PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 94-2653
Complete
Title
of
Case:In re the Marriage
of:
DAVID L. GRACE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
KAY S. GRACE,
Respondent-Respondent.
Submitted
on Briefs: May 9, 1995
COURT COURT OF
APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion
Released: June 1, 1995
Opinion
Filed: June
1, 1995
Source
of APPEAL Appeal from a judgment
Full
Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower
Court. COUNTY: Wood
(If
"Special" JUDGE: Patrick
J. Taggart
so
indicate)
JUDGES: Eich,
C.J., Gartzke, P.J., and Vergeront, J.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSFor the petitioner-appellant the
cause was submitted on the briefs of David L. Grace, pro se, of
Wisconsin Rapids.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSFor the respondent-respondent the
cause was submitted on the brief of Christine L. Klessig of Omholt,
Meagher, Forsythe & Klessig, S.C., of Amherst.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED June
1, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62,
Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2653
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re
the Marriage of:
DAVID
L. GRACE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
KAY S.
GRACE,
Respondent-Respondent.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Wood County: PATRICK J. TAGGART, Judge.
Reversed and cause remanded with directions.
Before
Eich, C.J., Gartzke, P.J., and Vergeront, J.
EICH,
C.J. David Grace appeals from a
judgment divorcing him from Kay Grace.
The trial court found that Kay was not entitled to maintenance at the
time of the divorce but held open the issue due to her potential health
problems. David argues that the trial
court erroneously exercised its discretion in holding open the maintenance
issue. We see no error in the decision
to hold maintenance open for such a purpose.
We conclude, however, that the trial court erred in not limiting the
maintenance provision in the judgment to that limited purpose. We therefore reverse and remand for
appropriate modification of the judgment.
David
and Kay divorced in 1994 after a sixteen-year marriage. Both were forty-three years old at the time
of the divorce and both were employed, David earning $68,287 and Kay
$46,760. The trial court considered the
several factors governing maintenance determinations under § 767.26, Stats.,[1]
and of particular import on this appeal is the court's discussion of Kay's
health, which formed the basis for its decision to keep maintenance open. The court made the following findings on the
subject:
Kay ... was born with only one kidney. Up until 1986, she had check-ups which
proved to be negative. In 1986, she ...
discovered that she was in renal failure.
[O]n December 10, 1986, with her mother as a donor, she received a
kidney transplant. She has had some
complications since then, including two hospitalizations, one in December of
1988 and one in August of 1991. The
complications regarded the use of immunosuppressants. She currently takes Prednisone, a blood pressure medication, a
fluid retention medication and hormones.
She suffers from the side effects of increased bruising, fluid retention
and permanent leg discoloration. At the
current time, she describes herself as being in good health and [reports] that
the kidney transplant has not affected her ability to work. Kay ... provided no medical testimony
concerning her problems, but her medical history was undisputed.... She continues to use medications to deal with
her problems.
David concedes that the trial court's findings regarding
Kay's medical history and current health condition are accurate.
After
considering the medical and the other statutory factors under § 767.26, Stats., the trial court concluded that,
while "maintenance is not appropriate and not necessary at this
time," in light of "the potential health problems that Kay ... may
have in the future, the Court will not deny maintenance to Kay ... but will
hold the matter of maintenance open in the future." David appeals from that decision.
Maintenance
determinations are discretionary with the trial court, and we will not reverse
absent an erroneous exercise of that discretion. Forester v. Forester, 174 Wis.2d 78, 85, 496
N.W.2d 771, 774 (Ct. App. 1993). We
have discussed at some length the scope of our review of a trial court's
discretionary determination:
A
court exercises discretion when it considers the facts of record and reasons
its way to a rational, legally sound conclusion. It is "a process of reasoning" in which the facts and
applicable law are considered in arriving at "a conclusion based on logic
and founded on proper legal standards."
Thus, to determine whether the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in a particular matter, we look first to the court's on-the-record
explanation of the reasons underlying its decision. And where the record shows that the court looked to and
considered the facts of the case and reasoned its way to a conclusion that is
(a) one a reasonable judge could reach and (b) consistent with applicable
law, we will affirm the decision even if it is not one with which we ourselves
would agree.
