PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 93-1825
Complete
Title
of
Case:
90-CV-534
WISCONSIN HOUSING & ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BAY SHORE APARTMENTS,
Defendant-Appellant,
PETER H. KNAUP,
Defendant.
----------------------------------------
90-CV-535
WISCONSIN HOUSING & ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FLAGSHIP,
Defendant-Appellant,
PETER H. KNAUP,
Defendant.
Submitted
on Briefs: June 8, 1994
COURT COURT OF
APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
Opinion
Released: February 8, 1996
Opinion
Filed: February
8, 1996
Source
of APPEAL Appeal from a judgment
Full
Name JUDGE COURT: Circuit
Lower
Court. COUNTY: Dodge
(If
"Special" JUDGE: Andrew
P. Bissonnette
so
indicate)
JUDGES: Gartzke,
P.J., Dykman and Sundby, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented: Sundby,
J.
Appellant
ATTORNEYSFor the defendant-appellant the
cause was submitted on the brief of John A. Erich of Reinhart,
Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C. of Milwaukee.
Respondent
ATTORNEYSFor the plaintiff-respondent the
cause was submitted on the brief of Lawrence Bensky and Robert J.
Dreps of La Follette & Sinykin of Madison.
COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION DATED AND
RELEASED February
8, 1996 |
NOTICE |
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an
adverse decision by the Court of Appeals.
See § 808.10 and Rule
809.62, Stats. |
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound
volume of the Official Reports. |
No. 93-1825
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN
COURT OF APPEALS
90-CV-534
WISCONSIN
HOUSING & ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BAY
SHORE APARTMENTS,
Defendant-Appellant,
PETER
H. KNAUP,
Defendant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
90-CV-535
WISCONSIN
HOUSING & ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FLAGSHIP,
Defendant-Appellant,
PETER
H. KNAUP,
Defendant.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Dodge County: ANDREW P. BISSONNETTE, Judge. Affirmed.
Before
Gartzke, P.J., Dykman and Sundby, JJ.
GARTZKE,
P.J. Bay Shore Apartments and Flagship
are Wisconsin limited partnerships.
They appeal from a declaratory judgment in favor of Wisconsin Housing
& Economic Development Authority (WHEDA).
Each partnership mortgaged real estate to WHEDA. The judgment declares that under ch. 234, Stats., and under the contracts between
the parties, upon satisfaction of the mortgages, Bay Shore's and Flagship's
"replacement reserve funds shall be disbursed first to the limited
partnership to bring its cumulative return on equity to six percent (or any
other amount permitted by ch. 234) and then to WHEDA, subject to any
applicable rights of the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development." (Emphasis added.)
The
judgment before us is based on the trial court's interpretation of the phrase
"dissolution of the limited-profit entity" in § 234.07(1), Stats. That statute provides in pertinent part that upon the
"dissolution of the limited-profit entity any surplus in excess of the
distributions allowed by this section shall be paid to the authority,"
WHEDA.[1]
If,
as the trial court held, "dissolution of the limited-profit entity"
means satisfaction of their mortgages to WHEDA, when that occurs Bay Shore and
Flagship must pay their replacement reserves to WHEDA. But if the phrase means dissolution of the
Bay Shore and Flagship partnerships, they need not pay their replacement
reserves to WHEDA unless the partnerships themselves are dissolved while they
are limited-profit entities. We
conclude that the trial court correctly construed the phrase as it appears in
§ 234.07(1), Stats., and we
therefore affirm.
1. BACKGROUND
WHEDA
initiated this action by bringing certain claims against the partnerships, and
they in turn counterclaimed. The trial
court dismissed WHEDA's claims after the parties reached a settlement and
dismissed all of the counterclaims except one.
The remaining counterclaim raised the replacement reserves issue. The partnerships and WHEDA brought cross
motions for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and the trial court granted
summary judgment for WHEDA.
