COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 7, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
Nos. 94-1845-CR
94-2720-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEVEN E. ISBELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
and an order of the circuit court for Dane County: P. CHARLES JONES,
Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Dykman and Vergeront, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Steven E. Isbell appeals from a judgment of
conviction and from an order denying his postconviction motion to exclude
statements he made during a conversation with a prison psychologist from the
presentence evaluation report.[1] Isbell contends that his conversation with
the psychologist should not have been considered by the trial court during
sentencing because it was protected by the psychologist-patient privilege under
§ 905.04(2), Stats.[2] We conclude that the statements were not
privileged under § 905.04(2) and consequently, the trial court properly
exercised its discretion when it considered them during sentencing. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
Isbell pleaded no
contest to one count of burglary, contrary to § 943.10(1)(a), Stats.
Isbell's parole on another matter was revoked and he was sent to Dodge
Correctional Institution to await sentencing.
There, Dr. Debra L. Anderson conducted an interview with Isbell where he
told her that he had "fantasies that he [would] drive across the country
to get back at those people who have hurt him in the past."
Isbell moved to delete
the statements made to Dr. Anderson from his presentence report on the grounds
that they were privileged. The trial
court denied the motion and sentenced Isbell to fifty-eight months in
prison. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Sentencing is left to
the discretion of the trial court, and our review is limited to determining
whether there was an erroneous exercise of that discretion. State v. Bobbitt, 178 Wis.2d
11, 14, 503 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Ct. App. 1993).
We will not interfere if we find a reasonable basis for the court's
determination. State v.
Scherreiks, 153 Wis.2d 510, 517, 451 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Ct. App.
1989). Whether the trial court
correctly interpreted § 905.04, Stats.,
is a question of law which we review de novo. See Steinberg v. Jensen, ___ Wis.2d ___,
___, 534 N.W.2d 361, 368 (1995).
PSYCHOLOGIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
In order for Isbell's
conversation with Dr. Anderson to have been privileged, Isbell must have
intended that the statements be confidential and that belief must have been
objectively reasonable. State v.
Locke, 177 Wis.2d 590, 605, 502 N.W.2d 891, 897-98 (Ct. App.
1993). Section 905.04(1)(b), Stats., provides in part, "[a]
communication or information is `confidential' if not intended to be disclosed
to 3rd persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient
in the consultation, examination, or interview ...."
Although Isbell may have
intended his statements to be confidential, that belief was unreasonable. Isbell was never told by Dr. Anderson that
whatever he disclosed to her would remain confidential. Instead, Isbell was told that the interview
was being conducted for "staffing" purposes. It was clear from a prison inmate's handbook
that although the interview might have been useful for treatment and diagnosis,
the information was sought for other purposes such as to permit the staff to
evaluate Isbell's needs and to make appropriate custody, placement, and program
recommendations. Accordingly, we
conclude that Isbell's statements to Dr. Anderson were not privileged. Therefore, the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion when it considered them during sentencing.
By the Court.—Judgment
and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[2] Section 905.04(2), Stats., provides in part, "A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made or information obtained or disseminated for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition ...."