COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED February 20, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 95-0011
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
PREDCO, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FIRST BANK SOUTHEAST,
N.A.,
Defendant-Respondent.
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PREDCO, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FIRST BANK SOUTHEAST,
N.A.,
and DEAN BECK,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL D. GUOLEE, Judge. Affirmed
in part; reversed in part and cause remanded.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Fine and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. This appeal results from two intransigent litigants
making their respective bad business decisions worse. Predco, Incorporated was called upon to comply with an
unconditional guaranty for a business it had divested itself of without
obtaining a release of the guaranty.
First Bank Southeast, N.A., formerly Kenosha National Bank, agreed to
serve as trustee of an industrial bond issue that went sour. Predco relies upon aggressive litigation to
pursue its ends. First Bank has
exercised self-help attachment of money under its control.
In this particular
appeal, Predco appeals from an order granting summary judgment to First Bank
and Dean Beck. The order dismissed
Predco's claims for return of any surplus funds Predco paid First Bank to
satisfy an earlier judgment and for funds recovered by First Bank as expenses
in a bankruptcy proceeding. In
addition, the order Predco appeals from declared that First Bank had a first
lien against funds the bank received on behalf of bondholders from the
bankruptcy. The lien is for past and
future attorney fees and litigation expenses flowing from the bankrupt's
default on the repayment of the bonds. The
trial court did not review any of the amounts claimed by First Bank or
determine the amount of First Bank's lien.
On appeal, Predco
contends that claim preclusion bars First Bank from recovering additional
monies from Predco; that the doctrine of subrogation allows Predco to recover a
portion of the funds it previously paid First Bank to satisfy a judgment the
bank had against Predco; that the doctrines of claim preclusion and subrogation
entitle Predco to the funds First Bank received from the bankruptcy; and that
the trial court erred when it dismissed Predco's claims against Beck.
We reject Predco's claim
that it is entitled to recover either any surplus funds paid on the earlier
judgment or the funds First Bank received from the LTV bankruptcy for its own
expenses. While we agree that First
Bank has a first lien on the funds received on behalf of bondholders, we
conclude that the lien is not as extensive as First Bank argues. Further, the trial court must determine the
actual amount of the lien. Therefore,
we affirm the order in part and reverse in part, and we remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
FACTS
As all the filings in
this case recite, this dispute has a lengthy history. In 1978, Wilton, Iowa, issued industrial revenue bonds to finance
the construction of a production facility for Precision Steel Company - Iowa, a
subsidiary of Predco. First Bank[1]
agreed to serve as trustee. Precision
Steel was to pay the bonds, and Predco guaranteed Precision Steel's
obligations. The respective rights and
obligations of the parties were detailed in a loan agreement between Wilton and
Precision Steel, an indenture of trust between Wilton and First Bank, and a
guaranty agreement between Predco and First Bank.
In 1981, Predco sold
Precision Steel to Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc., a subsidiary of LTV
Corporation. In July 1986, LTV and its
affiliated companies, including the successor to Precision Steel, filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. First
Bank filed two claims in the LTV bankruptcy, one on behalf of the bondholders
and one for its own expenses arising from the default on the bond
obligation.
First Bank also demanded
that Predco honor its guaranty obligations, which Predco refused to do. First Bank filed suit in federal court to
enforce the guaranty in 1988, obtained a judgment in 1989 and a supplemental
judgment in 1992 (collectively, "federal judgment"), and ultimately
collected the judgments in 1992. The
federal judgment was for principle and interest owed to bondholders, attorney
fees and costs incurred in the litigation on the guaranty through 1992, and
attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the LTV bankruptcy through
1989. The federal judgment also earned
post-judgment interest. In part because
the interest rate on the federal judgment exceeded the interest rate on the
bonds, First Bank received $207,745.40 more than it paid to bondholders. The amount of $55,805.58 was interest, and
the remainder was reimbursement for attorney fees and expenses. In December 1992, Predco filed suit to
recover this alleged "surplus judgment" of $55,805.58.[2]
After paying the
judgment against it, Predco filed a motion in the LTV bankruptcy for transfer
of First Bank's claims to Predco. The
bankruptcy court denied the request, not because it determined that Predco was
not entitled to the claims, but because the dispute did not affect the
bankruptcy proceeding itself. The
bankruptcy judge held that the dispute would be better resolved in state
court.