Bay
Shore owns a 112-unit apartment in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin. Flagship owns an apartment project with
thirty-three units in Green Lake and thirty-seven units in Kewaskum,
Wisconsin. Bay Shore and Flagship rent
their projects to low and moderate income tenants and receive a federal rent
subsidy under Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 ("Section
8") through the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).
Bay
Shore and Flagship each entered a housing assistance payments contract (HAP
contract) with WHEDA, which HUD approved, under which HUD provides the Section
8 rent subsidy to each partnership.
WHEDA administers the Section 8 rent subsidies.
Under
the Section 8 program, HUD and the partnerships establish fair market rents for
the units in the projects. The partnerships
agree to rent their units to low and moderate income tenants and in return
receive a Section 8 rent subsidy. The
tenants pay up to thirty percent of their income toward the market rent, and
the rent subsidy makes up the difference.
Tenants pay their share of the rent to the partnerships, and HUD pays
the rent subsidy to the partnerships.
42 U.S.C. § 1437, et seq.
Each partnership deposits those payments in the bank account in its
name. Out of these accounts the
partnerships pay their expenses, make any required deposits to reserves and
make permitted distributions to their partners.
Bay
Shore and Flagship borrowed from WHEDA to develop their projects, and to secure
their loans they gave WHEDA notes and mortgages on their projects. Each mortgage provides that the rights and
obligations of WHEDA and each partnership shall at all times be in conformance
with ch. 234, Stats.
The
Bay Shore note bears interest at 7.53% and provides for equal monthly payments
of principal and interest, the final payment being due September 1,
2009. The Flagship note bears interest
at 13.41% and provides for equal monthly payments of principal and interest,
the final payment being due April 1, 2012.
The
Bay Shore and Flagship notes prohibit prepayment prior to the expiration of
twenty years from the date of the first principal payment without the prior
written approval of WHEDA. Thereafter,
Bay Shore and Flagship may prepay, provided certain conditions are met. Expiration of the twenty-year period for Bay
Shore will occur on October 1, 1999, and for Flagship on May 1, 2002.
Bay
Shore and Flagship each entered a regulatory agreement with WHEDA. Each regulatory agreement provides that its
terms continue only so long as the WHEDA note and mortgage are outstanding. Bay Shore's and Flagship's regulatory
agreements require that all project revenue be deposited in a bank account in
the name of the respective partnership.
Each agreement provides for establishment of a replacement reserve. The partnerships must use the principal in
the replacement reserve and income earned on the principal to pay for capital
improvements and operating expenses.
WHEDA must give its prior written approval to any expenditure. Unexpended income accumulates in the
replacement reserve.
Bay
Shore's and Flagship's regulatory agreements restrict distributions in any one
year to six percent of WHEDA-approved initial equity in the project. The initial equity and the resulting maximum
allowable distribution remain the same for the term of the loan. The agreements grant WHEDA the right to
pre-approve distributions in excess of such permitted six percent annual
distribution.
Each
regulatory agreement provides that the tenant rent payments and Section 8 rent
subsidy not expended for debt service, operating expenses, replacement reserves
or the permitted six percent annual distribution, are "residual
receipts." Unless otherwise
directed by WHEDA, the partnerships must transfer residual receipts to their
replacement reserves. Excess Section 8
rent subsidy builds up in the replacement reserves as residual receipts.
Bay
Shore's and Flagship's regulatory agreements provide that their respective
mortgages control in case they conflict with the regulatory agreement.
The
Bay Shore First Amendment to its 1978 Limited Partnership Agreement provides
that as long as Bay Shore is indebted to WHEDA, it shall conduct itself as a
limited-profit entity as defined in § 234.01(8), Stats., and any distributions are subject to § 234.07, Stats.
The Flagship amended and restated 1981 limited partnership agreement has
the same provision. It is undisputed
that WHEDA required these provisions as a condition to making its loans to Bay
Shore and Flagship.
