COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED June 27, 1995 |
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No. 94-2542-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY HICKS,
Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
STANLEY A. MILLER, Judge. Reversed
and cause remanded with instructions.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
WEDEMEYER, P.J. The State of Wisconsin appeals from an
order, which dismissed one count of a criminal complaint charging Anthony Hicks
with violating the controlled substances tax statute. The dismissal was granted on the basis that the controlled
substances tax law, as implemented, violates Hicks's protection against
self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The State claims that the trial court erred
in granting Hicks's motion to dismiss because Hicks lacks proper standing to
assert that the controlled substances tax, as implemented, violates his right
against compelled self-incrimination.[1] Because Hicks lacks proper standing to
assert that the controlled substances tax law, as implemented, violates his
constitutional rights, we reverse the order and remand this case to the trial
court with instructions to deny Hicks's motion to dismiss and reinstate the
controlled substances tax violation count.
I. BACKGROUND
Hicks was initially
charged with one count of attempting to deliver cocaine, as party to a crime,
contrary to §§ 161.16(2)(b)1, 161.41(1)(c)4, Stats., 1991-92, and 939.05, Stats. The State
filed an amended information adding one count of possessing cocaine without
evidence that the controlled substances tax had been paid, contrary to
§§ 139.87(1), Stats.,
1989-90;[2]
139.87(2), 139.88(2), 139.89, 139.95(2),[3]
161.16(2)(b)1 and 939.05, Stats.,
1993-94.
Hicks moved to dismiss
the controlled substances tax violation count, alleging that it violated his
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination under the procedures
implemented by the Department of Revenue.
The trial court heard arguments from both sides and granted Hicks's
motion to dismiss. The State now
appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
The constitutionality of
a statute is reviewed de novo. State v.
McManus, 152 Wis.2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654, 660 (1989). As a preliminary consideration, we note that
Hicks does not challenge the statute on its face because that issue has already
been decided. See State v.
Heredia, 172 Wis.2d 479, 484-86, 493 N.W.2d 404, 406-07 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the controlled substances tax statute does not violate a
defendant's rights against compelled self-incrimination), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2386 (1993).
Instead, Hicks argues that
this statute is unconstitutional as implemented. Specifically, Hicks claims: (1) that the procedures established
by the Department of Revenue that require a dealer to purchase the tax stamps
in person compel the dealer to incriminate himself because the clerk selling
the stamps could identify him or because the police could stake-out the
purchase; and (2) that the procedures established by the Department of Revenue
that require a dealer to affix the tax stamps to the drugs in his possession
compel self-incrimination because they demonstrate the dealer's knowledge of
the nature and substance of the drugs.
There is no evidence in
the record, however, that Hicks ever attempted to purchase tax stamps, or that
he ever affixed any tax stamps to any drugs.
In other words, Hicks did not engage in the procedures that he alleges
make a facially constitutional statute unconstitutional. A party has standing to challenge the
application of a statute if the application causes that party injury in fact
and the party has a personal stake in the outcome of the action. Racine Steel Castings v. Hardy,
144 Wis.2d 553, 564, 426 N.W.2d 33, 36 (1988).
The procedures that Hicks alleged were implemented by the Department of
Revenue have not caused Hicks any injury because he never attempted to comply
with them. Therefore, the hypotheticals
that Hicks raised regarding a clerk identifying him or police staking out the
area where stamps are purchased are purely speculative. Because Hicks did not purchase or affix
stamps, the question of whether the statute, as implemented, is
unconstitutional, must be left for another day. Hicks lacks proper standing to assert it.
Hicks claims that he has
standing to attack the implementation of the statute because the statute
applies unconstitutionally to every person who falls within the statute's ambit
and that no person required to pay the tax may do so without incriminating
himself or herself. As noted above,
however, this court has previously upheld the statute, on its face, as constitutionally
permissible. See Heredia,
172 Wis.2d at 484-86, 493 N.W.2d at 406-07.
In Heredia, this court held that the statute “both
contemplates and permits the anonymous payment of the tax” and that the statute
“does not subject those who comply with its provision to compelled
self-incrimination.” Id.
at 484-85, 493 N.W.2d at 407. Accepting
Hicks's argument that he has proper standing because no one can pay the tax
without incriminating himself or herself, would squarely contradict our holding
in Heredia. We are bound
by that holding and therefore reject Hicks's argument. See In re Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, 82 Wis.2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149, 150 (1978).
Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court's order dismissing the controlled substances tax violation
count against Hicks, and instruct the trial court to reinstate the charge.
By the Court.—Order
reversed and cause remanded with instructions.
Not recommended for
publication in the official reports.
No. 94-2542-CR (D)
SCHUDSON, J. (dissenting). Hicks's argument that he has standing is
premised on his assertion that “[n]o person required to pay the tax may do so,
under the Department's procedures, without incriminating himself or herself.” Thus, as he explains, “[b]ecause the
Department's implementation of the statute cannot be applied constitutionally
to anyone required to pay the tax, Hicks is not required to show any injury
beyond the fact that he is being prosecuted for failing to pay the tax.” Under Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39 (1968), Hicks is correct.