A plan of reorganization
was finally approved in the LTV bankruptcy in 1993. On the claim submitted on behalf of the bondholders, First Bank
received $312,526.00 and two classes of securities. Conceding that Predco has an interest in this payment based upon
subrogation, First Bank nonetheless claims a first lien against the cash
received. The lien secures unreimbursed
expenses First Bank has or will incur because of the default on the bonds. First Bank contends that the secured
expenses include the litigation expenses incurred in the present case and any
related future litigation Predco may file.
Although First Bank transferred the securities to Predco, it has refused
to transfer any of the cash payment without a full release of all liabilities
from Predco.
On its claim for
administrative expenses, First Bank submitted a claim of $303,223.82 in the LTV
bankruptcy. According to the summary
judgment materials, this claim included all expenses actually incurred through
April 15, 1993, and additional expenses estimated to June 30, 1993. LTV accepted First Bank's claim, but reduced
it by the $207,745.40 First Bank received under the federal judgment that was
not paid to bondholders. First Bank
received the difference, $95,478.42, in cash.
In August 1993, Predco
filed suit to recover the proceeds of the bankruptcy claims from First
Bank. In addition, Predco named Dean
Beck, a trust officer with First Bank, as a defendant. The suit was consolidated with the
litigation for the "surplus judgment," and Predco filed an amended
complaint claiming subrogation, breach of contract, conversion, unjust
enrichment/constructive trust, and negligence.
In its answer, First Bank filed a counterclaim seeking a judgment
declaring that it had a continuing first lien on the proceeds from the LTV
bankruptcy for fees and expenses it incurred as trustee as a result of the
default on the bonds.
The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motions of
First Bank and Beck. Although First
Bank repeatedly described Predco's claims as frivolous, both in briefs filed
with the trial court and on appeal, First Bank did not seek a finding that the
claims or appeal were frivolous.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING CLAIMS
AGAINST FIRST BANK
Before addressing the
specific claims made by Predco, it is necessary to set forth the legal
principles that govern the issues raised by Predco's claims against First
Bank. Essentially, Predco contends that
by subrogation it is entitled to an alleged "surplus judgment." Predco also contends that the principles of
merger and claim preclusion, or res judicata, bar First Bank from
recovering additional money from Predco.
Conversely, First Bank claims that the trust indenture gave it an
open-ended right to recover all expenses of collection caused by the default on
the bonds, including the expenses of defending against Predco's claims. Therefore, this appeal involves the
doctrines of subrogation, merger, and claim preclusion, as well as our
standards of review for contract interpretation and summary judgment.
Subrogation is an
equitable action that may be applied when a party who is secondarily liable
satisfies the debt or obligation of one who bears the primary legal
responsibility for the debt or obligation.
Cunningham v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 Wis.2d 437,
443-44, 360 N.W.2d 33, 36 (1985). When
the party with secondary liability pays the obligation, he or she succeeds to
the rights, or "steps into the shoes," of the party who was
paid. Id. at 444, 360
N.W.2d at 36. The purpose of
subrogation is to place the ultimate loss on the party primarily responsible
and to avoid unjust enrichment to that party.
Id. Subrogation
arises by operation of law ("equitable subrogation") or by contract
("conventional subrogation").
Id. at 445, 360 N.W.2d at 37.
The party seeking to
prove subrogation has the burden of introducing evidence to establish his or
her claim. Id. at 445-46,
360 N.W.2d at 37. As a general rule,
payment by a guarantor subrogates the guarantor to the rights of the creditor
to whom the guarantor has made payment.