The
Bay Shore partnership agreement provides that the partnership continues until
December 31, 2028, about nineteen years beyond the due date of its final
monthly loan payment to WHEDA. The
Flagship partnership agreement provides that the partnership continues until
December 31, 2030, about eighteen-and-one-half years beyond the due date of its
final monthly loan payment to WHEDA.
Bay
Shore and Flagship report tenant rent payments and the Section 8 rent subsidy
as taxable income on their federal income tax returns. Bay Shore and Flagship fund their
replacement reserves from such rent payments and subsidies. Thus, they pay
income taxes on the amounts deposited in the reserves. Each partner must pay his or her
distributive share of the interest income earned from the replacement reserves.
II. STATUTES INVOLVED
Section
234.01(8), Stats., provides in
pertinent part:
"Limited-profit
entity" means any person or trust which, in its articles of incorporation
or comparable documents of organization, or by written agreement with the
authority, provides that:
(a) As a condition
of acceptance of a loan or advance under this chapter, the limited-profit
entity shall enter into an agreement with the authority providing for
limitations of rents, profits, dividends and disposition of property or
franchises; ...
Section
234.07, Stats., provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), a
limited-profit entity which receives loans from the authority may not make
distributions, other than from funds contributed to the limited-profit entity
by stockholders, partners, members or holders of beneficial interest in the
limited-profit entity, in any one year with respect to a project financed by
the authority in excess of 6% of its equity in such project on a cumulative
basis. The equity in a project shall
consist of the difference between the amount of the mortgage loan and the total
project cost .... Upon the dissolution
of the limited-profit entity any surplus in excess of the distributions allowed
by this section shall be paid to the authority....
(2) If a
limited-profit entity agrees to provide housing for low-income and
moderate-income persons until the end of the maximum term of a mortgage that
the limited-profit entity gives the authority, a limited-profit entity that
receives a loan from the authority may not make distributions, other than from
funds contributed to the limited-profit entity by stockholders, partners,
members or holders of a beneficial interest in the limited-profit entity, in
any one year with respect to a project financed by the authority in excess of
12% of its equity in the project on a cumulative basis.
III.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Bay
Shore and Flagship contend that ch. 234, Stats.,
and the contracts between the parties require Bay Shore and Flagship to pay
surplus to WHEDA only if they dissolve, as partnerships, while indebted to
WHEDA, and therefore they need not pay their replacement reserves to WHEDA upon
satisfaction of their notes and mortgages.
They contend that the term "dissolution" as used in
§ 234.07, Stats., does not
mean satisfaction of the WHEDA note and mortgage; requiring them to pay their
replacement reserves to WHEDA upon termination of their status as
limited-profit entities is contrary to the public purpose of ch. 234; and ch.
234 and their regulatory agreements limit distributions and not profits. Flagship contends that its regulatory
agreement does not require it to give its replacement reserve to WHEDA upon
satisfaction of its note and mortgage.
WHEDA
contends that the legislature intended that WHEDA retain surplus funds
generated by limited-profit entities for publicly subsidized housing projects,
and that the language of § 234.07(1), Stats.,
is plainly addressed to dissolution of limited-profit entities, as statutorily
defined, and does not mean dissolution of the partnerships themselves. It contends that the statute's manifest
purpose is to make the surplus funds remaining upon mortgage satisfaction
available to develop and preserve additional low and moderate income housing,
and that purpose requires that the funds be paid to WHEDA. WHEDA contends that the partnerships'
interpretation of the statute contradicts their contractual agreements, that
their policy arguments are speculative and unfounded, and that their
interpretation of the statute would undermine the legislature's goal to
discourage mortgage prepayment.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The
historical facts are undisputed. For
that reason, the case before us involves only issues of law. Those issues require us to interpret the
Wisconsin statutes, a review we make without deference to the trial court. City of Wisconsin Dells v. Dells
Fireworks, Inc., 197 Wis.2d 1, 15, 539 N.W.2d 916, 921 (Ct. App. 1995).
