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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED OCTOBER 18, 1995 |
NOTICE |
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A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to
review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will
appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2843
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II
STEVEN D. KINNEY (deceased)
and CARLENE KINNEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
STEMPERS I-94 SHELL, INC.,
SHELBY INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
LABOR AND INDUSTRY
REVIEW COMMISSION and
WISCONSIN WORK INJURY
SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFIT FUND,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Kenosha County:
DAVID M. BASTIANELLI, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, Nettesheim
and Snyder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Carlene Kinney appeals from a judgment affirming a decision of the Labor
and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) denying Kinney worker's compensation
death benefits for her son's death at Stemper's I-94 Shell. Kinney challenges the evidence supporting
LIRC's determination that at the time of his death, Steven Kinney was outside
the course of his employment. She also
argues that in denying benefits, LIRC was required to find that Steven had
wholly and completely deviated from his employment and that LIRC improperly
relied on statements given to police by Steven's murderers. We conclude there was no error in LIRC's
consideration of the police statements and that sufficient credible evidence
supports LIRC's determination that Steven had substantially deviated from his
employment at the time of his death. We
affirm the judgment.
Steven was employed as a
cashier at Stemper's Shell, a gas station and convenience store open
twenty-four hours a day, every day of the week. On December 30, 1986, Steven began working his usual shift from
3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Sometime during
his shift, Steven agreed to substitute for employee Luigi Aiello and he
continued working into the next shift.
During the evening or in the early hours of December 31, another
employee of the station, John Ekornaas, came to the station and remained
there. Ekornaas was not scheduled to
work and was not at the station in the capacity of his employment.
Shortly before 4:04 a.m.
on December 31, Steven and Ekornaas were murdered inside the station. Their bodies were found in a back utility
room separated from the merchandise and cashier area of the station by another
room and door. The men's wallets were
taken as well as the money from the cash register. During questioning, Aiello admitted involvement in the
murders. He gave a statement which
indicated that he and another, Spriggie Hensley, had gone to the station to
sell drugs to Steven and Ekornaas.
Aiello stated that Hensley had beaten the men over a debt Steven
owed. Hensley also gave a statement
indicating that a drug deal was going to be made at the station and he was
along only at Aiello's behest. Aiello
and Hensley were convicted of the murders and armed robbery.
The administrative law
judge (ALJ) concluded that there was no evidence that Steven had engaged in any
unlawful activity on the night of his death.
The ALJ rejected as incredible the statements of the murderers and
determined that Steven's death was attributable to the special dangers
associated with the type of employment since robbery was a motivational factor
in the assault on Steven. Death
benefits were awarded.
LIRC found that Steven,
by voluntarily admitting Aiello and Hensley to the station and going in the
back room with them, acted contrary to his employer's rules and for the purely
personal purpose of engaging in an illegal drug transaction. LIRC reversed the ALJ's decision and denied
benefits.
To establish liability
for worker's compensation, it must be proved that at the time of the injury the
employee was (1) performing service growing out of and incidental to his or her
employment, and (2) that the injury arises out of the employment. See Nash-Kelvinator Corp.v.
Industrial Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 84, 62 N.W.2d 567, 569 (1954). This case involves the first test—whether at
the time of his death, Steven was performing service in the course of his
employment.[1] Once it is established that the employee
entered upon the performance of his or her duties and was found dead at a place
where the employee might have been in discharge of his or her duties, but there
are no witnesses to confirm that he or she was in the performance of duties,
the claimant enjoys a presumption that the employee was in the continuance of
his or her employment at the time of death.
See Kosteczko v. Industrial Comm'n, 265 Wis. 29,
31, 60 N.W.2d 355, 356 (1953); Tewes v. Industrial Comm'n, 194
Wis. 489, 494, 215 N.W. 898, 899-900 (1928).
However, the presumption is rebutted by any evidence that the employee
deviated from employment or acted in disobedience of an employer's rule for his
or her own personal benefit. Tyrrell
v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis.2d 219, 225-26, 133 N.W.2d 810, 814
(1965); M.W. Martin, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Wis.2d 574,
582-83, 109 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (1961).
