COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August 29, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-3170-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SYLVESTER J. SASNETT,
JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: VICTOR MANIAN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Sullivan, Fine
and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Sylvester J. Sasnett, Jr., pro se, appeals from
a judgment convicting him of two counts of first degree sexual assault as a
party to a crime, one count of burglary as a party to a crime, and one count of
robbery as a party to a crime, and from orders denying him post-conviction
relief. Sasnett asserts the following
claims of trial-court error: (1) that
expert testimony by the victim's therapist invaded the province of the jury;
(2) that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel; (3) that
his right to an impartial jury was compromised because of an improper comment
made during voir dire by a juror who was excused from the jury panel;
and (4) that the sentence imposed after his conviction was unduly harsh and
unconscionable. We affirm.
Sasnett's criminal acts
occurred on January 25, 1989, in connection with a 19-year-old developmentally-disabled,
mildly retarded woman. Lisa, the victim
of the assaults, testified at trial that on the date the crimes took place, she
was at home alone watching television in her bedroom when she heard a door
open. Sasnett, an acquaintance of Lisa's
family, came into her bedroom and “punched her in the eye.” Sasnett then picked her up and carried her
into the living-room, placing her on the floor. When they entered the living-room, Lisa saw another male standing
there who was told by Sasnett to collect the stereo, jewelry and “other
stuff.” Sasnett then raped Lisa. After Sasnett completed his assault, the
other man raped Lisa as well. After the
men carried a number of items out of the house, Lisa called the police and her
mother's fiance, Gary Sapiro.
Sasnett testified that
he and two other men decided to burglarize Lisa's home because Sapiro had
“short-changed” them on money due for work they had previously done for
him. He testified that they entered the
home and encountered Lisa, not expecting to find anybody home. Sasnett stated that he kept Lisa still while
the others searched the home for property to steal. Sasnett further testified that he left the house during the
course of the crime for ten to twelve minutes to load the stolen property in a
car. When he returned, he found Lisa
naked and curled up in a corner.
According to Sasnett, one of his accomplices told him “that he had raped
her and that he took care of her.”
Sasnett denied that anybody hit Lisa.
He also denied raping Lisa.
I.
Sasnett challenges the
trial court's decision allowing the State to introduce expert testimony
concerning the developmental disabilities of Lisa. Sasnett argues that the expert's testimony regarding Lisa's
ability to recall events impermissibly bolstered Lisa's credibility. “Whether or not expert opinion should be
admitted into evidence is largely a matter of the trial court's
discretion.” State v. Friedrich,
135 Wis.2d 1, 15, 398 N.W.2d 763, 769 (1987).
In reviewing this decision, “[t]he question on appeal is not whether
this court ... would have permitted it to come in, but whether the trial court
exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in
accordance with the facts of record.” State
v. Wollman, 86 Wis.2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225, 228 (1979).
“Expert testimony is
admissible only if it is relevant.
`Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” State v. Pittman, 174 Wis.2d
255, 267, 496 N.W.2d 74, 79 (1993) (citation omitted). Further, expert testimony should assist the
jury. See Rule 907.02, Stats.
The expert, however, must not be allowed to convey to the jury his or
her own belief as to the veracity of the complainant. State v. Jensen, 147 Wis.2d 240, 256-257, 432
N.W.2d 913, 920 (1988); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis.2d 92, 96,
352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Ct. App. 1984).
The trial court ruled
that it would permit Lisa's therapist to testify concerning Lisa's mental
capacity, her ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and her ability
to recount historical facts. The trial
court based its decision on the fact that because the jury saw Lisa testify
with obvious limitations, they were entitled to have the testimony of a
therapist who had been working with her.
The therapist testified that she began working with Lisa in the early
1980's and worked with her until 1990.
At that time, she moved into a supervisory role with Lisa's new
therapist. As part of Lisa's therapy,
the therapist worked to develop her ability to distinguish between right and
wrong, which according to the therapist, Lisa had mastered quite well. The therapist also testified that her therapy
focussed on Lisa's ability to recall events.