Nor
are we bound by WHEDA's conclusions regarding the meaning of the disputed
phrase in § 234.07(1), Stats. The courts apply varying degrees of
deference to an administrative agency's statutory interpretations. Sauk County v. WERC, 165
Wis.2d 406, 413, 477 N.W.2d 267, 270 (1991).
If the agency's experience, technical competence and specialized
knowledge aids the agency in its interpretation and application of the statute,
the agency's view is entitled to "great weight." Id. If the agency's decision is "very nearly" one of first
impression, we grant it "due weight." Id. at 413-14, 477 N.W.2d at 270. Finally, we review the agency's
interpretation de novo, according it no weight if the case is one of first
impression and the agency lacks special expertise or experience in determining
the question presented. Id.
at 414, 477 N.W.2d at 270-71.
WHEDA
never before has had to determine the meaning of the disputed phrase
"dissolution of a limited-profit entity." We are aware of no special expertise that WHEDA has in making
that determination. We therefore decide
the meaning of the phrase without deference to WHEDA's view.
V. REVIEW LIMITED TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
It
is undisputed that Bay Shore and Flagship are limited-profit entities, as
defined in § 234.01(8), Stats. Bay Shore's limited partnership agreement,
as amended, provides that as long as Bay Shore is indebted to WHEDA, it shall
conduct itself as a limited-profit entity as defined in § 234.01(8), and
any distributions are subject to § 234.07, Stats. The amended
and restated limited partnership agreement under which Flagship operates has
the same provision. WHEDA required
those provisions as a condition of making its loans to Bay Shore and Flagship.
Because
Bay Shore and Flagship are limited-profit entities and because they have
received loans from WHEDA, the only question before us is the meaning of the
provision in § 234.07(1), Stats.,
"Upon the dissolution of the limited-profit entity any surplus in excess
of the distributions allowed by this section shall be paid to the
authority." We construe that
provision, and not the documents or agreements between the parties. The statute controls, and it controls
absolutely.
The
statute, § 234.07(1), Stats.,
controls absolutely because it speaks in mandatory terms. It declares that a limited-profit entity
which receives loans from the authority "may not" make distributions
in excess of six percent of its equity.
It provides that the equity in a project "shall" consist of
the difference between the mortgage loan and the project cost. It provides that the total project cost
"shall" include certain items.
It provides that with respect to every project the authority "shall
... establish the entity's equity at the time of making of the final mortgage
advance and ... that figure shall remain constant during the life of the
authority's loan with respect to such project." After providing that upon dissolution of the limited-profit
entity any surplus in excess of the distributions allowed by § 234.07(1)
"shall be paid to the authority," it provides that surplus
"shall not" be deemed to include an increase in net worth.
The
word "shall" is presumed mandatory when it appears in a statute. Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv.
Comm., 82 Wis.2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214, 217 (1978). While under certain circumstances we may
construe "shall" as directory if necessary to carry out the
legislature's intent, id.
at 571, 263 N.W.2d at 217, no room exists in this statute for such a
reading. Section 234.07(1), Stats., is inflexible in its commands.
Because
the language of § 234.07(1), Stats.,
is mandatory and obligatory on a limited-profit entity as well as on WHEDA,
"the statutory provisions step in and control and regulate the mutual
rights and obligations rather than the provisions of any contract the parties
may attempt to make varying therefrom."
Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co., 168 Wis. 456, 462, 169
N.W. 609, 610-11 (1919). We therefore
look to the statute to determine the rights and duties of the parties, not to
the documents or agreements between them.[2]
VI. INTERPRETATION OF § 237.07(1), Stats.
We
are to avoid absurd or unreasonable readings of a statute. Walag v. Town of Bloomfield,
171 Wis.2d 659, 663, 492 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Ct. App. 1992). We reject as absurd the argument that the
phrase in § 234.07(1), Stats.,
"dissolution of the limited-profit entity" means dissolution of the
type of organization under which the entity chose to do business.