The deviation test asks
whether "the employee engaged in some activity of his [or her] own which
has no relation to his [or her] employer's business?" Krause v. Western Casualty & Sur.
Co., 3 Wis.2d 61, 72-73, 87 N.W.2d 875, 882 (1958). We reject Kinney's contention that it must
be established that the employee wholly, totally or completely deviated from his
or her employment. A "complete
deviation doctrine," as coined by Kinney, has not been adopted.[2] The standard is whether a substantial
deviation, as opposed to an impulsive, momentary or insubstantial deviation,
occurred. Nigbor v. DILHR,
120 Wis.2d 375, 384, 355 N.W.2d 532, 537 (1984). The deviation may be slight in terms of the length of time
involved or distance traveled. Tyrrell,
27 Wis.2d at 226, 133 N.W.2d at 814.
The issue is whether
sufficient evidence supports LIRC's determination that Steven had substantially
deviated from his employment at the time of his death. LIRC's findings of fact are conclusive if
there is any credible evidence to support those findings. West Bend Co. v. LIRC, 149
Wis.2d 110, 117-18, 438 N.W.2d 823, 827 (1989). Moreover, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of LIRC in
respect to the credibility of a witness or the weight to be accorded to the
evidence supporting any finding of fact.
Id. at 118, 438 N.W.2d at 827. The "any credible evidence" test applies. Id.
Contrary to Kinney's
assertion, LIRC's conclusion can be based on reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence.[3] If different inferences can reasonably be
drawn from the evidence, a question of fact is presented and the inference
drawn by LIRC, if supported by any credible evidence, is conclusive. Eastex Packaging Co. v. DILHR,
89 Wis.2d 739, 746, 279 N.W.2d 248, 251 (1979).
The gas station owner
testified that it had been communicated to all employees the rule that
employees of the station were not to be on the premises unless they were
working their scheduled shift or were customers. Following a robbery at the station on December 24, 1986, a rule
was instituted that on the third shift the door to the station was to be
locked. During that shift, no one, not
even customers, was to be allowed inside, and all transactions were to be
handled through a cash window. The
station manager indicated that the employees were not issued keys to the
station and that the only key available to employees was hanging on a hook
inside the station. The manager also
testified that Steven had inquired about obtaining cocaine and that Steven had
indicated that he had previously purchased cocaine from Aiello. This evidence is sufficient to support
LIRC's inference that Steven voluntarily admitted Aiello and Hensley for
personal purposes.[4]
LIRC also looked at the
statements Aiello and Hensley gave the police.
Kinney argues that because each man's statement pointed the finger at
the other, the statements constitute inherently incredible evidence which could
not overcome the presumption of continuity of employment. Evidence is incredible only when it is in
conflict with the uniform course of nature or with fully established or
conceded facts. Haskins v. State,
97 Wis.2d 408, 425, 294 N.W.2d 25, 36 (1980).
Inconsistencies and contradictions in the statements of witnesses do not
render the testimony inherently or patently incredible, but simply create a
question of credibility for the trier of fact to resolve. See id.
The ALJ rejected Aiello
and Hensley's statements as incredible and self-serving. When addressing the statements, LIRC
properly noted that because the evidence was documentary, the ALJ had not made
the credibility assessment based on the witnesses' appearance before the
ALJ. Thus, LIRC was in an equal
position to determine the credibility of the evidence. LIRC found portions of the statements
consistent on certain occurrences that night and relied on those portions. It was within LIRC's province to do so.
Aiello's and Hensley's
statements established that there was some kind of drug debt owed that made
them want to threaten Steven or Ekornaas, or both. Aiello and Hensley went to the station for the purpose of
completing a drug transaction and extracting payment on the debt. Aiello called the station to let Steven know
they were on their way. After gaining
admittance into the station, Aiello turned off the exterior lights and
pumps. Steven and Ekornaas went into
the back room for the purpose of examining and purchasing drugs.
