PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 94-2888
Complete Title
of Case:
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff‑Appellant,
v.
CHARLES R. EDLEBECK,
individually, and d/b/a
LANNON ESTATES MOBILE
HOME PARK, JAMES L. ILK,
HIGHWAY MOBILE HOMES
SALES, INC., and
LANNON ESTATES, INC.,
a Wisconsin corporation,
Defendants‑Respondents.
Submitted on Briefs: July 28, 1995
Oral Argument:
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: September 6, 1995
Opinion Filed: September
6, 1995
Source of APPEAL Appeal from an order
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Waukesha
(If
"Special", JUDGE: ROGER P. MURPHY
so indicate)
JUDGES: Anderson, P.J., Brown and
Nettesheim, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Bruce
A. Craig, assistant attorney general.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the defendants-respondents, the cause was
submitted on the brief of Charles F. Schroeder of Dubin, Balistreri
& Schelbe of Milwaukee, Susan LaCava of Susan LaCava, S.C.
of Madison, and David R. Friedman of Friedman Law Firm of
Madison.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED SEPTEMBER 6, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file
with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court
of Appeals. See § 808.10
and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is
subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the
Official Reports. |
No.
94-2888
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff‑Appellant,
v.
CHARLES R. EDLEBECK,
individually, and d/b/a
LANNON ESTATES MOBILE
HOME PARK, JAMES L. ILK,
HIGHWAY MOBILE HOMES
SALES, INC., and
LANNON ESTATES, INC.,
a Wisconsin corporation,
Defendants‑Respondents.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County: ROGER P. MURPHY,
Judge. Reversed and cause remanded
with directions.
Before
Anderson, P.J., Brown and Nettesheim, JJ.
ANDERSON,
P.J. The State of Wisconsin appeals from an order
of the trial court wherein the court dissolved a temporary injunction against
the defendants and dismissed the State's action. Because we conclude that the trial court incorrectly decided a
legal issue and Edlebeck and the other defendants are therefore not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, we reverse and remand.
The
State filed a complaint against Charles R. Edlebeck, a mobile home park operator
and the owner of Lannon Estates Mobile Home Park, Lannon Estates, Inc. and
Highway Mobile Homes Sales, Inc. Lannon
Estates, Inc., and Highway Mobile Homes Sales were named as defendants. The complaint also named James L. Ilk, the
president and managing officer of Lannon Estates, Inc., and a seller of new
mobile homes. The complaint was filed
in order to enjoin the defendants from violating Wis. Adm. Code ch. ATCP 125, to seek civil forfeitures for
the violations and to enjoin and abate the continued sale of mobile homes
without a license in violation of §§ 218.11 and 218.12, Stats.
The
complaint alleged, among other things, that Edlebeck and Ilk implicitly or
explicitly informed prospective tenants that the purchase of a mobile home from
Edlebeck or Highway Mobile Homes Sales was a precondition to renting a site at
Lannon Estates Mobile Home Park or that the purchase of a mobile home from
another dealer would result in discriminatory treatment against them, in
violation of §§ ATCP 125.02(1) and (2).
The complaint alleged that Edlebeck informed some tenants that they
would be charged for water usage, in violation of §§ ATCP 125.03(4) and
125.04(3). The complaint also alleged
failure to provide a purchaser of a mobile home and prospective tenant with a
copy of the rental agreement prior to the tenant signing the mobile home
purchase contract. See
§ ATCP 125.03(1). Additionally,
the complaint alleged that Edlebeck and Ilk sold mobile homes at the Lannon
Estates Mobile Home Park location without a license contrary to §§ 218.11 and
218.12, Stats.
The
State filed a petition and motion for a temporary injunction in circuit
court. The defendants filed motions to
dismiss.[1] The parties stipulated to the imposition of
a temporary injunction while the issue was submitted to the court as to whether
manufactured homes fall within the definitions of mobile home under § ATCP
125.01(1) and § 218.10(2), Stats. The trial court subsequently filed a
memorandum decision, agreeing with the defendants' contention that: “[T]he State's attempt to apply regulations
governing mobile homes to manufactured homes must be rejected. The injunction should be dissolved and the case
dismissed.” The State appeals.
Although
the State contends that the trial court made no mention of summary judgment in
its decision and did not engage in the analysis typically required, the court
treated the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. While the trial court might not have
expressly stated that it was converting the motions to those of summary
judgment, we conclude that this is a functional equivalent of a summary
judgment motion because the court did consider items outside the
pleadings. See § 802.06(3), Stats.
In
reviewing a summary judgment determination, we apply the same standards as the
trial court. Posyniak v. School
Sisters of St. Francis, 180 Wis.2d 619, 627, 511 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Ct.
