COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED July 05, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 94-0271
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
ALICE H. KOCINSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ATTORNEY STEPHEN E.
KRAVIT,
KRAVIT, GASS &
WEBER, S.C.,
AND ALL INSURERS, ET
AL.,
Defendants-Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County: MICHAEL J. SKWIERAWSKI, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Sullivan, Fine
and LaRocque, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Alice H. Kocinski, pro se,
appeals from an order dismissing her pro se complaint against
Attorney Stephen E. Kravit and the law firm of Kravit, Gass & Weber, S.C.
(collectively, Kravit), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and failure to file the complaint within the applicable statutory
period of limitations. Kocinski's pro se
complaint alleged that Kravit provided “inadequate representation” and
“participat[ed in] illegalities” with another law firm, the City of Milwaukee,
and the defendant's attorneys—all in a “fraudulent attempt to deprive [her] of
her just due for compensable damages” resulting from a 1982 boat accident. We only address one issue presented for our
review—whether her complaint states a valid claim for legal malpractice.[1] We conclude that Kocinski's complaint does
not allege how Kravit's alleged actions caused her to suffer any monetary
damages or any injury. Therefore,
Kocinski has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and we affirm
the order of the trial court.
Kocinski filed her legal
malpractice complaint against Kravit, seeking $103,000,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages and $2,000 in past legal fees. Kocinski retained Kravit in April 1987 because her previous
counsel withdrew from representing her in a personal injury suit resulting from
a 1982 boating accident. Her previous
counsel obtained a $260,000 settlement with the City of Milwaukee for her
injuries, but Kocinski refused to consent to the settlement agreement and her
counsel withdrew from the case. Kocinski then retained Kravit to challenge the enforceability of
the settlement agreement, but the trial court upheld the agreement. Kravit then withdrew from representing Kocinski
after she rejected Kravit's advice not to appeal the trial court order. Kocinski filed a pro se appeal
to both the court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court, see Kocinski
v. Home Ins. Co., 147 Wis.2d 728, 433 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1988), and
then to the supreme court, which modified the court of appeals decision and
remanded the case to the trial court. See
Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co., 154 Wis.2d 56, 452 N.W.2d 360
(1990). She then instituted the
separate cause of action against Kravit that is at issue in the present case.
“Whether a claim for
relief exists is a question of law which this court reviews independently,
without deference to the circuit court.”
Paskiet v. Quality State Oil Co., 164 Wis.2d 800, 805, 476
N.W.2d 871, 873 (1991). The alleged
facts stated in the complaint must be accepted as true. Id. “[T]he `complaint must be liberally construed to do substantial
justice and, if reasonably possible, construed to state a cause of
action.'” Id. (citation
omitted). If after reviewing the
allegations contained in the complaint, it appears certain that no relief can
be granted to the plaintiff, then we will affirm an order dismissing a
complaint for failure to state a claim.
Peterman v. Midwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 177 Wis.2d 682,
697, 503 N.W.2d 312, 318 (Ct. App. 1993).
“A legal malpractice
plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship,
(2) the acts or omissions constituting the alleged negligence, (3) cause and
(4) injury.” Estate of Campbell
v. Chaney, 169 Wis.2d 399, 405, 485 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Ct. App.
1992). Even if we liberally construe
Kocinski's complaint, it fails to allege how Kravit caused her to incur any
damages. See Paskiet,
164 Wis.2d at 805, 476 N.W.2d at 873.
Further, she neither mentions any legal argument nor refers to any legal
authority to establish how Kravit allegedly caused her to suffer any
injury. Kocinski alleges in her
complaint that she has suffered “[h]umiliation, anguish, degradation, pain,
intense grief, insults, [and] suffering.”
These, however, are emotional distress-type damages usually secondary to
personal injuries. Emotional distress
is insufficient to allege a basis for relief in this case. See Acharya v. Carroll,
152 Wis.2d 330, 337, 448 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, because
Kocinski failed to properly establish two of the four requirements of a legal
malpractice action—cause and injury—the complaint fails to state a valid claim
for relief. Id. at 339,
448 N.W.2d at 280. Kocinski also states
in her complaint that she is suing for punitive damages. “`There must be a showing of some actual
injury which would justify an award of actual or compensatory damages
before punitive damages may be awarded.'”
Tucker v. Marcus, 142 Wis.2d 425, 440, 418 N.W.2d 818, 823
(1988) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). Therefore, because Kocinski's complaint does not justify an award
of actual or compensatory damages, she also has no basis to seek punitive
damages against Kravit.
The trial court properly
dismissed Kocinski's legal malpractice claim; hence, we affirm.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] Kravit's brief raises several other potential bases on which the trial court dismissed Kocinski's complaint: (1) claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) common law principles do not support ignoring the statute of limitations; and (3) malpractice action accrued prior to August 24, 1987. We do not address these issues. See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663, 665 (1938) (only dispositive issue need be addressed).