It need not be a
lengthy process. While reasons must be
stated, they need not be exhaustive. It
is enough that they indicate to the reviewing court that the trial court "undert[ook]
a reasonable inquiry and examination of the facts" and "the record
shows that there is a reasonable basis for the ... court's
determination." Indeed,
"[b]ecause the exercise of discretion is so essential to the trial court's
functioning, we generally look for reasons to sustain discretionary
decisions."
Burkes v. Hales, 165 Wis.2d 585, 590-91, 478 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Ct. App.
1991) (citations and quoted sources omitted) (footnote omitted).
When
a court provides appropriate and legally sound reasons, based on the facts of
record, for holding open a final maintenance decision until a future date, it
may do so. Wright v. Wright,
92 Wis.2d 246, 260, 284 N.W.2d 894, 901-02 (1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 951 (1980). We believe the trial
court's explanation of the reasons underlying its decision in this case is
adequate under these standards.
David
argues that there is no evidence in the record to contradict Kay's testimony
that her health was "good" at the time of the divorce in 1994. He has, however, conceded the accuracy of
the trial court's findings regarding Kay's medical history. We believe the court could, in the exercise
of its discretion, properly base its decision on the fact that, while Kay's
health may have been good at the time of trial, she has only one kidney--which
was transplanted from her mother, who is now sixty-seven years old--and has
experienced serious complications of her chronic renal disease, requiring
continual medication and hospitalizations.
David
argues, however, that any determination regarding Kay's "potential"
health problems from her kidney disease is wholly speculative in that no expert
testimony was received on the subject at trial, and that, as a result, the
court could not properly hold maintenance open on the record before it.
We
disagree. Whether expert testimony is
necessary in a given situation is a question of law, which we decide without
deference to the trial court's opinion.
Kujawski v. Arbor View Ctr., 132 Wis.2d 178, 181, 389
N.W.2d 831, 832 (Ct. App. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 139 Wis.2d 455,
407 N.W.2d 249 (1987). We do not
believe that expert testimony is a necessary underpinning for the court's
exercise of discretion. Expert
testimony is required when the issue under consideration involves "special
knowledge or skill or experience on subjects which are not within the realm of
the ordinary experience of [hu]mankind."
Kujawski, 139 Wis.2d at 463, 407 N.W.2d at 252; see
also Drexler v. All Am. Life & Casualty Co., 72 Wis.2d
420, 428, 241 N.W.2d 401, 406 (1976).
This is not a case where
a court or jury is required to set future wage loss, medical expense or similar
damages, as in a personal injury or medical malpractice action. Here the court was simply considering
whether, in light of Kay's undisputed medical history and the evidence of her
renal transplant, there was a reasonable potential for future health problems
that would justify retaining jurisdiction to award maintenance at such time as
that potential might become a reality.
We disagree with David that the court, given the record before it,
needed additional evidence in the form of expert medical testimony in order to
make such a determination. We think the
court could, and did, appropriately exercise its discretion to leave maintenance
open on the strength of the record before it.
As
we noted at the outset, however, the trial court left maintenance open for any
and all purposes, despite the limited nature of the basis for its
decision. As a result, the judgment
leaves the door open to an award of future maintenance to Kay for conditions or
circumstances wholly unrelated to her health problems, such as a diminution in
income or an increase in needs caused by factors not suggested in this record
or in the court's decision.
We
therefore reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court with directions to
amend the maintenance provision so as to limit its applicability to the
specific health concerns discussed in the court's decision and in this opinion.
By
the Court.—Judgment reversed
and cause remanded with directions.
[1] Under § 767.26, Stats., the trial court bases its maintenance decision on the
length of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the property
division, the parties' educational levels and earning capacities, the
feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-supporting, the
tax consequences to each party, any agreements the parties entered into, the
contribution by one party to the other's education or training and other
factors the court deems relevant.