COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED October
4, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-3205-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEVEN
M. SOSINSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Winnebago County: WILLIAM E. CRANE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Anderson, P.J., Nettesheim and Snyder, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Steven M. Sosinski appeals pro
se from an order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial. Sosinski was convicted of one count of second-degree
sexual assault contrary to § 948.02(2), Stats. On appeal, Sosinski challenges the trial
court's evidentiary rulings.[1]
Sosinski
was charged with having sexual contact with his fourteen-year-old
stepdaughter. The victim and Sosinski's
wife, Kim, testified at trial. On appeal,
Sosinski argues that all testimony regarding Kim's "actions and/or
demeanor should have been ruled inadmissible, for lack of relevance." While he contends that this testimony was
prejudicial to him, he does not identify the allegedly prejudicial testimony. We will not independently develop Sosinski's
argument or consider an inadequately briefed issue. See Vesely v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 128
Wis.2d 246, 255 n.5, 381 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Ct. App. 1981); see also State
v. Beno, 99 Wis.2d 77, 91, 298 N.W.2d 405, 413 (Ct. App. 1980).
We
turn to Sosinski's second claim that the trial court erred in admitting the
victim's prior consistent statements into evidence. Sosinski complains that the statements were unnecessarily
cumulative of the victim's trial testimony.
Section
908.01(4)(a)2, Stats., governs
the admissibility of prior consistent statements. It provides as follows:
(4) A statement is not hearsay if:
....
(a)The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross‑examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is:
....
2.Consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive ....
Sosinski
claimed that his stepdaughter fabricated the sexual assault because she was
unhappy living with him and was motivated to have either herself or Sosinski
removed from the house.
The
requirements of § 908.01(4)(a)2, Stats.,
were met in this case. The victim
testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination concerning her
statements, the prior statements were consistent with the victim's testimony,
and the statements rebutted an express or implied charge of improper motive or
fabrication. See State v.
Mares, 149 Wis.2d 519, 525-26, 439 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Ct. App. 1989).
At
trial, Debra Knop, the neighbor to whose house the victim ran after the
assault, recited the victim's statement to her regarding the assault. Knop's testimony was consistent with the
victim's trial testimony. Oshkosh
Police Officer Melissa Stensrud testified that she was dispatched to Knop's
home the night of the assault and spoke with the victim. The victim gave a written statement which
Stensrud read to the court. The
statement was consistent with the victim's testimony at trial.
Admission
of the victim's prior consistent statements was proper because Sosinski went
beyond suggesting that the jury would have to resolve a credibility contest
when he alleged that the victim fabricated the assault and had a motive for
doing so. Compare State v.
Peters, 166 Wis.2d 168, 176-78, 479 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Ct. App. 1991)
(defendant's statement that his version of events would be truthful did not
amount to a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive). We discern no misuse of the trial court's
discretion in admitting the victim's prior statements into evidence. See Mares, 149 Wis.2d at
526-29, 439 N.W.2d at 148‑49. Sosinski contends that
the testimony of Officer John Nolte, who participated in his arrest on the
evening of the assault, was inadmissible.
Nolte testified about the circumstances under which Sosinski was finally
taken into custody. Sosinski does not
adequately argue this claim. Therefore,
we do not consider it further. See
Vesely, 128 Wis.2d at 255 n.5, 381 N.W.2d at 598.
Sosinski
also does not elaborate on his claim that therapist Teri Bryers should not have
testified. Therefore, we do not address
it further. See id.
Finally,
we reject Sosinski's claim that the testimony of Laura Lindstrom, a Winnebago
County Department of Social Services social worker, was irrelevant. Lindstrom rebutted testimony by Kim that
during a meeting with Lindstrom and Kim, the victim recanted her claim that
Sosinski sexually assaulted her.
Lindstrom testified that she did not permit Kim to question the victim
about her allegations at any time the three were together. Lindstrom's testimony was proper rebuttal evidence. See Rausch v. Buisse,
33 Wis.2d 154, 167, 146 N.W.2d 801, 808 (1966) (rebuttal may meet new facts put
in by the defendant).
By
the Court.—Order affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.