COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED NOVEMBER 21, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0393
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
INSURANCE SERVICES OF
WAUSAU, INC.,
a Wisconsin
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S & S INSURANCE
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Marathon County:
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. S & S Insurance Services, Inc., appeals a judgment
that awarded Insurance Services of Wausau, Inc., $54,658.19 for breach of
contract, plus $13,317.72 prejudgment interest, after a trial by jury. S & S contracted to sell some of its insurance
agency accounts to ISW. Their Asset Purchase
Agreement (APA) contained a formula to determine the sales price, setting it at
a multiple of the annual commission rate on policies in effect on the closing
date. The parties essentially agreed
that they intended this to mean the actual commissions received from September
1, 1988 to August 31, 1989, on the policies that were in effect on October 1,
1989, the planned closing date. On the
actual closing date, October 16, 1989, the parties executed a Certificate of
Agreed Upon Purchase Price. This
document changed the operative date to October 16, 1989, for determining which
policies went into the APA's sales price formula; it also set the sales price
at $185,329.59 "as of" October 16, 1989. When ISW discovered sometime later that some policies it
initially used in the APA's sales price formula had actually not been yielding
ISW any commissions on October 16, 1989, it sued S & S for the difference
between the certificate's $185,329.59 fixed sales price and $130,671.40, the
amount ISW now recomputed as the correct sales price under the APA's formula.
S & S did not file
motions after verdict. It therefore
submits nearly all its appellate issues in terms of the interest of justice
under § 752.35, Stats. S & S offers several arguments why we
should exercise our discretionary power to reverse the judgment: (1) the certificate's fixed sales price
superseded the APA's formula sales price, thereby setting the final sales price
for the accounts, not only by virtue of the APA's and the certificate's plain
terms, but also by virtue of a ruling we issued in an earlier appeal that had
become law of the case; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that
it could elect to consider the two documents as one contract, depending on the
evidence; (3) the trial court should have instructed the jury that both parties
must assent to a contract; (4) the trial court violated the parol evidence rule
by allowing extrinsic evidence to contradict unambiguous contracts; and (5) the
evidence required an instruction on the duty fact finders have to construe
ambiguous documents against the drafter.
Outside the framework of its interest of justice argument, S & S
argues that the trial court erroneously awarded ISW prejudgment interest. We reject these arguments and affirm the
judgment.
Although we have the
discretionary power to reverse judgments in the interests of justice, we
exercise an extremely limited review in such appeals. We may reverse the judgment if the trial court proceedings did
not try the real controversy or if they produced a miscarriage of justice. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Wales,
138 Wis.2d 508, 517, 406 N.W.2d 426, 430 (1987). These tests are disjunctive.
State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis.2d 388, 401, 424 N.W.2d 672,
677 (1988). We may not reverse under
the miscarriage justice prong unless we also conclude that the result was
likely wrong. Id. at
400-01, 424 N.W.2d at 676-77. We may
reverse under the real controversy prong without examining the probability of a
different result so long as the trial court proceedings denied the jury a fair
opportunity to decide the case by wrongly admitting or excluding important
evidence. Id. Here, most of S & S's arguments deal
with the miscarriage of justice prong; only one deals with the real controversy
prong. After reviewing the record, we
are satisfied that a reasonable jury that considered the credible evidence
would not reach a different result on retrial.
A new jury on retrial would not likely find that the parties intended
the certificate's fixed sales price to supersede the APA's formula sales
price.
S & S has not
definitively shown that the parties intended the certificate's fixed sales
price to supersede the APA's formula sales price. First, the certificate itself was somewhat vague as to its
purpose; it does not expressly state that the parties intended its fixed sales
price to supersede the formula sales price.
In fact, it restates the formula from the APA, clarifies the closing
date, and sets $185,329.59 as the sales price "as of" October 16,
1989, the new closing date. At a
minimum, the use of the expression "as of" implied that the fixed
sales price was a provisional figure in the nature of a base point. Second, the weight of the other evidence did
not decisively show that the parties intended the certificate's inclusion of a
fixed sales price to resolve the sales price once and for all. Rather, the evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, permitted an inference that the parties intended the
certificate to serve as nothing more than a stopgap, best estimate of the sales
price "as of" October 16, 1989 closing date, with the final sales
price remaining dependent on an accurate inventory of the active polices in
ISW's accounts and on an accurate application of the sales price formula to
that inventory. Under these
circumstances, we see no likelihood that a retrial would produce a different
result. We now address S & S's
remaining miscarriage of justice arguments to show that they do not alter this
basic conclusion.
