PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 94-2279
†Petition for
review filed
Complete Title
of Case:
PHONE PARTNERS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP and
ANTHONY W. CZARNIK,
its general partner,
Plaintiffs-Counterclaim-
Defendants-Appellants,†
v.
C.F. COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Third
Party
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
COCHRAN, FOX & COMPANY, INC.,
Third
Party Defendant-
Respondent.
Submitted on Briefs: June 1, 1995
COURT COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion Released: August 16, 1995
Opinion Filed: August
16, 1995
Source of APPEAL Appeal from a judgment
Full Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower Court. COUNTY: Winnebago
(If
"Special", JUDGE: ROBERT A. HAWLEY
so indicate)
JUDGES: Anderson, P.J., Nettesheim and Snyder, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the plaintiffs-counterclaim
defendants-appellants, the cause was submitted on the briefs of David J. Van
Lieshout of Little Chute.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSOn behalf of the defendant-third party
plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Ralph J.
Ehlinger of Ehlinger & Krill, S.C. of Milwaukee.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August
16, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62(1), Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2279
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
PHONE
PARTNERS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP
and
ANTHONY
W. CZARNIK,
its
general partner,
Plaintiffs-Counterclaim-
Defendants-Appellants,
v.
C.F.
COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Third Party
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
COCHRAN,
FOX & COMPANY, INC.,
Third Party Defendant-
Respondent.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Winnebago County: ROBERT A. HAWLEY, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Anderson, P.J., Nettesheim and Snyder, JJ.
NETTESHEIM,
J. Phone Partners Limited Partnership appeals
from a trial court judgment dismissing its complaint against C.F.
Communications Corporation (CFCC) pursuant to the terms of a stipulated
settlement agreement. Phone Partners
contended that CFCC had not complied with the terms of the stipulation. As a result, it brought a motion for
enforcement of the stipulation and for damages. The trial court determined that Phone Partners had not provided
CFCC timely notice of the alleged noncompliance. The court therefore declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
Phone Partners' alleged damages.
Instead, the court entered an order dismissing Phone Partners' complaint
pursuant to the stipulation.
We
conclude that the trial court did not misuse its discretion when it refused to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of CFCC's alleged
noncompliance. We affirm the judgment
dismissing Phone Partners' complaint.
Background
During
1986, Phone Partners and CFCC entered into two separate lease agreements
whereby Phone Partners provided coin-operated telephones to CFCC. The telephones were then placed in various
business locations by CFCC. On August
27, 1992, Phone Partners brought this action alleging that CFCC had breached
the agreements by failing to make the monthly payments called for in the
agreements. Phone Partners sought
damages of approximately $1.4 million, repossession of the telephones and
related equipment, and other relief.
The dispute between the parties had also inspired other litigation in
other forums.
On
the day before this case was scheduled for jury trial, the parties entered into
a settlement stipulation which was placed upon the record and approved by the
trial court. The stipulation settled
all matters pending between the parties.
Among other provisions, the stipulation required CFCC to return four
hundred “working” telephones in two shipments of two hundred phones each and to
pay Phone Partners a total of $45,000, payable in an initial installment of
$10,000 with remaining payments of $5000 per month plus one percent interest on
the declining balance. Upon CFCC's
compliance with the stipulation, all matters pending between the parties were
to be dismissed and the parties would execute appropriate releases.
CFCC
returned the telephones on July 23 and August 12, 1993, in compliance with the
stipulation. CFCC made the first
monthly payment to Phone Partners in August 1993 and, in accordance with the
stipulation, made all of the successive monthly payments by check. Except for the final payment in March 1994,
Phone Partners cashed all the checks.
On March 25, 1994, per the stipulation, CFCC tendered the appropriate
releases and stipulation for dismissals of the pending litigation to Phone
Partners. On May 4, 1994, Phone
Partners advised CFCC that it would not execute the documents because the
telephones were not in working order.
CFCC
responded with a motion for enforcement of the stipulation. Phone Partners responded with its own motion
for enforcement of the stipulation, seeking an evidentiary hearing on its
further claim for $55,000 in damages as the alleged cost for repairing the
telephones.
In
support of its motion, Phone Partners relied on the following history. In October 1993, it had entered an agreement
to provide a third party with some of the returned telephones. From November 1993 to January 1994, the third
party complained that the telephones were not working properly. Consequently, Phone Partners had the
telephones inspected and repaired.
Phone Partners notified its attorney of the problem. The attorney counseled that Phone Partners
should investigate further before attributing the problems to CFCC. Upon advice of its attorney, Phone Partners
did not cash CFCC's final check tendered in March 1994.
At
the hearing on the parties' motions, CFCC argued that Phone Partners had not
provided adequate and timely notice of the alleged defects. After granting Phone Partners time to file a
brief on the question, the trial court ruled at a later hearing that Phone
Partners' complaints regarding the condition of the telephones had not
seasonably been brought to CFCC's attention.
In making this ruling, the court relied on relevant provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
Therefore, the court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to
whether the telephones were in working order.
Phone Partners appeals.
Discussion
The
trial court concluded that Phone Partners' objection to the condition of the
telephones had not been “seasonably brought” under the UCC. Section 402.602(1), Stats., provides that the “[r]ejection of goods must be
within a reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably
notifies the seller.” Section
402.606(1), Stats., provides,
“Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer:
¼ (b) Fails to make an effective rejection (s.