She testified that developmentally disabled people depend upon memory as
their only way to learn. The therapist
stated that Lisa has an incredible memory and that her ability to recall is
almost picture perfect.
Sasnett argues that the
therapist's expert testimony communicated to the jury that she believed Lisa
was telling the truth when she accused him of sexually assaulting her. We reject Sasnett's argument and disagree that
the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in permitting this
testimony. In response to questioning
whether or not working on Lisa's ability to recall was part of Lisa's therapy,
the therapist replied:
Lisa is incredible with her memory and
always has been. Her ability to recall
is almost picture perfect. And, again,
I think that relates to her developmental disability, because people with a
developmental disability have only one way to learn, and that's by memory. They cannot think through a process, they
cannot make decisions, they cannot learn by thinking through, they can only
learn by memory.
So, their memory serves them in order to get through
life. So, she could recall almost every
detail of every instance. She also does
not have the capability of elaborating on her memory, she can't elaborate the
way you and I might in looking back.
She only will recall the way it was.
As
the testimony indicates, the therapist did not offer an opinion or comment
regarding whether Lisa was sexually abused or if any of her allegations were
truthful. Further, she was not asked
about Lisa's character for truthfulness.
The therapist's testimony was properly admitted at trial.
II.
Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), sets forth the two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. First, counsel's performance must be
deficient. Id., 466 U.S.
at 687. Second, the deficient
performance must prejudice the defendant.
Id. A court, however, need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on the grounds of lack of sufficient
prejudice, that course should be followed.
Id., 466 U.S. at 697.
To show actual prejudice, the defendant must establish “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id., 466 U.S. at 694.
Initially, we point out
that Sasnett filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, claiming
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Sasnett requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to State
v. Machner, 92 Wis.2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). The trial court denied relief without an
evidentiary hearing. In a motion for
post-conviction relief, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if
he alleges facts which, if true, would establish a basis for relief. State v. Carter, 131 Wis.2d
69, 78, 389 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1986). If the
defendant fails to allege sufficient facts in his motion to raise a question of
fact, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the trial court may
in the exercise of its legal discretion deny the motion without a hearing. Id., 131 Wis.2d at 78, 389
N.W.2d at 4. Upon appeal, we review the
defendant's motion to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to raise a
question of fact necessitating a Machner hearing. This review is de novo. State v. Toliver, 187 Wis.2d
346, 360, 523 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Ct. App. 1994).
Sasnett failed to allege
sufficient facts to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding most of his
arguments. Further, his allegations
were mainly conclusory and in some cases, the record showed conclusively that
Sasnett was not entitled to relief.
Therefore, the trial court properly denied Sasnett's motions for
post-conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We discuss the myriad issues Sasnett raises.
A.
Sasnett argues that trial
counsel's advice to waive the preliminary hearing was deficient, prejudicing
his case. He has not, however, alleged
facts that show how he was prejudiced beyond general, conclusory assertions. Although Sasnett contends that the waiver
prevented him from obtaining potentially useful testimony for impeachment at
trial, he fails to specify what that testimony would have been. Moreover, a preliminary hearing is not a
discovery device. Bailey v. State,
65 Wis.2d 331, 344, 222 N.W.2d 871, 878 (1974).
B.
Sasnett next claims that
trial counsel's failure to file a motion for an independent expert evaluation
of Lisa was ineffective assistance of counsel.
Sasnett relies on State v. Maday, 179 Wis.2d 346, 507
N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993). In Maday,
the State sought to introduce the opinions of five expert witnesses to testify
that the behaviors of two sexual assault victims were consistent with the
behaviors of sexual abuse victims with whom the experts had dealt in the past. Id., 179 Wis.2d at 350, 507
N.W.2d at 368. This court determined
that the use of “comparison evidence” put the behavior of the two victims into
issue and therefore the defense had a compelling need for an independent
psychological examination to counter the State's evidence. Id., 179 Wis.2d at 357, 507
N.W.2d at 371. Here, there was no such
comparison evidence. Lisa's therapist
merely described her abilities, limitations, and disabilities. Accordingly, Maday is
inapplicable and the trial court was within its discretion in denying Sasnett's
motion to appoint an independent examination of Lisa.