Marchetti was convicted
for violations of the federal wagering tax statutes. He challenged “the statutory obligations to register and to pay
the occupational tax,” arguing that they violated his Fifth Amendment
rights. Marchetti, 390
U.S. at 40-41. Although speaking in
terms of “waivers” of the Fifth Amendment privilege rather than “standing” to
challenge the statutes, the Supreme Court explained:
To
give credence to such “waivers” without the most deliberate examination of the
circumstances surrounding them would ultimately license widespread erosion of
the privilege through “ingeniously drawn legislation.” We cannot agree that the constitutional
privilege is meaningfully waived merely because those “inherently suspect of
criminal activities” have been commanded either to cease wagering or to provide
information incriminating to themselves, and have ultimately elected to do
neither.
Id. at
51-52 (citations omitted). Thus, while Marchetti
did not talk in terms of “standing,” it clearly was concerned with the
principles underlying the standing issue in this case. See id. at 50-54; see
also Herre v. State of Florida Dep't of Revenue, 617 So.2d
390, 395, aff'd, 634 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1994). Marchetti rejected “the premise that the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege is entirely inapplicable to prospective acts” where, as
here, “the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’ and not merely
trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.” Id. at 53 (citations omitted).
Relying on State
v. Heredia, 172 Wis.2d 479, 493 N.W.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2386 (1993), the majority offers a tautology:
In Heredia,
this court held that the statute “both contemplates and permits the anonymous
payment of the tax” and that the statute “does not subject those who comply
with its provision to compelled self-incrimination.” Accepting Hicks's argument that he has proper standing because no
one can pay the tax without incriminating himself or herself, would squarely
contradict our holding in Heredia.
Majority
slip op. at 6-7 (citation omitted).
This tautology, of course, simply begs the question in this case. Clearly, Heredia's declaration
that the statute contemplates anonymous payment does not eclipse Hicks's
argument that the implementation of the statute, in every case,
precludes anonymous payment and therefore violates the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, Marchetti overruled
the very theory of “standing” the majority has attempted to revive. See United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115, 128-129 (1980) (Marchetti overruling United
States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United
States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955)).
Under Marchetti, therefore, I conclude that Hicks has
standing.
How exactly does the
Department of Revenue implement the statute?
Although Hicks offers strong arguments that the undisputed record
answers that question and allows this court to address the Fifth Amendment
issue, Marchetti emphasizes the need for “the most deliberate
examination of the circumstances.” Id.
at 51-52. Thus, I would remand for an
evidentiary hearing to develop a definitive factual record of the way in which
the Department implements the statute.
Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
[1] In the alternative, the State claims that: (1) Hicks failed to present any evidence that the Department of Revenue has taken any action to implement the controlled substances tax law; (2) the controlled substances tax law does not require the taxpayer to disclose incriminating testimony; and (3) the confidentiality provision in the controlled substances tax law provides the taxpayer protection co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment. Because we decide this case on the standing issue, however, it is not necessary for us to address any of these alternative arguments. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue need be addressed).
[2] As an initial
consideration, we note that the amended information listed § 139.87(1), Stats., which was repealed, effective
October 1, 1991. See 1991 Wis.
Act 39, §§ 2531-2534. Accordingly, on
remand the reinstated charge should reflect this fact. Prior to repeal, § 139.87(1), Stats., 1989-90, provided:
139.87 Definitions.
...
(1) “Controlled substance” has the meaning under s. 161.01(4) and includes a counterfeit substance, as defined in s. 161.01(5).
[3] The controlled
substances tax statute is contained in §§ 139.87-139.96, Stats., 1993-94.
Sections 139.87(2), 139.88(2), 139.89, and 139.95(2), provide as
follows:
139.87 Definitions. In this subchapter:
(2) “Dealer” means a person who in
violation of ch. 161 possesses, manufactures, produces, ships, transports,
delivers, imports, sells or transfers to another person more than 42.5 grams of
marijuana, more than 5 marijuana plants, more than 14 grams of mushrooms
containing psilocin or psilocybin, more than 100 milligrams of any material
containing lysergic acid diethylamide or more than 7 grams of any other
schedule I controlled substance or schedule II controlled substance. “Dealer” does not include a person who
lawfully possesses marijuana or another controlled substance.
139.88 Imposition.
There is imposed on dealers, upon acquisition or possession by them in
this state, an occupational tax at the following rates:
....
(2) Per gram or part of a gram
of other schedule I controlled substances or schedule II controlled substances,
whether pure or impure, measured when in the dealer's possession, $200.
139.89 Proof
of payment. The department shall create a uniform system
of providing, affixing and displaying stamps, labels or other evidence that the
tax under s. 139.88 has been paid.
Stamps or other evidence of payment shall be sold at face value. No dealer may possess any schedule I
controlled substance or schedule II controlled substance unless the tax under
s. 139.88 has been paid on it, as evidenced by a stamp or other official
evidence issued by the department. The
tax under this subchapter is due and payable immediately upon acquisition or
possessing of the schedule I controlled substance or schedule II controlled
substance in this state, and the department at that time has a lien on all of
the taxpayer's property. Late payments
are subject to interest at the rate of 1% per month or part of a month. No person may transfer to another person a
stamp or other evidence of payment.
....
139.95 Penalties. ...
(2) A dealer who
possesses a schedule I controlled substance or schedule II controlled substance
that does not bear evidence that the tax under s. 139.88 has been paid may be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years or both.