COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED March 13, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-3265
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
CITY OF MENASHA,
WISCONSIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ARBITRATOR KAREN
MAWHINNEY,
KRISTIN ERICKSON and
MENASHA CITY EMPLOYEES
UNION
LOCAL 1035, AFSCME,
AFL-CIO,
Respondents-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Winnebago County:
BRUCE SCHMIDT, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, Nettesheim
and Snyder, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. The City of Menasha has appealed from a trial court
order denying a petition for a writ of prohibition or declaratory judgment and
remanding the matter to an arbitrator.
The action arises from three grievances filed by Kristin Erickson, a former
employee of the City, and the Menasha City Employees Union Local 1035 (the
Union). Erickson and the Union sought
arbitration of the grievances by an arbitrator appointed by the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission (WERC) pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement existing between the City and the Union. The City argues that arbitration is barred by principles of claim
preclusion and issue preclusion, and because it withdrew any agreement to
arbitrate.[1] We agree with the trial court that these arguments
must first be addressed by the arbitrator, and we affirm its order denying
relief and remanding the matter to the arbitrator.
The grievances filed by
Erickson and the Union allege that the City wrongfully requested an updated
medical status report while Erickson was on leave from her job with the City
after an injury, wrongfully refused to provide her with light duty, and
wrongfully discharged her without cause and refused to rehire her. The City contended that the same facts and
issues underlying these grievances were previously litigated in a worker's
compensation claim filed by Erickson before the Department of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations (DILHR), and that arbitration of the grievances was
therefore barred by principles of claim and issue preclusion. It also contended
that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because to the
extent that an agreement to arbitrate existed, the City withdrew from the
agreement prior to arbitration.
Before the grievances
were heard by the arbitrator, the City petitioned the trial court for a writ of
prohibition or declaratory judgment determining that the grievances were not
arbitrable. In the order which is the
subject of this appeal, the trial court denied relief and remanded the matter
to the arbitrator, holding that the City's arguments regarding issue and claim
preclusion were affirmative defenses which had to first be heard and decided by
the arbitrator.[2]
We agree with the trial
court's analysis. The City's arguments
regarding claim and issue preclusion are defenses to the grievances asserted by
Erickson and the Union. If a collective
bargaining agreement entitles an employee or union to arbitration of a dispute,
the merit of any defenses available to the employer must first be considered in
the arbitration proceeding, rather than by the courts. Dunphy Boat Corp. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 267 Wis. 316, 327, 64 N.W.2d 866, 872 (1954).
The City contends that Dunphy
is inapplicable because the provision for grievance arbitration in its
collective bargaining agreement was required by law and was therefore not
voluntary, and because it withdrew any agreement to arbitrate. It contends that the arbitrator therefore
lacks jurisdiction to consider the grievances or defenses.
It is undisputed that
the collective bargaining agreement executed by the City and the Union provides
for arbitration of grievances. The City
cites no law in support of the proposition that it is entitled to unilaterally
withdraw from this portion of the agreement.
Similarly, it cites no law to support the proposition that because final
and binding interest arbitration is mandated by § 111.70(4)(cm)6, Stats., it is not bound by the
agreement to arbitrate.
Generally, this court
will not consider arguments which are not supported by references to legal
authorities. State v. Shaffer,
96 Wis.2d 531, 545-46, 292 N.W.2d 370, 378 (Ct. App. 1980). In any event, since these grievances fall
within the broad language of the collective bargaining agreement providing for
arbitration of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
agreement, any argument that the City was entitled to withdraw from the
arbitration process must first be presented to the arbitrator.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently replaced the terms "res judicata" and "collateral estoppel" with the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion." Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis.2d 541, 550, 525 N.W.2d 723, 727 (1995).
[2] The trial court initially granted the writ of prohibition based on this court's decision in County of LaCrosse v. WERC, 174 Wis.2d 444, 497 N.W.2d 455 (Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 182 Wis.2d 15, 513 N.W.2d 579 (1994). We reversed the trial court's order in City of Menasha v. WERC, No. 93-1221, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 27, 1994), after release of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision determining that the exclusive remedy provision in the Worker's Compensation Act is not a bar to an employee's right to grieve a refusal to rehire after an injury. County of LaCrosse, 182 Wis.2d at 25, 513 N.W.2d at 582. We remanded the matter to the trial court to permit it to address the arguments currently being raised by the City on appeal.