Nothing
in ch. 234, Stats., restricts
WHEDA to doing business with any particular form of business organization. As far as ch. 234 is concerned, when WHEDA
does business with a "limited-profit entity" that entity may choose
any form of organization, ranging from a sole proprietorship through general or
limited partnerships and corporations.
A corporation organized under ch. 180, Stats.,
has "perpetual duration," unless its articles of incorporation
provide otherwise. Section 180.0302, Stats.
In theory, a ch. 180 corporation might never be dissolved. A partnership can be dissolved wholly on the
happening of a fortuitous event. On
application by or for a partner, a court shall decree dissolution whenever a
partner has been declared "a lunatic in any judicial proceeding or is
shown to be of unsound mind" or has become in any way "incapable of
performing the partner's part of the partnership contract" or has been
"guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on
of the business." Section
178.27(1)(a), (b) and (c), Stats. It is absurd to suppose that a provision so
important as that in § 234.07(1), Stats.,
regarding payment of surplus in excess of allowable distributions to WHEDA
would turn on the form of organization the limited-profit entity chose.
Since
the term "limited-profit entity" has meaning only with reference to
WHEDA's loan to it, the legislature must intend that the life of the entity
terminates when the loan is satisfied and nothing remains to be done except to
dispose of what is left in the hands of the entity, the "surplus in excess
of the distribution allowed by" § 234.07(1). Disposal of that surplus is plainly
controlled--it must be paid to the authority, WHEDA. "Dissolution of a limited-profit entity" therefore must
mean, as the trial court concluded, that the legislature intended to give
"dissolution" of the entity its common dictionary meaning of
"coming to an end," and that "dissolution of the limited-profit
entity" occurs upon satisfaction of the mortgage the entity has given to
WHEDA.[3]
We
reject for another reason the contention that "dissolution of a
limited-profit entity," means dissolution of the form of organization in
which the entity chose to do business.
Section 234.07(1), Stats.,
severely restricts the "distributions" the entity may make "in
any one year with respect to a project financed by the authority." The entity is prohibited from making
"distributions, other than from funds contributed to the limited-profit
entity by stockholders, partners, members or holders of beneficial interest in
the limited-profit entity ... in excess of 6% of its equity in such project on
a cumulative basis." The
restriction allows no exceptions.
Except for the requirement that upon dissolution "any surplus in
excess of the distributions allowed by this section shall be paid to"
WHEDA, such surpluses could be paid to entities, stockholders, partners and the
like.
To
allow the limited-profit entity to retain the surplus after satisfying a
mortgage to WHEDA would result in the entity's having exceeded the statutory six-percent
ceiling on distributions. The first
sentence in § 234.07(1), Stats.,
provides that a "limited-profit entity which receives loans from the
authority may not make distributions ... in any one year with respect to
a project financed by the authority in excess of 6% of its equity in such
project on a cumulative basis."[4] (Emphasis added.) Because the only funds exempt from that limitation on
distributions are "funds contributed to the limited-profit entity by
stockholders, partners, members or holders of beneficial interest in the
limited-profit entity," a prohibited distribution could occur unless the
surplus at issue were paid to the authority, WHEDA. Nothing in ch. 234, Stats.,
requires the limited-profit entity, after it has satisfied its mortgage to the
authorities, to retain the surplus.
Our
construction of § 234.07(1), Stats.,
furthers the purpose of ch. 234, Stats. When it created ch. 234, the legislature
declared in part that
in establishing Wisconsin housing finance authority, the
legislature is acting in all respects for the benefit of the people of this
state to serve a public purpose in improving and otherwise promoting their
health, welfare and prosperity and that the Wisconsin housing finance
authority, as created by this act, is empowered to act on the behalf of the
people of this state in serving this public purpose for the benefit of the
general public.