We first reject S &
S's argument that the trial court improperly gave the jury the option, rather
than the obligation, to consider the APA and the certificate as two parts of an
integrated contract. First, as we noted
above, the credible evidence did not decisively establish S & S's view of
the certificate; it permitted an inference that the certificate's fixed sales
price did not represent the final sales price.
This left the jury freedom to consider the certificate in its proper
perspective. Second, our prior decision
did not declare the certificate to be a significant aspect of the parties'
overall agreement. In reversing a
summary judgment ruling, we held only that the certificate might have relevance
and that its potential relevance barred summary judgment; our ruling rested on
the assessment that the summary judgment proceedings produced insufficient
information to decisively resolve the matter.
As a result, the trial court properly instructed the jury that, as the
fact finder, it had the duty to determine whether the parties intended separate
writings to form an integrated contract.
The trial court also reasonably addressed a related issue when it
declined to instruct the jury that the parties' contract required mutual assent
for validity. The trial court covered
the same overall concept in terms of intent; it ordered the jury to determine
whether the parties intended the two writings to form an integrated contract.
We also reject S &
S's argument that the trial court should have instructed the jury to construe
the APA against ISW, who S & S alleges drafted it. First, S & S participated in the APA's
preparation and therefore cannot transfer sole responsibility for the
document's contents to ISW. Such facts
do not create an inference that ISW included ambiguities in the APA in order to
take advantage of S & S.
Second, courts give that instruction when the one party has disparate
bargaining power over the other. Goebel
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 83 Wis.2d 668, 675, 266 N.W.2d
352, 356 (1978). Here, the parties'
bargaining powers were comparable, each having knowledge of and experience in
the insurance business. Third, the
evidence itself neutralized the inference that the instruction might have
otherwise suggested. S & S insists
that if the jury construed the APA against ISW, then the jury would have to
resort to the certificate's fixed sales price to reach the correct sales
price. But the evidence itself
permitted an inference that the parties intended the APA's sales price formula
to control the sales price and intended the certificate to provide merely a
stopgap, modifiable base point, for temporarily implementing the formula, until
the parties learned what insurance polices actually remained active in ISW's
accounts on the closing date. Under
these circumstances, the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury that
ISW's status as the APA drafter made the certificate's fixed sales price
controlling.
We also reject the one
claim S & S raises that arguably implicates the real controversy
prong. According to S & S, the way
that the trial court tried the case effectively allowed the parties to
improperly alter unambiguous documents, the APA and the certificate, with
extrinsic parol evidence, including expert testimony on the meaning of the
documents. Read together, the terms of
the documents left conflicting inferences on what controlled the final sales
price. Second, S & S's argument
also mischaracterizes the nature of the trial evidence. As we noted above, S & S has never
decisively shown that the parties intended the certificate's fixed sales price
to override the APA's sales price formula; the evidence permitted an inference
that the certificate's fixed sales price was a stopgap, modifiable base point,
which the parties intended to later change when they acquired additional
information about the policies. In sum,
the trial court correctly admitted extrinsic evidence to help the jury
determine the parties' intent, without violating the parol evidence rule.
Finally, the trial court
correctly awarded ISW prejudgment interest.
Courts award such interest for reasonably ascertainable, measurable and
computable claims. See Dahl
v. Housing Authority for the City of Madison, 54 Wis.2d 22, 31, 194
N.W.2d 618, 622-23 (1972). ISW's claim
met this standard. This was not a case
of intangible matters. ISW had a claim
directly tied to the tangible results of the business' operations. Once ISW had identified the policies still
active in its accounts on October 16, 1989, and the commissions they yielded,
ISW could compute the transaction's correct sales price by application of the
sales price formula to the newly available information. This made ISW's claim sufficiently
ascertainable and fixed in amount to justify an award of prejudgment
interest. The fact that the parties'
contract set the sales price figure in terms of a floating number, rather than
a fixed one, did not render ISW's claim nonascertainable for purposes of
prejudgment interest; the parties' contract precisely fixed the rate at which
the operation's revenues influenced the sales price, and its precision on this
matter made ISW's final claim a simple matter of tallying and inventorying the
active accounts, with reference to a specified date. As a result, ISW had a valid claim for prejudgment interest.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.