C.
Sasnett next claims that
trial counsel's failure to file a motion regarding his own competency to stand
trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Sasnett alleges that trial counsel should have doubted his
competency based upon the fact that he was undergoing chemotherapy for
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma at the time of his arrest, during pre-trial proceedings,
and throughout the trial. Further, Sasnett
alleges that he was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
prior to trial. Therefore, Sasnett
argues that under State v. Guck, 176 Wis.2d 845, 851, 500 N.W.2d
910, 912 (1993), trial counsel was required to seek a competency
evaluation. In denying post-conviction
relief, the trial court concluded that “the transcript overwhelmingly
establishes the defendant's competence and coherence at trial. He presented himself as a well-spoken,
articulate and intelligent individual.
His reference to timeframes and events in his life were [sic]
clearly outlined as to dates and locations.”
We agree with the trial court that Sasnett presented no evidence in
support of his position.
D.
Sasnett next argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek severance of the charges of
party to the crime of two counts of first-degree sexual assault from the crimes
of burglary and robbery. He bases his
argument upon “verifiable information that complications from a vasectomy
received in 1987 affected his ability to have sexual intercourse.” Sasnett's conclusory allegations, however,
do not explain how the vasectomy affected his ability to rape Lisa. Further, although severance is a remedy
directed at curing the risk of prejudice when a defendant is tried on the basis
of an information containing multiple counts, it has been consistently
recognized that when evidence of both counts would be admissible in separate
trials, the risk of prejudice arising due to a joinder of offenses is generally
not significant. State v.
Bettinger, 100 Wis.2d 691, 697, 303 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1981). Therefore, “[w]e must focus upon whether or
not in this case evidence of the commission of one of the charges would be
admissible to prove the commission of the second charge.” Id., 100 Wis.2d at 697, 303
N.W.2d at 588.
It is clear that
evidence of the commission of one charge would be admissible to prove the other
charges. “`Other crimes' evidence is
admissible to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate
context of happenings near in time and place.”
Id. Here, the
crimes charged occurred simultaneously and by Sasnett's own admission, he was
at Lisa's residence at the time in question and held Lisa down while the
burglary and robbery were committed.
This admission would be allowed as other acts evidence to show
opportunity, knowledge, and identity. See
Rule 904.04(2), Stats.
The record clearly indicates that the burglary and robbery counts are
connected with the rape. The denial of
the motion to sever was not error.
E.
Sasnett next argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his
statement to the F.B.I. agents made when he was arrested while an out-patient
at the Veterans Administration Hospital in New Orleans. According to the record, Sasnett was advised
of his Miranda rights, signed a waiver form, and agreed to be
extradited. The trial court ruled that
there was “no apparent basis for counsel to challenge the statement the
defendant made to the F.B.I.” Although
Sasnett now argues that he was under the influence of chemotherapy and thus was
unable to freely consent, this information is not part of the appellate
record. Therefore, we cannot consider
it. State v. Kuhn, 178
Wis.2d 428, 439-440, 504 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Ct. App. 1993). Further, Sasnett must be able to show the
presence of some coercive tactics by the F.B.I. in order to sustain a challenge
to the voluntariness of the confession.
“In determining whether a confession was voluntarily made, the essential
inquiry is whether the confession was procured via coercive means or whether it
was the product of improper pressures exercised by the police.” State v. Clappes, 136 Wis.2d
222, 235–236, 401 N.W.2d 759, 765 (1987).
“This determination is made ... by examining the totality of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the confession.”
