COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED September 21, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-1969
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
IN RE THE ESTATE OF
WILLIAM G. EASTMAN,
DECEASED:
JAMES P. WATKINS,
Appellant,
v.
ESTATE OF WILLIAM G.
EASTMAN,
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment
of the circuit court for Dane County:
SARAH B. O'BRIEN, Judge. Affirmed
in part; reversed in part and cause remanded with directions.
Before Dykman, Sundby,
and Vergeront, JJ.
PER CURIAM. James P. Watkins appeals pro se from
a judgment dismissing his claim against the Estate of William G. Eastman. The claim is based on Eastman's shooting of
Watkins's dog. We reverse insofar as
the judgment dismissed the claim for damages under § 174.01(3), Stats.
We affirm in all other respects.
Watkins's claim against
the Estate sought damages for Eastman's killing of his "purebred Siberian
Husky," Norton. Watkins stated
that he had been "emotionally devastated," and he sought $50,000 to
compensate for "the loss of Norton and to pay for psychological
help." Watkins later amended the
amount claimed to $150,000. The trial
court granted a motion to dismiss at the close of Watkins's case. It concluded that Eastman's shooting of the
dog was permitted under § 174.01(1)(b), Stats. The court also made other rulings which we
will discuss below.
A person who illegally
kills a dog is liable to the owner for double damages resulting from the
killing. Section 174.01(3), Stats.
A person may intentionally kill a dog if a domestic animal that is owned
by the person is threatened with serious bodily harm by the dog; the dog is on
property owned by the person; and other restraining actions were tried and
failed, or immediate action is necessary.
Section 174.01(1)(b). Watkins
does not dispute that Norton was on Eastman's property or that Eastman's
pheasants were domestic animals. He
argues that the circumstances of the shooting did not otherwise satisfy the
statute.
Eastman was the only
known witness to the shooting of the dog.
Watkins attempted to testify about what Eastman told him about the
incident, but the trial court sustained the Estate's objection under
§ 885.16, Stats., the
"dead man's statute." The
only account of the incident at trial was provided by a sheriff's deputy who
investigated at Watkins's request.
According to the deputy,
Eastman said that when he first arrived two dogs were outside his pheasant pen,
chasing pheasants that were inside the pen.
Eastman said the dogs caused the birds to fly over the wall of the pen,
at which time the dogs were killing them.
When Eastman approached, the dogs "broke and started to
run." Eastman did not say whether
he did anything after he saw the dogs and before shooting at them. Eastman showed the deputy where he was when
he shot at the dogs. It was a short
distance from the pheasant pen. He shot
at one dog and missed, and then shot at Watkins's dog and hit it. The deputy estimated, on the basis of
Eastman's account, that the dog was approximately 120 yards away from the pen
when shot. Eastman told the deputy that
"he felt that it would be a problem if they were allowed to escape, and
due to the fact that he didn't know who the animals belong to, he fired at
them."
Watkins also presented
the testimony of an animal pathologist at the Animal Health Laboratory in
Madison who performed an autopsy on Norton.
He testified that one bullet "severed the tail and then went in
just right lateral to the anus, and it traveled a path almost directly to the
right hip and fractured the bones of the hip as well as the head of the
femur." This was not a fatal
wound, "providing the dog could have been taken to a facility that would
handle the shock and the cardiovascular effects" of the event. The fatal wound was a shot to the head.
The circumstances of the
fatal shot are not clear from the testimony.
It appears that Eastman went to the wounded dog and shot it again,
although so far as we can determine there was no testimony expressly to that
effect.[1] The trial court appeared to find that this
was what occurred.
In its decision, the
trial court noted that the dogs were running away, but it accepted Eastman's
explanation that "immediate action was necessary to prevent the dogs from
escaping, only to come back at a later time to continue to harm his
birds." The court further
acknowledged that Watkins "makes a compelling argument that injuring the
dog would have been enough and that killing it was unnecessary." However, the court concluded that shooting
the dog a second time was justified because Eastman could not approach it to
look for tags and it would have been cruel to leave it there.
In reviewing a trial
court's decision to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's case, we are to
give "substantial deference" to the trial court's ability to assess
the evidence, and should set aside the dismissal only if the court was
"clearly wrong." James
v. Heintz, 165 Wis.2d 572, 577, 478 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Ct. App. 1991). We must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Section
805.14(1) and (3), Stats.
We conclude that, under
any view of the evidence, the trial court was clearly wrong in ruling that
Eastman's actions were in compliance with § 174.01(1)(b), Stats.
That statute is written in the present tense: "if a domestic animal ... is
threatened with serious bodily harm ...." (Emphasis added.) A dog
that was 120 yards from the pen and running away was not threatening serious
bodily harm to the pheasants. The fact
that the dog had previously threatened harm, and might again at some later
time, does not make the killing authorized.
