COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED JUNE
6, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-2008-CR
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE
OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CURTIS
ELLIS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL
from judgments of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: LAURENCE C. GRAM, JR., Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Wedemeyer, P.J., Sullivan and Schudson, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. A jury found Curtis Ellis
guilty of first-degree intentional homicide, a violation of § 940.01(1), Stats., and attempted first-degree
intentional homicide, a violation of §§ 940.01(1) and 939.32, Stats.
Ellis appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied
suppression of two statements he gave to police. Ellis maintains that the first statement should have been
suppressed because it was involuntary.
He contends that the second statement was inadmissible at trial because
it was the product of the allegedly involuntary first statement. We reject Ellis's arguments and affirm.
On
December 23, 1990, a limousine was parked in front of a Milwaukee tavern. In the limousine were two passengers and a
driver. One of the passengers left the
limousine. As the passenger walked
away, he was followed by a man who shot him.
The shooter then turned and fired three shots into the front of
the limousine, but the driver and the other passenger managed to get
away.
Police
arrested Ellis for the shootings in March 1991. Officer David Orlowski was assigned to complete an
"arrest show up" form.
Officer Orlowski subsequently testified that when police interview
arrestees regarding their background, they use these forms to compile the
information they obtain. Officer
Orlowski testified that while he filled out the form, Ellis told him about the
shootings.
Within
one hour after completing the show-up, Ellis was interviewed by another
officer, Detective Leroy Shaw.
Detective Shaw informed Ellis that he was aware Ellis had told Officer
Orlowski about the shootings. Detective
Shaw testified that Ellis then told police about the shootings.
Prior
to trial, Ellis moved the trial court to suppress the statements he gave to the
police. He maintained that the
information he gave to Officer Orlowski should be suppressed because Officer
Orlowski had interrogated him without providing him with any Miranda[1]
warnings, and that his statement was involuntary. Ellis sought suppression of the statement he gave to Detective
Shaw, contending that the statement had been obtained by exploiting the
information police obtained in the initial statement he had given to Officer Orlowski. Ellis thus contended that the second
statement was in part the product of the improper interrogation by Officer
Orlowski and was inadmissible.[2]
Officer
Orlowski testified at the suppression hearing regarding his actions at the
show-up interview with Ellis. He told
the trial court that to complete the show-up form, officers ask arrestees
questions about their personal history, including questions about their names,
birth dates, height, weight, family history, and whom to notify in an
emergency.
Officer
Orlowski testified that, at the time he completed the form with Ellis, Ellis
was seated at a desk without handcuffs.
Officer Orlowski testified that Ellis began "rambling on about
things" during the interview. The
officer stated that he told Ellis he knew "a lot" of Ellis's
historical background because, during the investigation into the shooting, he
had spoken with people who knew Ellis, including his family. Officer Orlowski testified that Ellis stated
that he wished to talk to him "because [I] was listening to
him." Ellis then began to tell
Officer Orlowski about his involvement in the shootings, and also about
"an incident with his girlfriend."
Officer
Orlowski admitted that at the time Ellis began talking about these incidents,
Ellis had not been provided with any Miranda warnings. Officer Orlowski noted, however, that he had
not asked Ellis about the shootings, but that Ellis volunteered the information
and continued talking about the shootings throughout the show-up interview. Although Officer Orlowski testified that he
asked no specific questions of Ellis regarding the shootings, he conceded that
he had asked two questions seeking clarification of terms Ellis used. Officer Orlowski testified that when Ellis
began speaking of "units," he asked him to explain what he meant by a
"unit," and Ellis told him he meant guns. Officer Orlowski also testified that Ellis told him that one of
"the guys" suggested that they "break it." Officer Orlowski testified that he asked
Ellis what "break it" meant, and Ellis told him that to "break
it" means to commit a robbery.
Ellis
denied that he gave Officer Orlowski a statement regarding the shootings. On cross-examination, however, he admitted
that he had spoken to Officer Orlowski about an incident with his
girlfriend. He testified that Officer
Orlowski did not threaten him in any way, or make any promises to him. Ellis also admitted that he had been
arrested before and that he was familiar with his Miranda
rights. He affirmed that he had spoken
with Officer Orlowski willingly. The
trial court found that Officer Orlowski had not given Ellis any Miranda
warnings, but also implicitly found that Ellis had given a statement to Officer
Orlowski about the shootings.[3] The trial court held that Ellis had given
the information to Officer Orlowski voluntarily.