The evidence is
sufficient to support LIRC's inference that Steven was involved in a drug deal
just prior to the assault which took his life.
Not only was admitting Ekornaas, Aiello and Hensley a violation of two
of his employer's rules,[5]
those persons were not at the station for purposes to benefit the
employer. In other words, the rules
were not violated to advance the employer's interests. Likewise, there was no employment-related
reason for Steven to go in the back room of the station with these men. LIRC's conclusion that Steven had stepped
outside the course of his employment is supported by sufficient credible
evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence.
Kinney argues that the
statements of Aiello and Hensley should not be admitted because they constitute
hearsay. She claims that because Aiello
and Hensley are incarcerated in the Waupun Correctional Institution, LIRC erred
in determining that they were unavailable as witnesses.
We need not determine
whether the statements constitute inadmissible hearsay. Although hearsay testimony may be admitted
at the discretion of the ALJ, Wis. Adm.
Code § Ind 80.12(1)(c),
it should not be received over objection where direct testimony is obtainable, see
Outagamie County v. Town of Brooklyn, 18 Wis.2d 303, 312, 118
N.W.2d 201, 206 (1962).
Kinney objected to the
admission of the statements. Here,
however, Kinney contributed to the unavailability of the direct testimony. The parties attempted to take the videotape
depositions of Aiello and Hensley at Waupun.
Kinney's counsel, in conjunction with counsel for the Wisconsin Work
Injury Supplemental Benefit Fund, advised Aiello and Hensley that if they
intended to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against testifying, that it
could not be done on a question-by-question basis.[6] Aiello and Hensley were informed that they
could refuse to testify if they did not intend to testify as to the entire
matter. Aiello and Hensley refused to
testify. We deem Kinney judicially
estopped from seeking the requested remand for the purpose of permitting her to
subpoena Aiello and Hensley. See
State v. Michels, 141 Wis.2d 81, 97-98, 414 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Ct.
App. 1987) (a party should not be heard to take a position on appeal different
from that taken during the trial); see also Zindell v. Central
Mut. Ins. Co., 222 Wis. 575, 582, 269 N.W. 327, 330 (1936) (where a
party has induced certain action, he or she cannot later complain on appeal).
The appellant's briefs
cite forty-seven cases. For only
fourteen of those citations does she provide pinpoint cites, that is a citation
to the exact page on which the proposition the case is cited for can be
found. The briefs fail to comply with
the Rule 809.19(1)(e), Stats., and the incorporation of A Uniform System of Citation (15th ed.
1991). For this violation of the rules
of appellate procedure, we penalize counsel for the appellant $25. See Rule
809.83(2), Stats. Within ten days of the date of this opinion,
counsel for the appellant shall submit payment of the $25 penalty to the clerk
of this court and shall not charge the penalty to any client.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] We need not consider the "positional risk" doctrine. That doctrine states that an accident arises out of employment if the conditions or obligations of employment create a zone of special danger out of which the incident causing the injury arose and it applies only to the determination of whether the injury arises out of employment. Goranson v. DILHR, 94 Wis.2d 537, 555, 289 N.W.2d 270, 279 (1980). An employee may step outside of the scope of employment even in situations where the positional risk doctrine might otherwise apply. Id.
[2] Kinney principally argues that Tyrrell v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis.2d 219, 133 N.W.2d 810 (1965) and Kosteczko v. Industrial Comm'n, 265 Wis. 29, 60 N.W.2d 355 (1953), establish the "complete deviation doctrine." Those cases do not so hold. It simply happens to be the facts of those cases that a complete deviation was found.
[3] Kinney asserts that LIRC's findings cannot be made based upon inference and cites Eastex Packaging Co. v. DILHR, 89 Wis.2d 739, 279 N.W.2d 248 (1979), in support of that assertion. It is a misstatement of Eastex.
[4] LIRC rejected the ALJ's finding that Aiello had used his employee key to unlock the station door and gain entrance. LIRC did so upon proper consultation with the ALJ about the credibility of witnesses. The ALJ had no reason to doubt the testimony of the station manager.