COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 28, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2401
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
HELEN WALSH, a minor,
by her Guardian ad
Litem,
BRUCE A. SCHULTZ,
SCOTT WALSH AND DIANE
WALSH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WISCONSIN
DELLS,
Defendant-Respondent,
HMO OF WISCONSIN,
INC.,
Involuntary-Party.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Columbia County:
RICHARD L. REHM, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Eich, C.J.,
Gartzke, P.J., and Dykman, J.
PER CURIAM. Helen
Walsh, by her guardian ad litem, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her
personal injury claim against the City of Wisconsin Dells. In 1990, Helen was injured in a city park. The issue is whether the City is immune from
liability under the Recreational Immunity Statute, § 895.52, Stats.
We conclude that it is, and therefore affirm.
The facts are
undisputed. Helen and a friend were
visiting Wisconsin Dells and wandering in the downtown area. Helen became tired and sat down on a picnic
table in a city park, where she and her friend rested and talked. A sign that identified the park tore loose
from its frame and fell on her, causing serious injuries.
Under § 895.52, Stats., a city is generally immune from
liability to persons who enter its property to engage in a recreational
activity.[1] Section 895.52(1)(g) defines
"recreational activity" as
any
outdoor activity undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or
pleasure, including practice or instruction in any such activity. "Recreational activity" includes,
but is not limited to hunting, fishing, trapping, camping, picnicking,
exploring caves, nature study, bicycling, horseback riding, bird-watching,
motorcycling, operating an all-terrain vehicle, ballooning, hang gliding,
hiking, tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing, skating,
water sports, sightseeing, rock-climbing, cutting or removing wood, climbing
observation towers, animal training, harvesting the products of nature and any
other outdoor sport, game or educational activity ....
This
list is not exhaustive; all substantially similar activities are included
within the definition. See Kruschke
v. City of New Richmond, 157 Wis.2d 167, 172, 458 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Ct.
App. 1990).
Because the facts are
undisputed, whether § 895.52, Stats.,
immunizes the City is a question of law properly decided on summary
judgment. Heck & Paetow
Claims Serv., Inc. v. Heck, 93 Wis.2d 349, 355, 286 N.W.2d 831, 834
(1980). We decide such questions
without deference to the trial court. Silverton
Enters. v. Gen. Casualty, 143 Wis.2d 661, 669, 422 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Ct.
App. 1988).
The City is immune from
liability because Helen was engaged in a recreational activity. Taking a break from window shopping and
sightseeing by resting upon a picnic table and talking with a friend is an
activity undertaken for the purpose of relaxation. As such, the statute directs that it be included in the category
of recreational activities. Although
Helen contends that her sedentary status when injured cannot be considered an
"activity," we must liberally construe § 895.52, Stats., in favor of property
owners. Linville v. City of
Janesville, 184 Wis.2d 705, 715, 516 N.W.2d 427, 430 (1994). Liberally construed, even resting is a
"recreational activity."
Helen also contends that
the legislature did not intend § 895.52, Stats.,
to "immunize a governmental entity from liability for negligently
designing, constructing and maintaining an information sign. A land owner owes a duty of ordinary care if
he chooses to erect an information sign on his land." However, § 895.52(2)(a), in plain
terms, relieves owners of the duty to keep their property safe for recreational
activities, to inspect the property, or to give warning of an unsafe condition,
use or activity. "Property"
includes "structures."
Section 895.52(1)(f). No
exceptions are provided for informational signs. If a statute's meaning is plain from its language, we apply that
plain meaning and must not look further to determine legislative intent. Village of Shorewood v. Steinberg,
174 Wis.2d 191, 201, 496 N.W.2d 57, 61 (1993).
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.