COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August 15, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
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No. 94-2881-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEVEN J. KEIZER,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: JOHN A. FRANKE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Fine and Schudson, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Steven J. Keizer appeals from the judgment
of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide, and from the trial court's
denial of his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that the trial court's modification of the involuntary
intoxication jury instruction was improper and relieved the State of its burden
of proving intent. He also argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony on
intoxication. We affirm.
At his jury trial,
Keizer did not dispute that he had strangled his wife, put her in a closet, and
waited two or three days before telling the police. His defense, however, was that he had ingested large amounts of
cocaine and alcohol that had caused him to suffer a “blackout.” He maintained that he did not remember
killing his wife and did not intend to do so.
The trial court instructed
the jury on first-degree intentional homicide and first-degree reckless
homicide. However, the trial court
declined to give the standard jury instruction on voluntary intoxication as
Keizer had requested. As tailored to
this case, the standard instruction would have read:
In deciding whether the defendant acted with
the intent to kill, you must consider the evidence that he was intoxicated at
the time of the alleged offense. If the
defendant was so intoxicated that he did not intend to kill, you must find him
not guilty of first-degree intentional homicide. Before you may find the defendant guilty, the State must prove by
evidence that satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
intended to kill.
Wis J I—Criminal 765. Instead, the trial court instructed:
In deciding whether the defendant acted with
the intent to kill, you may consider any evidence that he may have
been intoxicated or in a drugged condition at the time of the alleged
offense. However, the fact that the
defendant's intoxicated or drugged condition may have reduced his inhibitions
or made it easier for him to commit the crime is not, by itself, material. On the other hand, if the defendant was so
intoxicated or drugged that he was incapable of forming the intent to
kill, then he is not guilty of first degree intentional homicide. It is up to you to determine the extent, if
any, to which the defendant's intoxicated or drugged condition may
have affected his ability to form the necessary intent. You are the sole judges of the facts, and
you must not find the defendant guilty unless you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill.
(Emphasis
added to those portions Keizer challenges on appeal.)
Keizer variously argues
that the modified instruction relieved, shifted, or lowered the State's burden
of proving intent to kill.
Specifically, he contends that the trial court erroneously
(1) changed the word “must” to “may;” (2) converted “that he was
intoxicated” to “that he may have been intoxicated or in a drugged
condition;” (3) added an instruction telling the jury that “the fact
that the defendant's intoxicated or drugged condition may have reduced his
inhibitions or made it easier for him to commit the crime is not, by itself,
material;” (4) used rhetorical and comparative words, “however,” “on
the other hand,” “if any,” and “may have” that conveyed skepticism about the
intoxication defense; and (5) misstated evidence by twice referring
to “intoxicated or drugged” when his theory of defense depended on the
“synergistic effect” of alcohol and cocaine in combination.
Recently we considered a
similar challenge to a modification of the standard voluntary intoxication
instruction where the trial court also converted “must” to “may.” As we explained:
A trial court has wide discretion in developing
the specific language of jury instructions.
Further, the trial court's instructions do not have to conform exactly
to the standard jury instructions.
Nevertheless, the work of the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee is
persuasive and, generally, it is recommended that trial courts use the standard
instructions because they do represent a painstaking effort to accurately state
the law and provide statewide uniformity.
Because the standard instructions are not infallible, it is appropriate
for a trial court to modify them when necessary to fully and fairly state the
law.
State
v. Foster, 191 Wis.2d 14, 26-27, 528 N.W.2d 22, 27 (Ct. App.
1995) (citations omitted). Here, as in Foster,
we conclude that the modified instruction provided an inaccurate statement of
law. The proper instruction would have
instructed the jury that it “‘must consider the evidence regarding whether
the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense.’” Foster, 191 Wis.2d at 28, 528
N.W.2d at 28 (emphasis in original).
We are not convinced,
however, that any other portions of the trial court's modified instruction
misstated the law. The words that
Keizer considers to be rhetorical, comparative, and skeptical actually brought
the modified instruction closer to the meaning of an accurate instruction—i.e.,
the jury must consider evidence of “whether” the defendant was intoxicated, not
“that” he was intoxicated. Further, the
words, “by itself,” preserved the legal accuracy of the trial court's
instruction on the materiality of the evidence of intoxication.
Finally, given that
Keizer's evidence and argument repeatedly pointed to the combined effect of alcohol
and cocaine, the trial court properly could have instructed the jury regarding
Keizer's alleged intoxication from alcohol and cocaine. Given, however, that there was never any
issue of whether Keizer's alleged intoxication resulted from alcohol or
cocaine rather than from the two combined, we do not see how the jury could
have been misled in any way by the trial court's references to his “intoxicated
or drugged condition.”
Thus, we conclude that
the trial court's modified instruction was erroneous because it told the jury
that it “may consider any evidence that he may have been intoxicated or in a
drugged condition” instead of that it “must consider the evidence regarding
whether the defendant was intoxicated and/or drugged at the time of the alleged
offense.” We also conclude, however,
that the trial court's other modifications to the standard instruction brought
the modified instruction's meaning closer to an accurate statement of the law
under Foster.