Section 1(8), ch. 287, Laws of 1971.
WHEDA
must use the funds it receives for public purposes.
The power delegated to the Authority by ch. 234, Stats., authorizes the Authority to act
in such a way as will assist in the development and construction of housing for
low and moderate income families and persons and in the elimination of
substandard housing conditions in the state of Wisconsin. The legislature has declared that there
shall be a law and has determined the general policy sought to be
achieved. The Authority must act within
the limits as expressed by the purpose of ch. 234.
State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis.2d 391, 441, 208 N.W.2d 780, 809-10
(1973).
Those
public purposes can be thwarted if upon satisfaction of a mortgage to WHEDA, a
limited-profit entity may retain and ultimately distribute as profit the
surplus funds generated during the life of the mortgage. Such an entity would not be required to
implement the public purposes of ch. 234, Stats.
However,
Bay Shore and Flagship contend that requiring them "to forfeit their
replacement reserves" would frustrate the purpose and contravene the
public policy behind ch. 234, Stats. They claim that to require they repay their
surpluses to WHEDA will discourage development and maintenance of decent, safe
and sanitary low income housing because WHEDA will have no incentive to release
funds from the replacement reserves for needed expenditures. They assert that WHEDA will withhold its
consent to maximize the amount accumulated in the reserves in order to maximize
the amount subject to WHEDA's "confiscation." The answer, of course, is that the statute
provides that upon dissolution of the limited-profit entity, any surplus or
excess of distributions is to be paid to WHEDA. Bay Shore and Flagship should make their public policy arguments
to the legislature and not the courts.
Bay
Shore and Flagship assert that allowing WHEDA to take their replacement
reserves will discourage low income housing project owners from operating and
managing their projects prudently. That
cannot be true, since project owners continue to own the projects after the
limited-profit entity has been dissolved, and during the life of each entity
the reserves are available to the project owners for maintenance. The argument that maintenance of low income
housing will be jeopardized because project owners will have little incentive
to advance their own funds for maintenance makes no sense. During the life of the mortgage the project
owners have every incentive to use the accumulated surplus for that very
purpose, because they will continue to own the projects after their mortgages
to WHEDA are satisfied.
The
partnerships also attack WHEDA's reading of § 234.07(1), Stats., because they say it will
deprive the low income and moderate income tenants of the rent subsidy HUD sets
aside for the tenants' benefit. HUD,
the argument continues, allocated federal funds to help low and moderate income
people obtain decent, safe and sanitary housing, and the Section 8 subsidy is
supposed to benefit those people in those projects, and not WHEDA. They say that unexpended funds in the
replacement reserves should remain with the partnerships to benefit their
tenants. They contend the tenants will
be benefited because the partnerships "could" invest the funds and
"could" use the principal and earnings to subsidize the tenant rents
after the thirty-year term, and the partnerships "could" use the
funds to make capital improvements or project enhancements since the projects
will be thirty years old at that point and will likely need such
expenditures. They assert they
"could" hold the funds in reserve and avoid having to borrow funds in
the future, and to the extent that they do not borrow and pay interest they
will be better able to keep their rents affordable.
It
is true that each "could" is a possibility. It is also true, however, that the partnerships "could"
refuse to subsidize tenant rents. They
"could" refuse to use the funds to make capital improvements or
enhancements. They "could"
spend the funds and borrow in the future.
Which set of "coulds" should apply is not for us to
determine. The legislature decreed that
upon dissolution of the limited-profit entity, the surpluses we have been
discussing "shall be paid to the authority," WHEDA.
