COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED June 27, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
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No. 94-2909
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
T.C. #91-CV-005229
STEVEN NICOLET and
CHRISTIANA NICOLET,
Plaintiffs,
MICHAEL COSTELLO and
LAURA
THOMPSON COSTELLO,
husband and wife,
and BRIAN L. READ,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
VILLAGE OF FOX POINT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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T.C. #92-CV-010068
STEVEN NICOLET and
CHRISTIANA NICOLET,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VILLAGE OF FOX POINT,
Defendant.
_______________________________________________________________________________
T.C. #92-CV-017079
BRIAN L. READ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
VILLAGE OF FOX POINT,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: LAURENCE C. GRAM, JR., Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. The Village of Fox Point appeals from a judgment entered in
favor of Michael Costello, Laura Thompson Costello, and Brian L. Read. At issue is the legal title to part of a
strip of land 745.3 feet in length located in Fox Point. The strip of land was conveyed to the Town
of Milwaukee, Fox Point's legal predecessor in title, by a quitclaim deed from
Calumet Land Company in 1904. The trial
court held that the 1904 deed only conveyed an easement. Consequently, the Costellos and Read own the
fee interest, subject to Fox Point's easement, in the portion of the strip of
land that was adjacent to their properties.
Fox Point contends that the 1904 deed conveyed a fee interest in the
land. Alternatively, Fox Point contends
that it has acquired the land by adverse possession. We reject Fox Point's arguments and affirm the judgment.
The deed to Fox Point
provided in relevant part:
Witnesseth, that
[Calumet Land Company], in consideration of One ($1.00) Dollar and other
valuable considerations, to it in hand duly paid, receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, do hereby revise, release and quitclaim unto [the Town of
Milwaukee], its successors and assigns the following described real estate,
situated in the County of Milwaukee and State of Wisconsin: [legal description]
To have and to hold the
same with all appurtenances and privileges thereunto belonging or in any wise
appertaining, and all the estate, right, title, interest and claims of [Calumet
Land Co.], for the use and enjoyment of the public as a public street or
highway forever and for no other purpose whatsoever.
The
property was not platted, and the legal description in the deed follows Beach
Drive for the property's westerly boundary and the low water mark of Lake
Michigan for its easterly boundary.
The Costellos and Read
own separate properties that abut the west edge of Beach Drive across from part
of the tract conveyed to the Town of Milwaukee. Their properties were subdivided from larger tracts by surveys
approved by Fox Point. Each survey
included the land east of Beach Drive as part of the subdivided tracts. The Costellos and Read claim fee simple
title to part of the strip of land based upon Fox Point's approval of the
surveys and on their conclusion that, under Wisconsin law, a conveyance to a
municipality for highway purposes conveys only an easement. Fox Point contends that it acquired the fee
interest in the tract because the granting clause in the deed quitclaimed the
described “real estate.” It argues that
the limitation in the habendum clause, if effective for any purpose, limited
the estate conveyed to a determinable fee.
Relying upon established
case law, the trial court concluded that the limitation, “for the use and
enjoyment of the public as a public street or highway forever and for no other
purpose whatsoever,” made the grant an easement only. We agree with the trial court's conclusion.
This case is controlled
by language in Thorndike v. Milwaukee Auditorium Co., 143 Wis. 1,
126 N.W. 881 (1910). At issue in Thorndike
was whether the dedication by plat of a lot as a public square could be
enforced by the heirs of the dedicator.
Id. at 5, 126 N.W. at 882-83. The court held that a statutory dedication by plat conveyed
either a fee simple interest or a limited fee in trust to the
municipality. Id. at 12,
126 N.W. at 885. In either event, no
present interest remained in the dedicator that would allow the dedicator or
his or her successors to enforce the limitation on the use of the lot. Id. at 13, 126 N.W. at
885. To reach this result, however, the
court distinguished a long line of cases involving streets and roads. The court acknowledged that whether a
municipality acquired property for highway purposes by condemnation, conveyance,
common-law dedication, or statutory dedication by plat, the municipality
acquired only an easement and the abutting landowners hold the fee. Id. at 15, 126 N.W. at
886. The court stated that the long
line of cases created a uniform rule that had become a rule of property, and it
could not be departed from even if the original decisions upon which it was
based were doubtful. Id.
This uniform rule was
expanded upon in Stuart v. City of Neenah, 215 Wis. 546, 255 N.W.
142 (1934), where the court was presented with a situation similar to the
present case. The issue was the status
of title to a strip of land located between a roadway and the edge of Lake
Winnebago. Id. at 550,
255 N.W. at 143. The strip was
dedicated to the public by plat. The
court held that under the laws of the state, the city obtained an easement in
the property that went to the edge of the water. Id. The
owner whose property abutted the landward side of the road owned the fee under
the road and to the shoreline. Id.
The “rule of property”
announced in Thorndike and refined in Stuart
controls the present case. Regardless
of the granting language, the 1904 deed conveyed only an easement.
Alternatively, Fox Point
contends that if the 1904 deed conveyed only an easement, it has acquired title
to the disputed parcels by adverse possession.
Any claim for adverse possession must be based upon physical possession
of the property that is “hostile, open and notorious, exclusive and continuous
for the statutory period.” Leciejewski
v. Sedlack, 110 Wis.2d 337, 343, 329 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd,
116 Wis.2d 629, 342 N.W.2d 734 (1984).
For this purpose, “hostile” means that the possessor claims exclusive
right to the land and that his or her possession prevents the assumption of
possession by the true owner. Id.
Fox Point's argument has
two weaknesses. First, as a general
rule, the adverse possessor of property for street purposes acquires an
easement, not fee title. Walker
v. Green Lake County, 269 Wis. 103, 111, 69 N.W.2d 252, 256-57
(1955). Second, Fox Point has the right
to use the surface of the contested parcels, as well as the remaining portions
of the strip of land, as long as the property is used “for the use and
enjoyment of the public as a public street or highway.” Activity consistent with this use is not
hostile and adverse to the fee owners.
Consistent uses include those that are incidental to the use of a street
for public travel or for the safe and convenient use of the roadway, Randall
v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 378, 249 N.W. 73, 74-75 (1933), and
those which protect a roadway, Walker, 269 Wis. at 112, 69 N.W.2d
at 257.
The parties filed
reciprocal motions for summary judgment, and we assume that the facts contained
in the affidavits are true. See Silverton
Enters., Inc. v. General Casualty Co., 143 Wis.2d 661, 669, 422 N.W.2d
154, 157 (Ct. App. 1988) (practical effect of reciprocal summary judgment
motions is stipulation as to facts and agreement that issues presented can be
decided as a matter of law). According
to the facts set forth in the affidavits, Fox Point occasionally asserted
authority over the property that exceeded the authority of an easement
holder. At other times, however, it
acted after consulting with the abutting landowners. Because the affidavits do not show consistent activity hostile
and adverse to the interests of the fee owners, Fox Point has not established that it adversely possessed the
disputed tracts for any time period.
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.