COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED AUGUST
29, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2398-CR-NM
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GERALD
A. CHOLEWINSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Chippewa County: RODERICK A. CAMERON, Judge. Affirmed.
CANE,
P.J. Gerald A. Cholewinski appeals from
a judgment of conviction and a postconviction order.[1] The
state public defender appointed Attorney Jack E. Schairer as Cholewinski's
appellate counsel. Attorney Schairer
served and filed a no merit report pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Rule
809.32(1), Stats. Cholewinski filed a response. After an independent review of the record as
mandated by Anders, this court concludes that any further
appellate proceedings would lack arguable merit.
Cholewinski
was charged with third-degree sexual assault and misdemeanor battery of his
wife. However, the State amended the
complaint and Cholewinski entered no contest pleas to three misdemeanors: (1) armed while intoxicated, contrary to
§ 941.20(1)(b), Stats.; (2)
disorderly conduct, contrary to § 947.01, Stats.; and (3) negligent use of a weapon, contrary to
§ 941.20(1)(a), Stats.[2] The trial court withheld sentence and placed
Cholewinski on probation for eighteen months.
As conditions of that probation, he was precluded from having any
unauthorized contact with his wife, and he was directed to have an Alcohol and
Other Drug Abuse ("AODA") assessment and participate in recommended
treatment and counseling. However,
Cholewinski violated the conditions of probation by absconding from his halfway
house placement. The AODA counselor
characterized Cholewinski as "extremely dangerous" and believed he
"[was] at high risk of re-offending." Cholewinski's probation was revoked and the trial court imposed
two concurrent nine-month jail terms on the first two counts and a ninety-day
consecutive jail term on the third count.
At that hearing, the trial court mentioned that the original complaint
resulted from a plea bargain in which a sexual assault charge was
"bargained down."
Appellate
counsel filed a no merit report and Cholewinski filed two responses. This court struck the no merit report and
dismissed the appeal.[3] In the dismissal order, appellate counsel
was directed to move the trial court for clarification on whether the original
sexual assault allegation was a factor in imposing sentence. The trial court reaffirmed its prior ruling
and clarified that the sexual assault allegation did not affect the sentence it
imposed. Appellate counsel filed a
transcript of the hearing on the clarification motion and filed another no
merit report. Cholewinski filed a
response to this no merit report and referenced his two responses to the
previous no merit report in case no. 94-1233-CR-NM, which was rejected.[4]
The
no merit report addresses three sentencing issues, namely whether the trial
court: (1) erroneously exercised its
sentencing discretion; (2) relied on inaccurate information when it sentenced
Cholewinski; and (3) erred in denying his clarification motion. After reviewing the appellate record, this
court agrees with counsel's description, analysis and conclusion that pursuing
these appellate issues would lack arguable merit.
In
his response, Cholewinski persists in the contention that he was sentenced on
inaccurate information, principally the sexual assault allegation from the
original complaint. He also contends
that the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. Cholewinski raises several issues which only
have arguable merit if construed as ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims. Cholewinski criticizes trial
counsel because: (1) he failed to correct inaccuracies in the revocation
summary and in statements made by counsel and the trial court; (2) Cholewinski
is hearing-impaired and he was unable to communicate fully with counsel; and
(3) he failed to seek Judge Cameron's substitution.
Cholewinski's
principal issue is the trial court's purported reliance at sentencing on
erroneous information, namely that the plea agreement was "bargained
down" from a sexual assault charge.
However, this was precisely the issue this court directed the trial
court to address on Cholewinski's motion for clarification. At that hearing, the trial court stated
that:
I
don't recall relying upon the alleged [sexual assault] as being the basis for
the sentencing and, frankly, without the allegation, I think the sentence was
appropriate and justified based upon what this Court knew about Mr. Cholewinski
at the time of sentencing without regard of what the original charge was.
As appellate counsel noted, it would be frivolous to
pursue this issue when the trial court
expressly denied having considered that allegation at sentencing.
Cholewinski
contends that the no merit report is inaccurate.[5] He challenges the statement that his
in-patient treatment was followed by placement at Serenity House and he
adamantly objects to the probation agent's characterization of him as
"extremely dangerous."
Cholewinski has the right to be sentenced on accurate information. Bruneau v. State, 77 Wis.2d
166, 175, 252 N.W.2d 347, 352 (1977).
However, trial counsel discussed Cholewinski's "walk[ing] away
from" Serenity House and explained the context of his conduct, in an
attempt to minimize the characterization that he is "dangerous." Insofar as trial counsel did not correct
these alleged inaccuracies, Cholewinski's only redress would have been to
pursue an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.
Cholewinski
also contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing
discretion. On appeal, review of the
sentence is limited to whether the trial court erroneously exercised its
discretion. State v. Larsen,
141 Wis.2d 412, 426, 415 N.W.2d 535, 541 (Ct. App. 1987). The primary factors to consider are the
gravity of the offense, the character of the offender, and the need for public
protection. Id. at 427,
415 N.W.2d at 541. The weight given to
each factor is within the trial court's discretion. Cunningham v. State, 76 Wis.2d 277, 282, 251 N.W.2d
65, 67-68 (1977).