The purpose of this statute appears to be to create a high standard for
killing dogs, as opposed to that which might be applied to "nuisance"
wild animals. The authority to kill a
dog ends when the domestic animal no longer faces an immediate threat. Once Watkins's dog fled, Eastman had other
options for preventing future harm, such as contacting the proper animal
control authority.
The evidence also does
not show that Eastman's actions satisfied the final provision of the
statute. There is no evidence that he
tried and failed in other restraining actions, or that immediate action was
necessary. The fact that the dog might
later return did not make immediate killing necessary, since other measures
were available. Contrary to the trial
court's conclusion, the statute does not allow killing of a dog if immediate
action is necessary to prevent it from escaping and returning at a later time.
If, as the trial court
concluded, Eastman shot the dog a second time as an act of mercy, this act was
not permitted by any exception in the statute.
The only persons allowed to kill dogs are fish and game wardens,
officers controlling rabies or acting pursuant to court order, dog pound
officers, veterinarians, and dog owners killing their own dogs in a proper and
humane manner. Section 174.01(2), Stats.
Therefore, we conclude
the trial court erred in granting the Estate's motion to dismiss Watkins's
claim for damages under § 174.01(3), Stats. On remand, the trial court shall allow the
Estate to present its evidence, if any, and shall otherwise resolve the
remainder of this claim.
Watkins argues that the
trial court erred by ruling that § 885.16, Stats., bars his testimony as to what Eastman told him about
the shooting incident. That statute
provides in relevant part that no person shall be examined in respect to any
communication by the person with a deceased person in which the opposite party
sustains his or her liability to the cause of action from, through, or under
the deceased person. In other words, a
claimant, such as Watkins, cannot testify about a conversation with a deceased
person if the party opposing Watkins (here, the Estate) may be liable because
of its relationship with the deceased person.
The purpose of the statute is to prevent the possibility that a
one-sided description of such a conversation will be presented to the
court. The trial court properly
concluded that Watkins is barred from describing what Eastman said in order to
make a claim against the Estate.
As he explained at the
hearing, Watkins also seeks damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The trial court dismissed
this claim on the ground that Eastman's conduct was not extreme or outrageous because
the shooting was legal. Because we have
reached a different conclusion as to the shooting, this rationale is not
grounds for dismissing the claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. However, we may affirm when
the trial court's decision was correct, although for the wrong reason. State v. Alles, 106 Wis.2d
368, 391, 316 N.W.2d 378, 388 (1982).
One of the necessary elements of this claim is that the defendant
intended to cause emotional distress. Bowen
v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 183 Wis.2d 627, 639, 517 N.W.2d 432,
437 (1994). The evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to Watkins, does not establish this element. There is no evidence that in shooting at the
dogs Eastman intended to cause emotional distress to their owners.
Watkins argues that he
is entitled to an accounting of the Estate under § 858.03, Stats.
That statute concerns inventories.
At the hearing, Watkins cited § 862.11, Stats., which deals with accounts. Watkins's argument is based upon him being a "person
interested," as that term is used in those sections. However, he is not a "person
interested" as defined in § 851.21, Stats. Watkins is not entitled to an inventory or
an account.
Watkins argues that he
is entitled to damages for emotional harm that was done to him by Eastman's
suicide. However, there is no legal
theory upon which Watkins can recover for his feelings about Eastman's suicide.
Watkins argues that
Eastman recklessly endangered the public when he fired at the dogs. This argument has no relevance to Watkins's
claim against Eastman's Estate.
Watkins argues that he
should have been allowed to try his case to a jury. There is no right to a jury trial in probate cases. In re Estate of Elvers, 48
Wis.2d 17, 22, 179 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1970).
Watkins also makes
several other arguments which are without merit or are mooted by our resolution
of the issues above.
On remand, the trial
court shall allow the Estate to present its evidence in opposition to Watkins's
claim under § 174.01(3), Stats.,
and shall resolve any remaining issues related to that claim.
By the Court.--Judgment
affirmed in part; reversed in part and cause remanded with directions.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] In questioning the deputy, Watkins read the following sentences from the deputy's report: "Mr. Watkins was very upset by the fact that Mr. Eastman would shoot and kill a dog after he had already wounded it due to the fact that he may have been able to save the animal." "He feels that Mr. Eastman should be charged with something criminal, not only due to the fact that he had shot his dog, but that he had also shot the dog in the head at close range, killing without his permission." The deputy testified that these were true statements. However, the excerpts state only the feelings and opinions of Watkins, and do not actually state as fact that a second shot was fired. The report itself was not offered.