Winter v. Trepte, 234 Wis. 193, 198, 290 N.W. 599, 602
(1940). The subrogation right does not
enlarge or diminish the creditor's rights, however. Employer's Ins. v. Sheedy, 42 Wis.2d 161, 164-65,
166 N.W.2d 220, 222 (1969) (subrogee subject to any defense primary obligor has
against original obligee).
Additionally, because of its equitable nature, subrogation is not
automatically allowed whenever a possible claim for subrogation exists. First National Bank v. Hansen,
84 Wis.2d 422, 429, 267 N.W.2d 367, 370 (1978). Recovery is permitted if the equities favoring the party seeking
subrogation are greater than those of the party seeking to deny it. Id.
Under the doctrine of
merger, a valid, final judgment entered on a contract claim merges the contract
claim into the judgment. Production
Credit Ass'n v. Laufenberg, 143 Wis.2d 200, 205, 420 N.W.2d 778, 779
(Ct. App. 1988). The contract loses
vitality and ceases to bind the parties.
Id. Thereafter,
the party recovering the judgment may only maintain an action on the judgment. Id.
The doctrine of merger
is not without limitation, however.
Rights and advantages given to the judgment creditor in the original
claim may still be preserved, for example, liens imposed on specific properties
or statutory priority rights. Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 18 cmt. g (1982); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 599 at 22-23
(1947). Thus, non-monetary contract
rights in favor of the plaintiff are not destroyed when the plaintiff reduces
the obligation created by the contract to judgment. Aiken v. Bank of Georgia, 113 S.E.2d 405, 407 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1960) (bank's right to set-off granted in notes survived judgment to
collect on notes).
Claim preclusion, or res
judicata, makes a final adjudication on the merits in a prior action a bar
to subsequent actions between the same parties as to all matters that were or
could have been litigated in the earlier action. Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis.2d
541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723, 727 (1995).
For earlier proceedings to bar the present suit under claim preclusion,
three factors must be present. Id.
at 551, 525 N.W.2d at 728. First, there
must be identity between the parties or their privies in both proceedings;
second, there must be identity between the claims in the two proceedings; and
third, there must be a final judgment on the merits in the earlier
proceeding. Id. Identity of claims exists if the claims
arose from the same transaction, incident, or factual situation. Id. at 554, 525 Wis.2d at
729. Therefore, the emphasis is on the
underlying facts and not the number of legal theories that can be developed
from the facts. Id.
Construction of a
contract presents a question of law, and appellate courts need not defer to the
trial court's interpretation. Waukesha
Concrete Prod. Co. v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 127 Wis.2d 332, 339, 379
N.W.2d 333, 336 (Ct. App. 1985). The
court's objective when construing a contract is to ascertain the intent of the
parties from the contract language. Id. A basic tenet of contract construction is
that the court should select a construction that gives effect to each word or
provision of the contract. Jones
v. Jenkins, 88 Wis.2d 712, 722, 277 N.W.2d 815, 819 (1979). Similarly, the meaning of a particular
contract provision is ascertained by reference to the contract as a whole. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte,
111 Wis.2d 26, 36, 330 N.W.2d 201, 206 (1983).
Finally, summary
judgment is used to determine whether there are disputed issues for trial. U.S. Oil Co. v. Midwest Auto Care
Servs., Inc., 150 Wis.2d 80, 86, 440 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Ct. App.
1989). When reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, we apply the same methodology as the trial court. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when material facts are not
disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Section 802.08(2), Stats. All doubts on
factual matters are resolved against the party moving for summary
judgment. Grams v. Boss,
97 Wis.2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1980). We will reverse a trial court's decision granting summary
judgment if the trial court incorrectly decided a legal issue or if material
facts are in dispute. Hammer v.
Hammer, 142 Wis.2d 257, 263, 418 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Ct. App. 1987). The practical effect of reciprocal summary
judgment motions is a stipulation to the facts, and an agreement that the
issues presented can be decided as a matter of law. Silverton Enter., Inc. v. General Casualty Co., 143
Wis.2d 661, 669, 422 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Ct. App. 1988).