Whether an erroneous
instruction violates a defendant's right to due process presents a question of
law subject to de novo review. State
v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 639, 492 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Ct. App.
1992). As we explained in Foster:
In
reviewing an error in the instructions, we do not view the challenged word or
phrase in isolation. Rather, jury
instructions “must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Relief is not warranted unless the appellate
court is “persuaded that the instructions, when viewed as a whole, misstated
the law or misdirected the jury” in the manner asserted by the challenger. Where a criminal defendant claims that the
jury instructions violated constitutional due process, the issue is whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way
that violates the defendant's rights.
In making that assessment, we consider the challenged portion of the
instructions in context with all other instructions provided by the trial
court.
Foster, 191
Wis.2d at 28, 528 N.W.2d at 28 (citations omitted).
The variations from the
standard instruction did not undermine the jury's understanding of the burden
of proof. Within the modified
instruction the trial court accurately explained that “you must not find the
defendant guilty unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant intended to kill.” The trial
court also instructed that the State had the burden of proof. The instruction clearly did not prejudice
Keizer. Therefore, we conclude that
there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the modified
instruction in a way that violated Keizer's rights.
Keizer next argues that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present expert
testimony to support his voluntary intoxication defense. It is important to clarify, however, that
Keizer does not challenge the trial court's ruling excluding potential
testimony from treatment professionals or experts who worked directly with him.[1] Rather, although he also refers to counsel's
failure “to present expert testimony on [his] addiction,” Keizer actually
contends that counsel should have called an expert to testify on more general
subjects: “memory effects during
blackout, the combined effects of cocaine and alcohol and the relationship of
intoxication to intent.” The trial
court concluded that counsel's performance was not deficient and, further, that
the absence of such evidence “did not prejudice the defendant in any meaningful
way.”
To demonstrate
ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance
was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. State v. Moffett, 147 Wis.2d
343, 352, 433 N.W.2d 572, 575 (1989).
Questions of deficient performance and prejudice are questions of law
independently reviewed on appeal. Id.
at 352-353, 433 N.W.2d at 575.
The State offers
detailed, persuasive arguments to refute Keizer's arguments regarding both
deficient performance and prejudice. We
note that Keizer's reply brief makes no attempt to counter any of the State's
many convincing arguments on the ineffective assistance issue. See Charolais Breeding Ranches,
Ltd. v. FPC Sec., 90 Wis.2d 97,109, 279 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1979)
(opponent's arguments not refuted deemed admitted). We need not address each point because, clearly, the failure to
adduce general expert testimony in this case could not have been
prejudicial. Such testimony would not
have addressed whether Keizer intended to kill his wife.
At the postconviction
hearing, the defense offered testimony from Dr. Robert H. Verwert, a
psychologist with expertise in drug and alcohol abuse. Although Dr. Verwert testified that an
intoxicated person may experience blackouts, he could not say whether Keizer
experienced a blackout during the time in question. Further, without specific information on the quantity of alcohol
and cocaine Keizer had ingested, Dr. Verwert could not offer testimony to
assist a jury in determining the likelihood that Keizer experienced a
blackout. Most importantly, Dr. Verwert
testified that although a blackout can affect one's memory of an event, a
blackout does not deprive a person of his or her intent.[2] See State v. Flattum,
122 Wis.2d 282, 296 n.5, 361 N.W.2d 705, 713 n.5 (1985) (“We are cognizant of
the fact, as are many commentators, that alcohol[3]
dampens inhibitions, but does not generally impair the ability to act
purposively.”).
Thus, as trial counsel
testified at the postconviction hearing, the jury's less-informed assumptions
about blackouts could have been far more favorable to the defense theory than
an expert's testimony that would have disabused the jury of any notion that a
blackout vitiates one's intent.
Accordingly, we conclude that because general expert testimony in this
case would not have precluded or even militated against Keizer's intent to
kill, there was no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would
have been different had such an expert testified. State v. Dyess, 124 Wis.2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222
(1985). Thus, the absence of such
evidence was not prejudicial.[4]
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1]
At the post-conviction hearing, the issue was clarified:
THE
COURT: Excuse me. If I understood [defense counsel], the
challenge here is to the attorney's failure to offer general expert testimony
on the issues of drug use and the effects of particular drugs. Is there any claim here ... or any challenge
to the decision not to offer testimony of experts who specifically worked with
Mr. Keizer?
[DEFENSE
COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
Later in the hearing,
the trial court also explained:
Well, just so it's clear, ... I understood the issue discussed at trial was the defendant's desire to present people who worked with him to testify to their opinion about his ability to form an intent or his ability to intend what he did here. So that dispute is different than the claim now that there should have been some general testimony offered on the issue of cocaine use and arguably some kind of hypothetical along the lines.
[2] Dr. Verwert explained that a blackout is “the inability to recover stored memories,” not the inability to initially perceive what later is forgotten.
[3] Dr. Verwert also testified that he had not heard of the combination of alcohol and cocaine producing any condition precluding one's intent.
[4] Keizer also argues that the expert testimony would have bolstered his credibility by confirming that his lack of memory of some of the events could have been the result of blackouts. In the absence of expert testimony that Keizer in fact did suffer blackouts, however, we are not convinced that such bolstering would have rendered a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have been different.