blood or breath."
On those facts, it
matters not that Kelso was never orally informed by the officers that he was
under arrest for driving while intoxicated.
First, he was so informed in writing by the issuance of the
citation. Second, under the totality of
the circumstances in the case it cannot be said that a reasonable person in
Kelso's position would not have known he had been arrested for that offense
prior to being asked to submit to the test.[5]
By the Court.--Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)4, Stats.
Upon arrest of a person for violation of s. 346.63(1) ... or a local ordinance in conformity therewith ... a law enforcement officer may request the person to provide one or more samples of his or her breath, blood or urine for [testing] ....
[3] The state acknowledges, and we agree, that under the "objective test" for determining the existence of an arrest adopted in State v. Swanson, 164 Wis.2d 437, 446, 447, 475 N.W.2d 148, 152 (1991), a case we discuss in more detail below, the officer's "subjective understanding[]" or "unarticulated plan" is "irrelevant in determining the question ...." Instead, as in this case, we must look to what the officer communicated to the defendant by words or actions, and whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would consider himself or herself in custody. Id.
[4] The analysis proceeds as follows: (1) whether Swanson was legally in custody so as to support the escape charge depended on the validity of his arrest for possession of marijuana; (2) his arrest for marijuana possession depended, in turn, on the validity of the pat-down search in which the marijuana was found; (3) the pat-down search could be valid only if Swanson had previously been placed under arrest for drunk driving or some other offense; and (4) because, under the facts of the case, Swanson had not been placed under arrest prior to the search, the charge must be dismissed.
[5] We note that Kelso was informed of his arrest by the citation and the form containing all necessary information as to his rights with respect to testing. The form was read to him by the officers and he was given a copy of it. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the form to fulfill its purpose of "informing the accused."