"SURPLUS JUDGMENT"
Predco contends that
because First Bank obtained the federal judgment against it in a representative
capacity, i.e., as trustee for the bondholders, First Bank may not retain the
$55,805.58 "surplus judgment."
Predco relies upon a clause in the indenture of trust to argue that this
"surplus judgment" is owed to Precision Steel's successor. Predco then argues that it is subrogated to
the rights of Precision Steel's successor.
Predco is not subrogated
to any claim that Precision Steel's successor may have. Under the principles of subrogation, Predco
became subrogated to the rights of First Bank when it paid the judgment to
First Bank. See Cunningham,
121 Wis.2d at 443-44, 360 N.W.2d at 36.
Predco stepped into the shoes of First Bank, not Precision Steel's
successor. Predco provides no legal
authority to support its argument that it is subrogated to the rights of
Precision Steel's successor.
Additionally, if a "surplus judgment" existed, the right of
Precision Steel's successor to the surplus was determined in the LTV bankruptcy. First Bank's bankruptcy claim for
administrative expenses was reduced by all sums the bank received from Predco
but did not pay to bondholders.
Therefore, any "surplus judgment" has been accounted for and
has not been retained by First Bank.
PAYMENTS FROM LTV BANKRUPTCY
Predco contends that the
denial of its claims to recover the payments First Bank received from the LTV
bankruptcy ignores the principles of merger and claim preclusion. Predco correctly argues that the guaranty
agreement merged into the judgment in the federal court proceeding. Further, claim preclusion bars First Bank
from pursuing further litigation to enforce the guaranty. See Laufenberg, 143
Wis.2d at 205, 420 N.W.2d at 779.
Predco's argument,
however, ignores First Bank's position in the present case. First Bank does not rely on the
guaranty. First Bank relies on the
indenture of trust between itself and Wilton, Iowa, to support its efforts to
retain part or all of the funds recovered from the LTV bankruptcy.
Section 10.2 of the
indenture of trust provided that First Bank was entitled to payment and
reimbursement for reasonable fees for its services and all advances, counsel
fees and other expenses reasonably and necessarily made or incurred by First
Bank or its agents in connection with its services as trustee. The section also provided that in the event
of default, First Bank had a "first lien with right of payment prior to
payment on account of principal of, premium, if any, and interest on [b]onds"
for fees, charges, and expenses incurred by First Bank. Section 9.7 of the trust indenture,
governing the application of moneys in the event of default, also provided that
bondholders would be paid after the payment of the expenses and costs of any
proceeding to collect the moneys and of the expenses, liabilities and advances
incurred by First Bank. The second
granting clause of the indenture contains a provision that the trust terminated
upon full compliance with the obligations of the indenture, including all
payments due to First Bank, otherwise the indenture continued in full force and
effect.
First Bank bases its
right to retain part of the LTV bankruptcy payments on the indenture of trust,
the document upon which the bankruptcy claims were based. Neither merger of the guaranty into the judgment
nor claim preclusion from the guaranty litigation against Predco affect the
payments First Bank received from the LTV bankruptcy. To determine Predco's right to recover part or all of the
payments First Bank received from the LTV bankruptcy, we must examine each
claim separately.
First Bank's summary
judgment materials represented that the smaller payment, $95,478.42, was for
administrative expenses allowable under 11 U.S.C.S. § 503(b), and that its
total claim was reduced by the expenses and interest it recovered from
Predco. The record does not include a
copy of the order approving the claim or a confirmation of the final plan of
reorganization. We note, however, that under
the bankruptcy code an indenture trustee may be entitled to an allowance for
administrative expenses and reasonable compensation for making a substantial
contribution in a case filed under chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code. 11 U.S.C.S. § 503(b)(3)(D) & (5)
(Law. Co-op. 1995).
