COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
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No. 95-0325
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
BARB COMPANY,
a Wisconsin General
Partnership Consisting
of RONALD S. ROG
and CAROLYN ANN HUSS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
AMERICAN STATES
INSURANCE COMPANY,
an Indiana Insurance
Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Outagamie County:
DEE R. DYER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Barb Company and its owners, Ronald Rog and Carolyn
Huss, appeal a judgment dismissing their action to recover the proceeds of a
fire insurance policy. The jury found
that someone acting on behalf of Rog and Huss intentionally set the fire that
destroyed their auto supply business equipment and inventory. They argue that the verdict is not supported
by the evidence and that the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay evidence
at trial. We conclude that the evidence
supports the verdict and that the court erred when it allowed hearsay
testimony, but the error was harmless.
Barb concedes that the
evidence supports the jury's finding that the fire was intentionally
started. The jury heard expert
testimony that a liquid substance had burned on the floor near the front of the
store and that a laboratory found gasoline in the flooring samples. The jury found that Rog and Huss did not
personally start the fire, but that someone acting at their request or
direction set the fire. Barb contends
that the jury must have considered the substantial evidence of motive and
engaged in speculation that the owners were somehow involved in starting the
fire. Barb argues that no witness or
exhibit provided a nexus between either of the owners and the arsonist.
Sufficient evidence
supports the jury's findings. In
addition to the evidence establishing that the fire was caused by arson and
that the owners had a strong financial motive for destroying the business, the
jury heard evidence that the owners had exclusive access to the premises at the
time of the fire. Huss, her mother, and
a customer left the store together at 7 p.m.
They did not see or smell anything unusual at the time they exited and
locked the building. They left the
parking lot in separate cars at 7:05 p.m.
The fire was first seen between 7:10 and 7:14. A neighbor phoned the fire department at 7:15. By that time, the area around the front
window was aflame. By 7:19, when the
fire department arrived, the building was locked and fully engulfed in
flames. Rog, Huss and one employe had
all of the keys to the building. In
light of the short time in which the arsonist could spread the gasoline and
start the fire, along with the testimony that the building was securely locked
minutes before the fire, the jury could reasonably infer that only the owners
or their employe had access to the building at the time the fire was
started. We must sustain the jury's
verdict because it is supported by evidence the jury had the right to believe
and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. See Fehring v. Republic Ins.
Co., 118 Wis.2d 299, 305-06, 347 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1984).
The trial court erred
when it allowed the testimony of Stephen Hoyle recounting an experiment
performed at his request by an engineer in another city. Barb contended that the fire was started by
a coffeemaker at the back of the store that the witnesses do not recall turning
off. Hoyle called an unidentified
engineer in Kenosha who set up a coffeemaker and put an empty glass pot on
it. After one-half hour, the engineer
told Hoyle that the temperature had reached only 240 degrees. The results of the experiment conducted by
the Kenosha engineer are hearsay. The
trial court allowed Hoyle to testify regarding this experiment citing
§ 907.03, Stats., which
allows an expert to base his opinion on hearsay information. Although § 907.03 allows the admission
of an expert's opinion even though it is based on hearsay, the hearsay itself
is not admissible if offered to prove the truth of the matter. See State v. Weber, 174
Wis.2d 98, 107, 496 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 1973).
Nonetheless, we conclude
that the error in admitting Hoyle's testimony was harmless. This court must disregard an evidentiary
error unless it affects a substantial right of a party. See §§ 805.18(1) and 901.03(1), Stats.
The theory that the fire was accidentally caused by the coffeemaker was
discredited without resort to the objectionable hearsay evidence. The fire was seen near the front of the
store shortly after it started. An
electrical engineer who examined the wiring in the store concluded that the
coffeepot could not have been the cause of the fire because it was not
energized at the time the fire got to it.
The coffeepot theory does not account for the presence of gasoline in
the carpet or the speed with which the fire spread. None of the witnesses reported observing the smell of burnt
coffee before they left the building minutes before the fire. Finally, Hoyle's admissible testimony regarding
the burn pattern refutes the suggestion that the fire originated near the
coffee machine.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.