The
trial court exercised its discretion in considering the sentencing
factors. It characterized these
offenses as dangerous because a weapon was involved. It focused on the character of the offender, and mentioned
Cholewinski's "poor history" and his inability to successfully
complete probation. The need for public
protection also arose from Cholewinski's inability to comply with the
conditions of his probation. The trial
court told Cholewinski that "you are an individual who decides what you
want to do and when you want to do it without regard to what society requires
and you are putting your own interests first and that's not how things work out
all the time." The trial court
also mentioned the victim's continued fear of Cholewinski.
Cholewinski
also contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing
discretion in imposing a consecutive term on the third count. However, it is within the trial court's
discretion whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for multiple
convictions. Cunningham,
76 Wis.2d at 284-85, 251 N.W.2d at 68-69.
The
trial court exercised its discretion in imposing two concurrent jail terms and
one consecutive jail term for the three convictions. Cholewinski's maximum sentencing exposure was twenty-one months. The prosecutor recommended an aggregate term
of one year, whereas the probation agent recommended an aggregate term of nine
months.[6] Trial counsel recommended that Cholewinski
be released for time served, or for 120 days, with credit for the fifty days
already served.[7] The trial court properly considered the
sentencing factors, including Cholewinski's failure to comply with the
conditions of his probation. A
challenge to the sentencing court's exercise of discretion would lack arguable
merit.
Cholewinski
claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel.[8] Cholewinski's ineffective claims include
trial counsel's failure to object to inaccuracies in the revocation summary and
erroneous statements made at sentencing.[9] Cholewinski is hearing-impaired and contends
that trial counsel did not discuss various matters with him and that this lack
of information, coupled with his inability to understand the court proceedings
in view of his disability, constituted ineffective assistance. Cholewinski also objects to Judge Cameron
having presided over the case.[10] However, trial counsel could have moved to
substitute Judge Cameron because the record does not indicate that Cholewinski
had yet exercised his right of substitution.
Whether Cholewinski advised trial counsel of his objection to Judge
Cameron is unknown since he failed to preserve his ineffective assistance
claim.
"[I]t
is a prerequisite to a claim of ineffective representation on appeal to
preserve the testimony of trial counsel."
State v. Machner, 92 Wis.2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 905, 908
(Ct. App. 1979). It is inappropriate
for this court to determine trial counsel's competency on unsupported
allegations. State v. Simmons,
57 Wis.2d 285, 297, 203 N.W.2d 887, 894-95 (1973). Because there is no evidentiary record on these issues, this
court will not review Cholewinski's ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims.
After
having addressed each issue disclosed by Cholewinski, and having independently
reviewed the record, as expanded by the clarification proceedings, this court
concludes there are no other meritorious issues and that any further appellate
proceedings would lack arguable merit. Anders,
386 U.S. 738; Rule 809.32(3), Stats.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and postconviction orders are
affirmed, and Attorney Jack E. Schairer is relieved of any further appellate
representation of Cholewinski. Rule 809.32(3).
By
the Court.—Judgment and order
affirmed.
[2] A no contest
plea means that the defendant does not claim innocence, but refuses to admit
guilt. Cross v. State, 45
Wis.2d 593, 599, 173 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1970); § 971.06(1)(c), Stats.
[5] However, counsel's statement of the case,
which Cholewinski criticizes as inaccurate, is substantiated by the revocation
summary.
[6] Cholewinski contends that appellate counsel
erroneously reported these recommendations.
However, the sentencing transcript substantiates appellate counsel's
rendition of the respective recommendations.
[7] Cholewinski received sentence credit for the
thirty-seven days he served on a probation hold. Although trial counsel sought credit for the twenty-two days
Cholewinski was confined for in-patient treatment, the trial court recognized
that it was not compelled to grant sentence credit for in-patient treatment and
refused to do so.
[8] In the plea questionnaire and waiver of
rights form, Cholewinski indicated that he was satisfied with trial counsel's
representation.
[9] Cholewinski also
contends that trial counsel should have objected to the court's use of the
original complaint (with the sexual assault allegation), as a factual basis for
his pleas. Trial counsel had stipulated
to use of the original complaint, but only for purposes of accepting
Cholewinski's pleas.
[Judge] Cameron presided over a divorce case between me
and my wife at that time of which he granted to my wife. I did not attend the divorce proceedings
because I was under an arrest warrant at that time. I still [do] not know to this day of what was said against me by
[my] ex-wife at those proceedings at which could not [have] been good, if she
was granted the divorce.
He also claims that Judge Cameron recused himself from a sexual assault
case involving the judge's sister-in-law, which may have accounted for his
strong feelings against Cholewinski, who was charged with sexual assault.