COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED November 15, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2013
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT II
In re the Marriage of:
KATHERINE J. GREGOR,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
DONALD H. GREGOR,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of
the circuit court for Racine County:
ALLEN B. TORHORST, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, Nettesheim
and Snyder, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Donald H. Gregor appeals
from three orders arising out of his failure to pay child support and
maintenance. On appeal, Donald raises a
multitude of issues, none of which we find persuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the
circuit court.
The underlying facts
were set forth in this court's opinion on an earlier appeal, Gregor v.
Gregor, No. 92-1141, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 31,
1993). Since that appeal, numerous
hearings on various arrearages have occurred, culminating in orders finding
Donald in contempt for failure to pay child support.
Many of Donald's seven
issues attempt to challenge matters beyond this court's jurisdiction because
they arise from final orders or judgments never appealed from. Failure to appeal within the times set by
either § 808.04, Stats., or §
805.17(3), Stats., deprives this court
of jurisdiction. Wainwright v.
Wainwright, 176 Wis.2d 246, 250, 500 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Ct. App.
1993). By this court's order of
December 7, 1994, we indicated that we have jurisdiction to review the
May 9, 1994, contempt order; the June 30, 1994, order denying Donald's
motion to decrease child support; and the September 13, 1994, order denying his
motion for a new trial. We do not
address, therefore, his issues concerning reopening of the divorce judgment,
res judicata and his constitutional property rights.[1]
Donald next claims that
he was deprived of his constitutional rights to due process and hearing before
an impartial judge on maintenance arrearage issues. This question was fully aired at an April 1, 1992, hearing, at
which the circuit court deemed Donald's motion as one arising under § 806.07, Stats., and denied it. Donald evidently did not appeal at that
time. Contrary to his assertions, his
motions which underlie the orders now properly before this court did not
clearly raise the maintenance arrearage issue.[2] Moreover, Donald made no particular mention
of this arrearage at the September 9, 1994, motion hearing. A motion must be sufficiently specific to
support a particular objection sought to be raised on appeal. See E. M. Boerke, Inc. v.
Williams, 28 Wis.2d 627, 631, 137 N.W.2d 489, 491 (1965). We therefore deem Donald to have abandoned
this issue in the circuit court.
We are at a loss to
address Donald's fifth issue:
“Petitioner-Respondent's contemptuous failure to pay property taxes is
what ignited the current '92-95 government actions - under the color of law -
to impair, interfere and deny respondent-appellant his bill of rights freedoms
of life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness.” Much of his argument addresses matters
litigated well before the three orders now properly before us; much of it
chronicles, without citation to authority or legal argument, events between
1987 and 1992, rife with vague conspiracies and cabals against him, all without
support; but none of it specifies just what of the three orders constitutes
error concerning property taxes. This
argument neither explains nor develops Donald's position; we decline to develop
his argument for him. See State
v. Gulrud, 140 Wis.2d 721, 730, 412 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Ct. App. 1987).
Donald's sixth issue
argues error in changing child support from a fixed sum to a percentage and in
imputing income to him. However, Donald
ascribes these actions first to an order of February 19, 1992, which was the
order he appealed from in May 1992. A
litigant is concluded by the mandate of an appellate court as to all matters
actually presented or which might consistently with legal rules have been
presented to that court upon appeal. See
Cathey v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 Wis.2d 184, 188, 130 N.W.2d 777,
779 (1964). Donald is foreclosed as to
these contentions because the judgment on the previous appeal is res
judicata. See id.
at 185-86, 130 N.W.2d at 778.[3]
Finally, Donald contends
that his wages are being garnished twice rather than once. This matter was addressed at the motion
hearing of September 9, 1994, and while the circuit court did indicate that
there should only be one wage assignment of $375, the record reveals some
confusion over whether Donald's wages actually were being garnished twice:
THE COURT: Are you losing more than 375 a month on your Kinko income?
MR. GREGOR: Not now, because the problem is that--
THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. If
you're not losing it now-- If you are,
we'll straighten it out.
MR. GREGOR: My employer did not get both of them. I got a copy of one and my employer got a copy of another. Okay.
So on June--on April 28-- Well,
you filed the order June 30th, I believe.
One week later, you signed a wage garnishment for 375 and then one week
later, VanKampen signed a garnishment for 375.
THE
COURT: Should be only one in
effect. Your employer has got two and
taking out more than that? Mr.
Huempfner will straighten it out. If
not, it's 375 until someone changes it.
Donald has made no
adequate showing, either here or below, that his wages are actually being
garnished twice. We cannot, therefore,
fault the circuit court for taking no action beyond what was done. Donald is free to present proof to the
circuit court of his wages being doubly garnished.[4]
By the Court.—Orders
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Donald's property right issue does allude to the May 9, 1994, and June 30, 1994, orders, tying them to a motion hearing of April 28, 1994, which, Donald claims, violated his due process rights. However, Donald has provided this court with but one and one-half pages of the transcript of this hearing. Our scope of review is necessarily confined to the record before this court when an appeal is brought on a partial transcript. Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 194 Wis.2d 203, 212 n.2, 533 N.W.2d 746, 750 (1995). Without a full transcript, we will not surmise that the court somehow failed to accord Donald his rights.
[2] In the seventy-odd pages of motion papers, we find only one fleeting reference to the $2700 arrearage and that in the context of asking for an audit of the child support agency “[t]o determine where the lost $2,704.00 maintenance money paid by the respondent to the Clerk of Court went.”
[3] In the context of this issue, Donald baldly calls into question the integrity of the circuit court. We will not consider such baseless and disrespectful allegations.
[4] In the conclusion of his brief-in-chief, Donald asks for a wide range of relief, much of which involves issues not properly addressed on appeal. Generally, this court does not consider arguments broadly stated but never specifically argued. Fritz v. McGrath, 146 Wis.2d 681, 686, 431 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 1988). We see no reason to depart from this rule here.