COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JUNE 13, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
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No. 94-2312-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANDREW R. REYNOLDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Outagamie County:
HAROLD V. FROEHLICH, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Cane, P.J.,
LaRocque and Myse, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Andrew Reynolds appeals a judgment
convicting him of theft under § 943.20(1)(b), Stats. He argues that
the State presented insufficient evidence to justify the conviction. We reject that argument and affirm the
judgment.
A jury convicted
Reynolds of accepting money from Jeffrey VerHagen for investment purposes and
converting the money to his personal use.
VerHagen closed an IRA account and received a check for $16,738.62. After talking with Reynolds, who was
VerHagen's friend and insurance agent, VerHagen signed the check over to
"A. R. Insurance Consultants, Inc."
Reynolds endorsed the check "A. R. Reynolds Ins Consultants Inc.
Andrew R. Reynolds" and deposited the money in his business account. Reynolds proceeded to use the money for his
personal expenses and gambling.
The State presented
sufficient evidence to support all of the elements of the offense charged. We must affirm the verdict if the jury,
acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Weighing the credibility of witnesses is
exclusively the jury's province, and the verdict will be overturned only if,
viewing the evidence most favorably to the State and the conviction, it is
inherently or patently incredible, or so lacking in probative value that no
jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Poellinger,
153 Wis.2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752, 755 (1990). The State was required to prove that Reynolds had possession of
VerHagen's money because of his employment, that Reynolds intentionally used
the money without VerHagen's consent and contrary to Reynolds' authority, that
Reynolds knew that this use of the money was without VerHagen's consent and
contrary to Reynolds' authority and that Reynolds used the money with intent to
convert it to his own use. See Wis J I—Criminal 1444 (1994). VerHagen's testimony that he authorized Reynolds
to invest the money for him in another IRA account and not for personal use,
along with the bank records and Reynolds' testimony that he used the money for
personal expenses and gambling, adequately support the conviction.
Reynolds contends that
the money was a personal loan to him and that he was authorized to spend the
money as he saw fit. As the arbiter of
the credibility of the witnesses, the jury was free to reject that testimony. Poellinger, 153 Wis.2d at 503,
451 N.W.2d at 756. VerHagen's version
of the transaction is more believable for many reasons. The amount of the check, including the last
sixty-two cents, is an unusual amount for a personal loan. Other witnesses testified that VerHagen and
Reynolds inquired about the annuity that VerHagen claims he intended to
purchase with the money. VerHagen stood
to incur substantial tax penalty if he failed to invest the money in another
IRA account. VerHagen's divorce left
him with very little cash, making it unlikely that he would lend Reynolds the
money. Turning over money for the
purpose of an investment was consistent with past arrangements between VerHagen
and Reynolds. Past loan agreements
between VerHagen and Reynolds always involved a personal note or some kind of
collateral.
Reynolds argues that the
State failed to prove that he initially acquired the funds by
misrepresentation. That is not an
element of theft under § 943.20(1)(b), Stats. See Wis
J I—Criminal 1444 (1994).
By the Court.—Judgment
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.