That
equity investors will be reluctant to invest in low income housing because of
possible adverse income tax consequences is a just concern, but, as WHEDA
points out, how the taxing authorities treat the reserve funds at issue has
nothing to do with determining the legislature's intent as to the disposition
upon mortgage satisfaction.[5]
Bay
Shore and Flagship assert that allowing WHEDA to take their replacement
reserves will violate the "compacts" WHEDA made with them at the
outset of these developments. However,
each compact, so far as pertinent to this appeal, is that, as provided in § 234.07(1),
Stats., upon dissolution of Bay
Shore and Flagship as limited-profit entities, any surplus in excess of the
distributions allowed by that section must be paid to WHEDA. WHEDA does not violate the compact when it
insists that the partnerships perform as statutorily required.
The
partnerships contend that allowing WHEDA to take their replacement reserves in
effect makes WHEDA their partner when it is only a lender and will give WHEDA a
windfall to which it is not entitled.
The plain fact is that WHEDA is a lender and not a partner. To suggest that the surplus referred to in
§ 234.07(1), Stats., is a
windfall to which WHEDA is not entitled is to impugn the statute under which
the partnerships agreed to operate when they borrowed from WHEDA. WHEDA is entitled to the reserves because
the legislature has said so. The
"windfall" argument has no merit.
Bay
Shore and Flagship next contend that ch. 234, Stats.,
and the regulatory agreements limit distributions but not profits. They assert that neither ch. 234 nor the
regulatory agreements restrict or prohibit the partnerships from generating
profits in excess of the committed six percent annual distribution. Section 234.07(1), Stats., they argue, merely prohibits making distributions in
excess of the permitted six percent without WHEDA's approval. Meanwhile, residual receipts in replacement
reserves accumulate in the replacement reserves, and when the partnership
satisfies its note and mortgage, the prohibition terminates. We reject the contention. Section 234.07(1) provides that upon
dissolution the surplus in excess of distributions allowed by that statute must
be paid to the authority, and the statute prohibits "distributions"
in excess of six percent of an entity's equity in the project. And, as we have said, the same provision
requires that "upon" dissolution, payment must be made.
Although
Flagship's regulatory agreement requires its replacement reserve to be
disbursed to WHEDA upon satisfaction of its note and mortgage, Flagship
contends that the provision is "ineffective" to require Flagship to
pay its replacement reserve to WHEDA because it is said to conflict with
§ 234.07, Stats., which in
Flagship's view, "requires payment of surplus to WHEDA only if the borrower
dissolves and at the time of dissolution is a limited-profit entity." (Emphasis added.) We have rejected the same proposition with regard to
§ 234.07 several times throughout this opinion. The statute, as properly construed, does not conflict with
regulatory agreement. Finally, Flagship
asserts that the Bay Shore regulatory agreement, drawn and entered into by
WHEDA years before the Flagship regulatory agreement, does not contain the same
provision. It then asserts that this
somehow evinces WHEDA's original intent and the intent of the legislature that
§ 234.07, and not the terms of the regulatory agreement which terminates
when the borrower repays the underlying loan, is to govern payment of surplus
to WHEDA. We repeat--§ 234.07
prevails. That statute requires payment
upon dissolution of the limited-profit entity, and dissolution occurs when the
mortgage to WHEDA is satisfied.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because
we conclude that the circuit court correctly declared that Bay Shore and
Flagship must pay their replacement reserves to WHEDA at the time of satisfying
their respective mortgages to WHEDA, we affirm the judgment.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
No. 93-1825(D)
SUNDBY,
J. (dissenting). The
majority reaches a result which makes eminent good sense, but requires that we
judicially amend § 234.07(1), Stats.,
to read: "Upon satisfaction of
the authority's loan with respect to a project, any surplus in excess of
the distributions allowed by this section shall be paid to the authority
[WHEDA]." (Emphasized language
added.) Unfortunately, however, the
statute reads: "Upon the
dissolution of the limited-profit entity [,] any surplus in excess of the
distributions allowed by this section shall be paid to the
authority." (Emphasis added.) When the life of the authority's loan with
respect to a project ends, the limited-profit entity is not thereupon
dissolved. A limited-profit entity may
have dozens of loans with WHEDA. The
legislature may have contemplated that any surplus in excess of the
distributions allowed by § 234.07(1) could be used by the limited-profit
entity to provide additional low and moderate income housing, but once the
limited-profit entity dissolves, any reserve or reserves revert to WHEDA.
