COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED January 25, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
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No. 94-3109-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RAUL M. CASTRO,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Dane County:
GILBERT N. GERAGHTY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Gartzke, P.J., and Sundby, J.
PER
CURIAM. A jury found Raul M. Castro guilty of burglary, theft
and arson, arising from the October 8, 1988 fire at the Parthenon Restaurant in
downtown Madison. On appeal, Castro
contends that there was insufficient evidence that he was the perpetrator of
the crimes. He also argues that the
trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it permitted the State to
introduce evidence that he had been discharged for stealing from the business,
and when it refused Castro's request to question Gus Paras, the owner of the
Parthenon, about a 1979 fire of suspicious origin at another restaurant owned
by Paras. Because the court's
evidentiary rulings are reasonable discretionary determinations and because
sufficient evidence supports the guilty verdicts, we affirm.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The outcome of Castro's
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is controlled by this court's
standard of review--a standard misstated and misapplied in Castro's appellate
brief. While Castro catalogues evidence
that he believes would support not guilty verdicts, this court "need not
concern itself in any way with evidence which might support other theories of
the crime. An appellate court need only
decide whether the theory of guilt accepted by the trier of fact is supported
by sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict rendered." State v. Poellinger, 153
Wis.2d 493, 507-08, 451 N.W.2d 752, 758 (1990).
This court's standard of
review remains constant, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. Id. at 503, 451 N.W.2d at
756. We may not substitute our judgment
for that of the jury unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the
conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no reasonable jury
could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 507, 451 N.W.2d at 757-58. When the evidence supports more than one
inference, we must accept the inference drawn by the jury unless the evidence
on which that inference is based is incredible as a matter of law. Id. at 506-07, 451 N.W.2d at
757.
Castro argues that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the person who committed the
crimes. The record defeats that
argument.
Castro was a former
employee of the Parthenon. Paras fired
Castro two months before the fire for stealing. Castro had worked the late shift. He knew the restaurant's closing procedures, and knew that Paras
kept the day's cash proceeds in a locked basement office. Castro was in the restaurant about 2:00 a.m.
on the day of the fire. Paras briefly
spoke with him, but Paras did not see him leave. The restaurant closed at 3:00 a.m., and Paras and the other
employees left the premises about 4:30 a.m.
The alarm system went off shortly before 8:00 a.m., and the fire was
discovered by the security guard who responded to the alarm.
The fire was
concentrated around the basement office.
The lock on the office had been cut away with a circular saw. Paras testified that a substantial amount of
money was taken from the office. A
walk-in cooler was located across the hallway from the office. Police found two empty bottles and one
partially empty bottle of "California wine cooler" on the floor of
the walk-in cooler. Paras testified
that the bottles did not belong there.
Paras also testified that the restaurant had run out of
that particular brand shortly before the fire, and that a delivery had
been made on October 3, 1988. Castro's
fingerprints were found on the bottles.[1]
The evidence, while
circumstantial, supports the inference that Castro committed the crimes. Paras saw Castro in the restaurant a few
hours before the fire. Castro was
familiar with the restaurant, and could have hid until Paras left. He would have known that money was kept
overnight in the office. His
fingerprints were found at the scene, on bottles that could not have been
present while he was an employee. His
discharge two months before the crimes suggested a motive. See State v. Johnson,
121 Wis.2d 237, 252-53, 358 N.W.2d 824, 831 (Ct. App. 1984) (evidence of a
prior crime is admissible to suggest that revenge was a motive for the instant
crime).
Other Act Evidence
When
reviewing a trial court's evidentiary rulings, the question before this court
"is not whether this court, ruling initially on the admissibility of the
evidence, would have permitted it to come in, but whether the trial court
exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in
accordance with the facts of record."
State v. Pharr, 115 Wis.2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498, 501
(1983) (quoting State v. Wollman, 86 Wis.2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d
225, 228 (1979)). This court will
affirm if there is a reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. Id.
Castro contends that the
trial court erred when it permitted Paras to testify that Castro had been fired
for stealing money from the cash register.
Under § 904.04(2), Stats.,
evidence of other wrongs may be admitted if offered as proof of motive. In this case, the trial court ruled that the
circumstances surrounding Castro's discharge, including the reason for his
firing, were relevant to show Castro's motive to steal and to damage property
owned by Paras. The court's ruling was
a proper exercise of discretion.
The 1979 Fire
Castro
also contends that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of a 1979
fire at another restaurant owned by Paras.
Castro sought to cross-examine Paras about that fire and "to
discredit [Paras] by presenting facts showing bias."
When defining the scope
of permissible cross-examination, the proper test "is not whether the
answer sought will elucidate any of the main issues in the case but whether it
will be useful to the trier of fact in appraising the credibility of the
witness and evaluating the probative value of the direct testimony." State v. Lindh, 161 Wis.2d
324, 348, 468 N.W.2d 168, 176 (1991) (quoting Rogers v. State, 93
Wis.2d 682, 689, 287 N.W.2d 774, 777 (1980)).
Cross-examination will not be allowed unless there is a reasonable
relation between the evidence sought to be introduced and the proposition to be
proved. Id.
The scope of proper
cross-examination is a question committed to the broad discretion of the trial
court. Id. This court will reverse a trial court's
limitation or prohibition of cross-examination offered to show bias only if the
ruling "represents a prejudicial abuse of discretion." Id. at 348-49, 468 N.W.2d at
176. This court will affirm if a
reasonable basis exists for the trial court's ruling. Id. at 349, 468 N.W.2d at 176.
The trial court
disallowed the evidence because the 1979 fire was too remote in time to these
crimes, and because Castro had not shown that Paras was directly involved in
the earlier fire. The trial court's determination
was a reasonable exercise of discretion.
Several years separated the fires.
Castro offered no evidence that Paras was implicated in any fashion in
the 1979 fire. "[E]vidence that
simply affords a possible ground of suspicion" against a third person is
not admissible. State v. Denny,
120 Wis.2d 614, 623, 357 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Ct. App. 1984). We conclude that the trial court's refusal
to admit evidence of the 1979 fire was a reasonable discretionary decision.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Castro cites to Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1967), for the proposition that when a conviction is based solely on fingerprint evidence, the State must prove, to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis, that the fingerprints found at the scene could only have been put there when the crime was committed. Castro suggests that the application of that proposition to these facts compels a reversal. We disagree. Borum is not controlling precedent. See State v. Webster, 114 Wis.2d 418, 426 n.4, 338 N.W.2d 474, 478 (1983). Fingerprint evidence is treated like any other item of circumstantial evidence. We also note that the fingerprint evidence was not the only evidence linking Castro to the crimes.