We conclude that Predco
is not entitled to recover any part of this payment. According to the summary judgment materials, this payment to
First Bank was from an $8,000,000 fund set up solely to pay the fees and
expenses of the "steel indenture trustees." Therefore, the payment is for First Bank's own expenses approved
by LTV and the bankruptcy court.
Further, because First Bank's claim was reduced by part of the federal
judgment the bankruptcy claim for trustee expenses is not duplicative of any
amounts previously paid by Predco.[3]
The amount First Bank
recovered on the bondholder's claim, $312,526 and securities, is subject to
Predco's right of subrogation. First
Bank acknowledges this right and has transferred the securities to Predco. First Bank refuses to release any part of
the cash payment, however, because it claims that the indenture of trust grants
it a continuing first lien for all expenses.
The trial court held that a first lien exists, but it left unanswered
the extent of the lien. First Bank
contends that the indenture of trust entitles it to be made whole, i.e., to
recover all of its litigation expenses until litigation ceases or the fund is
exhausted.
First Bank's argument
goes too far. The bondholders have been
paid. First Bank has recovered the
expenses it incurred collecting under the guaranty and pursuing the
bondholder's claim in the LTV bankruptcy.
This is what First Bank is entitled to under the indenture of
trust. First Bank is not entitled to
recover its expenditure for attorney fees to defend against Predco's legitimate
attempts to recover on Predco's subrogation rights. Unless otherwise authorized by statute or contract, parties to
litigation in this state are responsible for their own attorney fees. Hunzinger Constr. Co. v. Granite
Resources Corp., 196 Wis.2d 327, 338, 538 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Ct. App.
1995). First Bank's contractual right
to recover attorney fees and expenses for efforts on behalf of the bondholders
provided by the indenture of trust does not extend to defending against the
subrogation claim.
The summary judgment
materials do not address the nature of the expenditures for which First Bank
claimed a lien against the bondholders' fund.
Therefore, the trial court's order declaring that First Bank has a
continuing first lien on the bondholder's fund is reversed. The cause is remanded for a determination of
the amount, if any, of First Bank's lien against the fund.
PREDCO'S CLAIM AGAINST BECK
Predco's final argument
challenges the trial court's dismissal of its negligence claim against Dean
Beck, the First Bank trust officer who became responsible for the Precision
Steel bonds while the guaranty litigation and LTV bankruptcy were pending. The amended complaint alleged that Beck
breached a duty of good faith and a duty to exercise ordinary care towards
Predco. Specifically, the amended
complaint identified the failure to (1) promptly transfer to Predco all funds
and property received from the LTV bankruptcy, (2) properly and adequately
assert and prosecute claims in the LTV bankruptcy, (3) assign the LTV
bankruptcy claims to Predco after Predco paid the judgment against it, and (4)
pay the "surplus judgment" to Predco. Predco's brief asserts that the tort liability was primarily
based on the handling of the LTV bankruptcy claims and their proceeds after the
guaranty litigation ended. Predco
asserts that Beck has individual liability based upon his personal involvement
and participation in the allegedly tortious conduct. See Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis.2d
683, 692, 273 N.W.2d 285, 289 (1979).
Beck filed a motion for
summary judgment. The trial court
granted the motion, holding that because the guaranty did not require First
Bank to file a claim in the bankruptcy, Beck was under no duty to undertake
extraordinary measures in pursuing the bankruptcy claims.
We have previously
concluded that there was no excess "surplus judgment" and that Predco
is not entitled to any part of the claim for trustee's expenses. Neither Beck's failure to act or his
negligent actions with respect to either item is actionable because there was
no injury to Predco. See Johnson
v. Seipel, 152 Wis.2d 636, 643, 449 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Ct. App. 1989)
(cognizable negligence claim requires injury).
Further, Predco has no
claim against Beck for actions he did or did not take in the LTV bankruptcy. Although the guaranty agreement merged into
the federal judgment, First Bank's rights and protections survived. See Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 18 cmt. g (1982); 50 C.J.S. Judgments
§ 599 at 22-23 (1947). Language in
the guaranty agreement precludes Predco from raising any claim for impairment
of collateral. Beck, as First Bank's
agent, is entitled to the same protection.