Id., 136 Wis.2d at 236, 401 N.W.2d at 765. The totality-of-the-circumstances analysis
requires a balancing of the personal characteristics of the defendant against
the coercive or improper pressure brought to bear upon the defendant or him or
her during questioning. Id.,
136 Wis.2d at 239, 401 N.W.2d at 767.
Sasnett has not identified any coercive or improper tactic used by the
F.B.I. agents.
F.
Sasnett next argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the
out-of-court identification made by Lisa.
A criminal defendant has the initial burden of showing that an
out-of-court photographic identification was impermissibly suggestive. If this burden is not met, the State is
under no obligation to establish the reliability of the identification under
the totality of the circumstances test.
State v. Mosley, 102 Wis.2d 636, 652, 307 N.W.2d 200, 210
(1981). Sasnett argues that various
discovery materials provided to the victim including a photo array consisting
of five photographs of different white males, indicate that the victim was
improperly coached. The discovery
materials, however, are not part of the appellate record and, therefore, will
not be considered by this court. Kuhn,
178 Wis.2d at 439-440, 504 N.W.2d at 411.
Further, his argument is meritless because he and Lisa knew each other
prior to the home invasion, and he admitted being at Lisa's home and
participating in the burglary and robbery.
G.
Citing authorities such
as Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), Sasnett argues that
trial counsel was deficient by failing to protect his fundamental
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
In Barker, the supreme court stated “the right to speedy
trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine
with precision when the right has been denied.
We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice
is supposed to be swift but deliberate.”
Id., 407 U.S. at 521.
The Court then rejected suggestions that it set a specified time period
during which a trial must be held. The
Court stated that “such a result would require this court to engage in
legislative or rule making activity rather than in the adjudication process to
which we should confine our efforts.” Id.,
407 U.S. at 523. In determining if a
particular defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, the court in Barker
created a balancing test which requires that courts consider the length of
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and any
prejudice to the defendant. Id.,
407 U.S. at 530.
Sasnett's initial
appearance was on October 29, 1990. At
Sasnett's arraignment on November 6, 1990, the parties agreed to a trial date
of February 27, 1991. A status
conference was held on February 27, 1991.
At that time, the trial did not proceed and defense counsel orally
advised the court: “I would enter a
speedy trial demand as of today's date.”
The jury trial commenced approximately two months later, on May 6,
1991. Sasnett has not demonstrated how
an earlier trial would have changed its outcome. He has not shown prejudice.
H.
Next, Sasnett argues
that trial counsel failed to protect his interests at the arraignment. Specifically, Sasnett complains that trial
counsel waived any objection to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea on the information. He
does not, however, assert that the arrest warrant or subsequent extradition
proceeding were defective. In the
absence of such claims, he has not shown prejudice.
I.
Sasnett also claims that
trial counsel should have entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental
defect, stating that he was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder as a
result of his experiences as a soldier in Vietnam. However, Sasnett has not presented any evidence that this
disorder was operative at the time the crimes were committed. A defendant does not have a constitutional
right to present an affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect if the defense does not have sufficient evidence to raise a
jury issue. State v. Leach,
124 Wis.2d 648, 662, 370 N.W.2d 240, 248 (1985).
J.
Sasnett next argues that
trial counsel failed to present a meaningful defense. Sasnett's defense was that he was guilty of the burglary and
robbery counts but that he had no knowledge of and was not involved in the two
counts of first-degree sexual assault.
Sasnett takes issue with this defense because it placed him at the scene
of the crime, and, because he was charged as a party to the crime on all four
counts, his guilt on all four counts was “virtually guaranteed.” In order for the State to prove that Sasnett
was a party to the crime of sexual assault, however, it would have to prove
that Sasnett directly committed the sexual assault, aided and abetted in the
commission, or was a party to a conspiracy to commit the crimes. State v. Hecht, 116 Wis.2d 605,
617–618, 342 N.W.2d 721, 728 (1984).