App. 1993). A summary judgment motion
shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Section 802.08(2), Stats. Importantly, we note that a trial court's
decision granting summary judgment will be reversed if it incorrectly decided
legal issues or if material facts were in dispute. Coopman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 179
Wis.2d 548, 555, 508 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Ct. App. 1993). The methodology prohibits this court from deciding issues of
fact; we must only decide whether a factual issue exists. Id.
The
State argues that “the trial court did not make any findings that defendants'
vehicles, alleged by the State to be ‘mobile homes’ in its complaint, did not
fall within the definitions of that term in § ATCP 125.01(1) and §
218.10(2), Stats.” Edlebeck, however, contends that the trial
court was correct in holding that the evidence that manufactured homes are not
mobile homes was uncontradicted and that the State was not authorized to
regulate this distinctive form of housing.
A
“mobile home” is defined by § 218.10(2), Stats.,
as “a vehicle designed to be towed as a single unit or in sections upon a
highway by a motor vehicle and equipped and used, or intended to be used,
primarily for human habitation, with walls of rigid uncollapsible
construction.” Similarly, a “mobile
home” is defined by § ATCP 125.01(1) as:
“a unit designed to be towed or transported and used as a residential
dwelling, but does not include a unit used primarily for camping, touring, or
recreational purposes.”
We
conclude that the trial court should have applied the definitions of “mobile
home” under § ATCP 125.01(1) and § 218.10(2), Stats., to the homes at issue in the present case. We agree with the State that the term
“manufactured home”[2] is limited
to §§ 101.90-101.96, Stats., and
is not relevant to the dealer licensing provisions of ch. 218, Stats., and the regulation of mobile
home parks pursuant to ch. ATCP 125.
Unlike the purposes of ch. ATCP 125 and ch. 218, which are to regulate
dealers and mobile home parks, the purpose of §§ 101.90-101.96 is to establish
uniform construction standards, inspection procedures and licensing of
manufacturers of manufactured homes and mobile homes. See § 101.90.
These are two different purposes and clearly the federal law does not
preempt the state regulation of dealer licensing and mobile home parks.
It
is unclear from the record whether the homes at issue in this appeal fall
within the definitions of “mobile home” under ch. ATCP 125 and ch. 218, Stats.
We therefore remand so the trial court can apply these definitions.[3]
As we
stated in State v. Flood, ___ Wis.2d ___, ___, 536 N.W.2d 458,
466 (Ct. App. 1995):
[Z]oning regulations and other state and local restrictions
have limited the number of mobile home park sites and created a monopoly
position for park operators. ¼ We conclude
that the DATCP could have reasonably determined that park operators have
sufficient market power such that the tie-in selling of mobile homes restricts
competition in the mobile home market and encourages unfair sales tactics.
Because of the disparate bargaining power between
parties, we conclude that ch. 218, Stats.,
and ch. ATCP 125 regulate these manufactured homes when they are placed in a
mobile home park and meet the appropriate definitions, unless the legislature
or the administration decide otherwise.
We therefore reverse and remand the cause of action and order that the
temporary injunction be reinstated.
By
the Court.—Order reversed and
cause remanded with directions.
Recommended
for publication in the official reports.
[2] Mobile homes and
manufactured homes are both defined in § 101.91, Stats., as they pertain to §§ 101.90-101.96, Stats.
Section 101.91(1) defines “mobile home” as:
[A] vehicle manufactured or assembled before June 15,
1976, designed to be towed as a single unit or in sections upon a highway by a
motor vehicle and equipped and used, or intended to be used, primarily for
human habitation, with walls of rigid uncollapsible construction, which has an
overall length in excess of 45 feet.
“Manufactured
home” is defined by § 101.91(2) as either of the following:
(a) A structure,
transportable in one or more sections, which in the traveling mode is 8 body
feet or more in width or 40 body feet or more in length, or, when erected on
site is 320 or more square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and
designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when
connected to the required utilities.
(b) A structure which meets all
the requirements of par. (a) except the size requirements, and with respect to
which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certification required by the
secretary of housing and urban development and complies with the standards
established under 43 U.S.C. 5401 to 5425.
[3] We further note
that the definition of “manufactured home” does not necessarily contradict the
definitions of “mobile home” found in ch. ATCP 125 and ch. 218, Stats.
The definitions in ch. ATCP 125 and ch. 218 require that a mobile home
be a unit (1) designed to be towed and (2) equipped and used or intended to be
used for human habitation/residential dwelling. It then follows that, if a home is a structure which is
transportable, built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a
dwelling, it could very well fulfill the definition of mobile home under the
provisions stated above. See §
101.91(2), Stats. Moreover, in State v. Flood,
___ Wis.2d ___, ___, 536 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Ct. App. 1995), we held that a
“mobile home” must “be designed to be both transported and to be a
residential dwelling, but the rule does not impose the requirement of doing
both at the same time.” Therefore, the
argument that double-wide homes are not mobile homes because they are
transported in two parts and consequently cannot be inhabited at the same time
they are transported failed. See
id.