COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED June
29, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule 809.62,
Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-0320
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
SISTER
MARY FELTEN,
and
ST. MARY'S SCHOOL,
Petitioners-Respondents,
v.
FRANK
A. DOLEZAL,
Respondent-Appellant.
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Richland County: MICHAEL T.
KIRCHMAN, Judge. Dismissed.
Before
Dykman, Sundby, and Vergeront, JJ.
PER
CURIAM. Frank A. Dolezal appeals from an order granting an
injunction restraining him from all contact with Sister Mary Felten and St.
Mary's School. The trial court found
reasonable grounds to believe that Dolezal had harassed Felten and other school
faculty and students in violation of § 947.013(1m)(b), Stats.,[1]
and granted a harassment injunction effective for one year. Dolezal contends that the trial court failed
to hold the injunction hearing within the statutory time requirement of seven
days after the issuance of a temporary restraining order thereby violating §
813.125(3)(c), Stats.[2] He raises three other issues for
appeal: (1) the trial court denied
him due process of law; (2) the trial court denied him a fair and
impartial hearing; and (3) the trial court abused its discretionary
power. We conclude that because the
injunction has expired, this appeal is moot.
We therefore dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
On December 14, 1993,
Sister Mary Felten and St. Mary's School filed a petition requesting a
temporary restraining order against Dolezal.
Felten asserted that Dolezal had engaged in a pattern of conduct that
was threatening to the faculty and students at the school and caused them to be
fearful for their own physical safety. The
petition noted three separate incidents in which Dolezal had harassed Felten
and other faculty members and students.
The
trial court granted a temporary restraining order and informed both parties
that a hearing was scheduled for December 20 on the matter. At the hearing, Judge Kent C. Houck
disqualified himself because Dolezal had requested that he recuse himself from
a divorce case in which Dolezal was a party.
On December 22, 1993, Judge Michael T. Kirchman was assigned to hear the
motion. After a hearing on the matter,
the court found reasonable grounds to believe that Dolezal had violated
§ 947.013, Stats., and it
granted a harassment injunction effective until January 20, 1995. Dolezal appeals.
MOOT QUESTION
We first address whether
this appeal is moot. Mootness is a
question of law which we review de novo.
"[A] case is moot when the decision sought by the parties cannot
have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy." In re W.J.C., 124 Wis.2d 238,
239, 369 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Ct. App. 1985).
As
a matter of judicial economy, we generally decline to review a case as soon as
mootness is shown, regardless when or how it is shown. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette,
108 Wis.2d 637, 643 n.4, 323 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Ct. App. 1982). We may, however, decide moot appeals on the
merits where the constitutionality of a statute is involved or where the
precise situation under consideration is likely to arise again such that a
definitive decision is essential to guide trial courts. DeLaMatter v. DeLaMatter, 151
Wis.2d 576, 591-92, 445 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Ct. App. 1989). We may also review a moot appeal if the
issue is one of great importance and evades review because the appellate
process cannot be completed in time. In
re Shirley J.C., 172 Wis.2d 371, 375, 493 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Ct. App.
1992).
The
one-year injunction expired January 20, 1995.
Nothing this court can do will affect it. Additionally, this appeal does not present any of the factors
which might persuade us that a decision on the merits is appropriate. Accordingly, we conclude that the appeal is
moot.
By the Court.—Order
dismissed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Section 947.013(1m)(b), Stats., provides:
Whoever, with
intent to harass or intimidate another person, does any of the following is
subject to a Class B forfeiture:
....
(b) Engages in a
course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which harass or intimidate the
person and which serve no legitimate purpose.
[2] Section 813.125(3)(c), Stats., provides:
The temporary
restraining order is in effect until a hearing is held on issuance of an
injunction under sub. (4). A judge or
court commissioner shall hold a hearing on issuance of an injunction within 7
days after the temporary restraining order is issued, unless the time is
extended upon the written consent of the parties or extended once for 7 days
upon a finding that the respondent has not been served with a copy of the
temporary restraining order although the petitioner has exercised due
diligence.