402.602(1)), but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a
reasonable opportunity to inspect them.”
Phone
Partners argues that the trial court erroneously relied on these provisions of
the UCC when rejecting its request for an evidentiary hearing as to whether
CFCC had complied with the stipulation.
Phone Partners contends that this case concerns a stipulation, not a
contract under the UCC. Thus, Phone
Partners reasons that the waiver, estoppel and laches implications of the UCC
provisions upon which the trial court relied are inapplicable. CFCC responds that the stipulation is a
contract, and must be interpreted under the UCC or common law contract law.
We
conclude that the correct answer lies in between the parties' opposite
positions on this issue. And, the
answer also implicates our standard of review which we first address.
A
trial court may totally accept or reject a stipulation presented by the parties
for its approval. See Bliwas
v. Bliwas, 47 Wis.2d 635, 638-39, 178 N.W.2d 35, 37 (1970). Until approved, it is no more than a
recommendation to the court. See
id. at 638, 178 N.W.2d at 37.
Approval of a stipulation is within the trial court's discretion because
once approved, it becomes the court's judgment. See id. at 639, 178 N.W.2d at 37. Therefore, when an order is entered
pursuant to the consent of the parties to be bound thereby, it is considered a
judicial act, subject to the court's continuing jurisdiction to modify the
order. Lueck's Home Improvement,
Inc. v. Seal Tite Nat'l, Inc., 142 Wis.2d 843, 848 n.4, 419 N.W.2d 340,
342 (Ct. App. 1987).
Similarly,
stipulations of settlement may be enforced by the court and may only be avoided
with the court's approval. See
§§ 807.05,[1]
806.07(1), Stats.; Burmeister
v. Vondrachek, 86 Wis.2d 650, 664, 273 N.W.2d 242, 248 (1979). The trial court is given discretion on
whether to grant relief from a stipulation pursuant to § 806.07. The standards in § 806.07 are congruent with
the equitable standards that permit a trial court to grant relief from a
voidable contract, for example, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable
neglect, fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party. See Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co.,
154 Wis.2d 56, 68, 452 N.W.2d 360, 366 (1990).
From
this law, it is clear that questions regarding the initial approval and
enforcement of a stipulation and relief therefrom are committed to the trial
court's discretion. This includes the
issue presented in this case: whether the trial court properly declined to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on Phone Partners' complaint that CFCC did not
return the telephones in working order and on Phone Partners' request for
further damages.
Therefore,
we review the trial court's ruling denying Phone Partners' request for an
evidentiary hearing on its motion for enforcement of the stipulation as a
discretionary act. An appellate court
will sustain a discretionary act if the trial court examined the relevant
facts, applied a proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational
process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis.2d
400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1982).
In
making its discretionary ruling, the trial court relied on the provisions of
the UCC to which we have alluded. This
brings us back to the question of the proper role of contract law in a
stipulation setting. Because the matter
is committed to the discretion of the trial court, we cannot hold, as CFCC
argues, that contract law is binding on the trial court as to a stipulation
question. However, neither can we agree
with Phone Partners that contract law is irrelevant. To the contrary, principles of contract law may sometimes
illumine a stipulation dispute even to the point of being dispositive. See Kocinski, 154
Wis.2d at 67, 452 N.W.2d at 365. Thus,
a trial court may properly look to contract law for assistance in construing,
enforcing or modifying a stipulation. See,
e.g., Oostburg State Bank v. United Savs. & Loan Ass'n,
125 Wis.2d 224, 234-35, 372 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 130
Wis.2d 4, 386 N.W.2d 53 (1986).
Turning
to this case, we observe that by March 1994, CFCC had fully performed all of
its obligations under the July 1993 stipulation. It had returned all the telephones, with the final shipment
occurring in August 1993, and had paid all of the installment payments,
including the final payment in March 1994.
Not until May 1994 did Phone Partners notify CFCC that the telephones
were allegedly defective.
In
contrast, when Phone Partners received the telephones from CFCC in July and
August 1993, it had the telephones stored in a separate storage facility in
Appleton, Wisconsin. Before placing the
telephones in storage, Phone Partners did not test them to determine if they
were in working condition as agreed in the stipulation. Without inspecting the telephones, Phone
Partners delivered fifteen of the telephones to a third party in October
1993. From November 1993 until January
1994, the third party complained about the condition of the telephones. It was only then that Phone Partners
inspected the telephones returned by CFCC the previous year.
Given
CFCC's full compliance with the delivery and payment provisions of the
stipulation, coupled with Phone Partners' delay in reporting the alleged
defects to CFCC, the trial court had a reasonable basis for concluding that
Phone Partners had not seasonably notified CFCC of any defects in the
telephones. The trial court properly
exercised its discretion by looking to the UCC for direction on this
question. As we have noted, although
the UCC was not binding, it did serve to illumine the inquiry. See Kocinski, 154
Wis.2d at 67, 452 N.W.2d at 365. As
such, the court was entitled to rely on those contract principles as
dispositive on the discretionary issue presented.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
[1] Section 807.05, Stats., provides:
No agreement, stipulation, or consent between the parties
or their attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in an action or special
proceeding shall be binding unless made in court ... and entered in the minutes
or recorded by the reporter, or made in writing and subscribed by the party to
be bound thereby or the party's attorney.