COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 28, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0507
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
JOEL E. BOHRINGER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL J. BOHRINGER,
Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
WAUKESHA STATE BANK,
Third Party Defendant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Grant County:
GEORGE S. CURRY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman and Vergeront, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Daniel J. Bohringer appeals from a judgment
declaring Joel E. Bohringer the owner of a disputed one-half acre parcel. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court's
findings of fact in support of the judgment are clearly erroneous. See § 805.17(2), Stats.
Because we conclude that they are not, we affirm.
The parties are brothers
and the disputed property was once the family homestead. In 1984, Joel purchased it and a separate
twenty-acre parcel from his sister. For
the next several years, Daniel testified that he frequently visited the
property and invested substantial time and effort in repairing the homestead,
which had fallen into ruin. As a result
of his efforts, the one-half acre parcel increased in value from nothing to
$3,000, according to a Grant County tax assessor.
Joel commenced this
action in 1991 to evict Daniel from the renovated premises after Daniel began
staying there from time to time. Daniel
defended and counterclaimed on the grounds that he owned the property. As proof, he produced a quitclaim deed
signed by Joel dated April 25, 1988, giving him title to the twenty-acre
parcel. He testified that the one-half
acre parcel was omitted by mistake and asserted that the deed should be
reformed to award him both parcels.
Joel testified that he
never intended to convey either parcel and did not know how his signature got
on the document, although he admitted that it was his signature. The trial court found that the parties
intended the deed to be "an equitable deed of trust as security for the
repayment of the $3,000 Daniel invested in the property." The court also found that the parties
intended that the deed include both parcels.
The resulting judgment allowed Joel clear title to both parcels once he
paid Daniel the $3,000.
Both Daniel and Joel
appealed. We held on appeal that the
quitclaim deed conveyed only the twenty-acre parcel to Daniel. We then remanded for a determination whether
the deed should be equitably reformed under § 706.04, Stats., to convey the one-half acre
parcel to Daniel as well. Bohringer
v. Bohringer, No. 92-2591, unpublished slip op. at 4-5 (Wis. Ct. App.
Feb. 10, 1994) (Bohringer I).
On remand, the trial
court found that there was no credible evidence that Joel ever intended that
the quitclaim deed convey the one-half acre parcel. The court also concluded that equitable considerations did not
favor Daniel's claim. Accordingly, Joel
received quiet title to the property.
In order for a real
estate transaction to be reformed and made enforceable under § 706.04, Stats., the claimant must prove by
clear and satisfactory evidence that the grantor or grantors assented to
it. Nelson v. Albrechtson,
93 Wis.2d 552, 561, 287 N.W.2d 811, 816 (1980). The trial court resolved that issue in Joel's favor, based on his
testimony that he never intended to transfer the parcel. That credibility determination is not
subject to review. Leciejewski v.
Sedlak, 116 Wis.2d 629, 637, 342 N.W.2d 734, 738 (1984). Our deference to it renders it impossible to
hold the court's finding on intent clearly erroneous.
Daniel points out that
the trial court's finding on Joel's intent contradicts its finding on that
issue in the decision we reversed in Bohringer I. Daniel contends that the court could not
later change its finding having once ruled that Joel intended to transfer both
parcels. However, when we reversed the
court's decision in Bohringer I, we necessarily set aside the
findings that supported that decision.
Nothing, therefore, prevented the court from re-evaluating the evidence
and reconsidering its initial findings on remand.
Because we affirm the
trial court's finding on Joel's intent, and because that finding precludes
relief under § 706.04, Stats.,
we need not review the court's alternative grounds for denying relief.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.