COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND RELEASED August 1, 1995 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See § 808.10 and
Rule 809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 93-1885-CR
STATE
OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF
APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
REGINALD YOUNG,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of
the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
ARLENE D. CONNORS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J.,
Fine and Schudson, JJ.
PER CURIAM. Reginald L. Young appeals from an order
denying his petition for conditional release from a mental health facility, to
which he had been committed, after being found not guilty of first-degree
intentional homicide because of mental disease or defect. The issue in this case is whether the State
can continue to hold an insanity acquittee in a mental health facility without
proving that the individual continues to suffer from mental illness. Young claims that in order to continue
commitment, the State must prove both that he suffered from a mental
illness and that he was dangerous.
Because a defendant can be kept in the mental health facility, as long
as he is considered to be dangerous, and even if he is no longer mentally ill,
we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Young was charged with
one count of first-degree intentional homicide arising out of a shooting that
occurred on June 21, 1990. Young pled
not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease. Young waived his right to a jury trial. During the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial, the trial court found him guilty of the charge, but following the
responsibility phase, the trial court found him not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect. Young was committed
to a mental health facility.
In July 1992, the trial
court received Young's petition for conditional release. After a hearing, the trial court found that
Young continued to be dangerous and denied his petition for conditional
release. Young argued that continuing
his commitment solely on the basis that he was dangerous, without also proving
that he still suffered from a mental illness, violated his due process
rights. He cited Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), in support of this contention. The trial court ruled that Foucha
did not apply and rejected his argument.
Young now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
The issue raised in this
case was recently decided by State v. Randall, ___ Wis.2d ___,
532 N.W.2d 94 (1995). In Randall,
our supreme court held that “it is not a denial of due process for an insanity
acquittee who has committed a criminal act to be confined in a state mental health
facility for so long as he or she is considered dangerous, provided that the
commitment does not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which could have
been imposed for the offense charged.” Id.
at ___, 532 N.W.2d at 96. Further, the Randall
court harmonizes Foucha with the Randall holding:
[W]e
read Foucha to permit the continued confinement of dangerous but
sane acquittees in a mental health facility, so long as they are treated in a
manner consistent with the purposes of their commitment, e.g., there
must be a medical justification to continue holding a sane but dangerous
insanity acquittee in a mental health facility.
Id.[1] The Randall court further
explained that “the [Wisconsin] legislature has determined that the inference
of dangerousness drawn from a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
continues, even after a clinical finding of sanity.” Id. Because
the Wisconsin statutory scheme provides such comprehensive treatment designed
in part to reduce dangerous behavioral disorders, even when clinical signs of
mental illness are no longer apparent, continued confinement based solely on
dangerousness is consistent with the purpose of commitment. Id. at ___, 532 N.W.2d at 96-97.
Hence, proof of actual mental illness is not necessary.
In the instant case, it
is undisputed that Young was still considered dangerous and that his commitment
time has not exceeded the maximum term of imprisonment for first-degree
intentional homicide. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in ordering continued confinement.
By the Court.—Order
affirmed.
This opinion will not be
published. See Rule 809.23(1)(b)5, Stats.
[1] In Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Louisiana statutory scheme, which allowed confinement based on dangerousness alone, was unconstitutional. Id. at 83. The basis for the finding, however, was specific to Louisiana's statutory scheme, which provided that an insanity acquittee could be held for an indefinite and unlimited duration until the acquittee could prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she was no longer dangerous. Id. Wisconsin's statutory scheme differs from Louisiana's in two important aspects: (1) the state, rather than the acquittee, bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the commitment should continue; and (2) commitment is not for an indefinite period of time, but is limited to the maximum term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offenses charged. See State v. Randall, ___ Wis.2d ___, ___, 532 N.W.2d 94, 97 (1995).