The State's burden thus required that it prove more than mere presence
or complicity in the robbery and burglary.
Further, Sasnett's assertion that trial counsel was ineffective because
she did not challenge Lisa's recollection of the sequence of events to show
that it was possible that the sexual assaults took place at a different time is
not only speculative, but it
contradicts Sasnett's own statement to the police and his testimony at trial.
K.
Sasnett also claims that
trial counsel failed to challenge the sexual assault charges by presenting
evidence that he was physically incapable of committing sexual assault because
of the complications of a previous vasectomy and cocaine use on the day of the
crime. As was noted by the trial court,
this allegation is “wholly conclusory and is unsupported by any factual
foundation as to both his medical condition and his use of cocaine.” Sasnett also complains that trial counsel failed
to effectively impeach Lisa by showing inconsistencies in her testimony. The record, however, is to the
contrary. Further, Sasnett claims that
trial counsel did not adequately cross-examine Lisa. Sasnett has not indicated anything substantive that would have
been revealed by a different type of cross-examination. Sasnett also claims that trial counsel was
ineffective because she did not draw the jury's attention to Lisa's alleged eye
condition, arguing that this would have affected Lisa's ability to identify her
assailant. This argument is also
conclusory and unsupported by any facts in the record.
L.
Sasnett last argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to poll the jury. The decision to assert or waive the right to
poll the jury is delegated to trial counsel.
See State v. Jackson, 188 Wis.2d 537, 541, 525
N.W.2d 165, 167 (Ct. App. 1994).
Sasnett has not shown any prejudice resulting from the trial counsel's
waiver and none is evident from the record.
III.
Sasnett argues that the
jury pool was tainted against him during voir dire, requiring a new
trial. According to Sasnett, during voir
dire a panelist testified within the hearing of the other jury panelists
that he knew Sasnett and that he knew Sasnett had committed a serious crime in
Brookfield. Upon hearing this, the
prosecutor told a police officer to run a check for a possible warrant on
Sasnett in Brookfield well within the hearing of the jury. The trial court denied post-conviction
relief stating that “comments made during voir dire in no way tainted
the jury panel or denied petitioner a fair trial.”
Voir dire is
conducted under the supervision of the trial court and broad discretion if
given to the court in the exercise of the process. State v. Migliorino, 150 Wis.2d 513, 537, 442
N.W.2d 36, 46 (1989). The trial court
determined that the jury was not prejudiced and instructed the jury to decide
the case solely on the evidence. It is
presumed that the jury follows the instructions given to it. State v. Truax, 151 Wis.2d
354, 362, 444 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Ct. App. 1989).
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is clear that the
trial court acted within its discretion.
IV.
Sasnett argues that the
sentence he received is unduly harsh and unconscionable. He argues that the fifty-year sentence imposed
by the trial court is excessive because he is suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Therefore, in his opinion, the sentence imposed may well be a life
sentence.
When reviewing a claim
that a sentence is too harsh, an appellate court first determines if the court
properly exercised discretion and then whether the sentence was excessive and
unduly harsh. State v. Glotz,
122 Wis.2d 519, 524, 362 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Ct. App. 1984). Review is tempered by a strong policy against
interfering with the sentencing discretion of the trial court. State v. Larsen, 141 Wis.2d
412, 426, 415 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Ct. App. 1987).
“It is presumed that the trial court acted reasonably and the defendant
must show some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis in the record for the
sentence.” Harris v. State,
75 Wis.2d 513, 518, 250 N.W.2d 7, 10 (1977).
A misuse of sentencing discretion “will be found only where the sentence
is so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as
to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.” Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis.2d
179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1975).
The sentence is not so excessive and unusual or disproportionate to the
offenses committed so as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of
reasonable people. The record reflects
that the trial court was aware of Sasnett's physical condition and properly
exercised its discretion arriving at the sentence.
By the Court.—Judgment
and orders affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.