The allegation that Beck
breached a duty of good faith does not state a claim for negligence. Although a covenant of good faith is implied
in every contract, Chayka v. Santini, 47 Wis.2d 102, 107 n.7, 176
N.W.2d 561, 564 n.7 (1970), breach of an implied covenant of a contract is a
breach of the contract, not a tort, see Hauer v. Union State Bank,
192 Wis.2d 576, 595, 532 N.W.2d 456, 463 (Ct. App. 1995).
This leaves only the
allegation that Beck was negligent with respect to the fund received for the
bondholders' claim in the LTV bankruptcy.
First Bank and Predco have competing claims to the fund. Although Predco's claim arises from
equitable subrogation, the competing claims are resolved by the terms of the
indenture of trust. Therefore, First
Bank and Beck's duties to Predco rest on the contract.
Although the negligent
performance or nonperformance of a contractual duty to use due care is
actionable in tort, see Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 146-47,
47 N.W.2d 901, 903-04 (1951), the contract may not be used to create the
underlying duty of care necessary for a tort claim, Landwehr v. Citizens
Trust Co., 110 Wis.2d 716, 723, 329 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1983). A tort claim arises out of a breach of
contract only if there exists an independent, common-law duty of care. Id. To determine if a duty of care exists, a court ignores the
existence of the contract. Dvorak
v. Pluswood Wisconsin, Inc., 121 Wis.2d 218, 220, 358 N.W.2d 544, 545
(Ct. App. 1984).
Predco argues that
Wisconsin has long recognized that a bond trustee owes certain
extra-contractual duties to all parties in interest with regard to bond
transactions. Marshall &
Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 422-24, 250 N.W. 862,
864-65 (1934); Schroeder v. Arcade Real Estate Co., 175 Wis. 79,
106, 184 N.W. 542, 552 (1921). Those
duties, however, are based on the trustee's fiduciary obligations and not on a
duty of ordinary care. McGeoch
Bldg. Co. v. Dick & Reuteman Co., 253 Wis. 166, 173-75, 33 N.W.2d
252, 255-56 (1948). Predco, however, is
alleging negligence, not a breach of a fiduciary obligation; therefore, the
authority is inapposite. Predco failed
to present authority that Beck owed it a duty of care independent of the
indenture of trust. Therefore, the
trial court properly granted Beck's motion for summary judgment.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] In order to simplify the recitation of facts, First Bank is identified as the trustee in this opinion although Kenosha National Bank was the bank that agreed to serve as trustee. First Bank is the corporate successor to Kenosha National Bank.
[2] The complaint alleged that the amount of the "surplus judgment" was $72,281.15. In the trial court brief on the summary judgment motions, Predco addressed only the $55,805.58 that First Bank admitted receiving as interest on the federal judgment. Additionally, in the brief on appeal, Predco refers to the "surplus judgment" as $55,805.58. Therefore, we use the same number.
[3] We recognize that the indenture of trust limits First Bank's right to reimbursement to reasonable costs and expenses. From the materials submitted on summary judgment, it appears that First Bank recovered from the LTV bankruptcy expenses that the federal court had specifically held in the action on the guaranty to be unreasonable or excessive. Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, LTV could have used this determination against First Bank to challenge the amount First Bank claimed. See Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis.2d 547, 558-59, 515 N.W.2d 458, 463 (1994) (issue preclusion or collateral estoppel may limit relitigation of an issue actually litigated in a prior case even when there is not a strict identity of the parties). Had LTV rejected any amount of claimed expenses as unreasonable, the benefit would have gone to other "steel indenture trustees," not to the bondholders. Predco has not provided any authority that under these facts it is entitled to challenge the bankruptcy court's determination of First Bank's expenses. We express no opinion, however, on whether Predco may, on remand, rely on the federal court's determination to seek an adjustment of the amount of First Bank's lien claim.