On
appeal, Ellis contends that Officer Orlowski subjected him to a custodial
interrogation without informing him of his constitutional rights. While Ellis concedes that Officer Orlowski
was courteous and "nice," he contends that Officer Orlowski's
"gentle manner" was inherently coercive under the circumstances. Thus, he contends that his initial statement
was involuntary, and therefore should have been suppressed. We disagree.[4]
As
Ellis notes, this court's review of a trial court's determination that a
custodial statement was voluntary is a question of constitutional fact subject
to independent review. See State
v. Turner, 136 Wis.2d 333, 343-44, 401 N.W.2d 827, 832-33 (1987). When presented with questions of
constitutional fact, a "reviewing court has the duty to apply
constitutional principles to the facts as found" by the trial court. Id. at 344, 401 N.W.2d at
832. The trial court's findings of
historical fact, to which the reviewing court applies the constitutional
principles, will not be upset unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 343, 401 N.W.2d at 832.
We
have no difficulty in holding that the police did not violate any
constitutional principles when Ellis made his first statement about the
shootings. "[C]oercive police
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not
'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
167 (1986), but even the presence of coercive police activity "does not,
in and of itself, establish involuntariness." State v. Deets, 187 Wis.2d 630, 635, 523 N.W.2d
180, 182 (Ct. App. 1994). In addition,
a defendant's custodial statement "is not presumed compelled simply
because interrogators may have taken it in violation of Miranda." State v. Camacho, 170 Wis.2d
53, 75, 487 N.W.2d 67, 77 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 176
Wis.2d 860, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993).
The
trial court's findings that Ellis spoke to Officer Orlowski about the shootings
and that he did so without police prompting are not clearly erroneous See § 805.17(2), Stats.
(trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous). Ellis's own testimony
indicates that his statement was voluntary.
Ellis admitted that because of numerous prior contacts with the police
he was aware of his Miranda rights. He also admitted that he voluntarily chose to speak with Officer
Orlowski. Neither Officer Orlowski nor
Ellis testified that Officer Orlowski asked questions about the shootings,
other than the two clarifying questions Officer Orlowski asked after Ellis
began supplying information about the shootings. Ellis denied telling Officer Orlowski about the shootings, but
the trial court found that testimony not credible, another finding that is not
clearly erroneous.
While
it is undisputed that Officer Orlowski was courteous and "nice" to
Ellis, we are aware of no case law suggesting that courteous behavior by police
toward an arrestee is inherently coercive.
There was no evidence presented to suggest that Officer Orlowski was
attempting, by behaving courteously, to undermine Ellis's desire to remain
silent. We cannot and will not hold
that police courtesy toward a prisoner is coercive behavior as a matter of law.[5]
By
the Court.—Judgments affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See
Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[2] Ellis also contended that the police had not
apprised him of his Miranda rights prior to his giving the second
statement. Police testified that they
had, and the trial court found the police version of the interrogation more
credible. Ellis has abandoned this
issue on appeal.
[3] We note that the trial court did not
specifically find that Ellis had given a statement to Officer Orlowski about
the shootings. However, such a finding
is a necessary prerequisite to the trial court's determination that Ellis's
initial statement about the shootings was voluntarily given.
[4] Because we hold that Ellis voluntarily gave
his first statement, his contention that the statement he gave to Detective
Shaw should also have been suppressed as the fruit of the first statement fails
of necessity. We will therefore not
address that argument further. See
Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938)
(only dispositive issues need be addressed on appeal).
[5] In support of his contention that Officer
Orlowski's gentle manner was coercive, Ellis cites to Woods v. Clusen,
605 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Wis. 1985), a case that holds "gentle
inducements" can be unconstitutional in certain circumstances. In Woods, the person being
questioned was a juvenile with no prior criminal record. His shoes and clothes were taken and he was
permitted to wear only jail coveralls. Id.
at 897. He was placed in an
interrogation room where "he was confronted with gruesome
photographs" of the crime for which he had been arrested. Id. He was not given his Miranda rights and he was not
asked if he wished to submit to an interrogation. Id. at 893. There was evidence that one police
officer cajoled the defendant and misrepresented the evidence in police
possession. Id. at
897. The other officer was
"fatherly," and offered advice to Woods that things would "be
easier" or "go better" if Woods confessed. Id. Woods confessed after lengthy questioning by police.
The facts here are
easily distinguished from Woods.
Ellis had experience with the criminal justice system and was aware of
his Miranda rights from that experience. Officer Orlowski was alone with Ellis, and
merely indicated that he was familiar with some of his background. Ellis began telling Officer Orlowski about
the shootings without any prodding from the police officer shortly after they
began filling out the show-up. Officer
Orlowski asked no specific questions about the crime and there is no allegation
that he made any representations about the crime or what information police had
about the crime. There was no evidence
that Officer Orlowski cajoled Ellis.
When he asked questions, he did so in an attempt to understand the terms
Ellis was using. The record is devoid
of any indication that Ellis gave his statement involuntarily because his will
had been overridden by Officer Orlowski's courtesy.