The
majority's construction of "dissolution of the limited-profit entity"
requires that there be a separate limited-profit entity for each loan and
agreement made with WHEDA. I submit
that the definition of "limited-profit entity" does not permit that
peculiar result.
Section
234.01(8), Stats., defines
"limited-profit entity" as follows:
"Limited-profit entity" means any
person or trust which, in its articles of incorporation or comparable documents
of organization, or by written agreement with the authority, provides that:
(a) As a
condition of acceptance of a loan or advance under this chapter, the
limited-profit entity shall enter into an agreement with the authority
providing for limitations of rents, profits, dividends and disposition of
property or franchises ....
Note that para. (a) speaks of "a" loan not
"the" loan.
Thus,
in its documents of organization, the "limited-profit entity" must
provide that as a condition of any loan or advance made by WHEDA, it
shall enter into an agreement with the authority in which it agrees to limit
its rents, its profits, its dividends, and agrees to the disposition of any
property or franchise subject to such an agreement. I see no reason why a limited-profit entity may not enter into
numerous loan and operational agreements with WHEDA without creating a separate
limited-profit entity for each project and each loan or operational agreement.
Clearly,
however, the members of a limited-profit entity may never realize more equity
than the entity had at the time the authority made the final mortgage advance
with respect to any project. Section
234.07(1), Stats., provides in
part:
With respect to every project the authority shall,
pursuant to rules adopted by it, establish the entity's equity at the time of
making of the final mortgage advance and, for purposes of this section, that
figure shall remain constant during the life of the authority's loan with
respect to such project.
Plainly, the limited-profit entity's equity does not
increase after the life of the authority's loan with respect to a project has
expired. That does not mean, however,
that any surplus in excess of that equity must thereupon revert to WHEDA. The legislature has said that any such
surplus shall revert to WHEDA "[u]pon the dissolution of the
limited-profit entity."
We
have been cautioned that in the absence of ambiguity in a statute, only the
plain meaning of words in the normal sense, as used in the context of the
statute, can be looked to. Girouard
v. Jackson Circuit Ct., 155 Wis.2d 148, 156, 454 N.W.2d 792, 795-96
(1990). "Resort to definitions,
statutory or dictionary, is appropriate for the purpose of determining meaning
that is plain on the face of the statute.
It is not necessary or appropriate to find ambiguity before looking to
word definitions." Id. The
Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 570 (2d ed. 1987), defines "dissolution" as
follows: "[L]egal termination,
esp. of business activity, with the final distribution of assets, the fixing of
liabilities, etc." The
satisfaction of a limited-profit entity's mortgage obligation to WHEDA does not
dissolve the entity--there is no sale of the project's assets, settlement of
liabilities, and other consequences which accompany the dissolution of a
corporation or partnership.
How
then is the public purpose of limiting profits of a limited-profit entity to be
ensured? I find the answer in the
definition of "limited-profit entity." Section 234.01(8)(b), Stats.,
provides in part:
If the
limited-profit entity receives a loan or advance under this chapter, the
chairperson of the authority, acting with the prior approval of the majority of
members of the authority, may, if he or she determines ... that the
limited-profit entity is ... not carrying out the intent and purposes of this
chapter, appoint to the board of directors or other comparable controlling body
of such limited-profit entity a number of new directors or persons, which
number shall be sufficient to constitute a voting majority of such board or controlling
body ....
I
believe WHEDA continues to have this authority to assume control of a
limited-profit entity, even after its agreement with the entity expires,
because the entity's use of any surplus or replacement reserve for purposes not
consonant with ch. 234, Stats.,
would not carry out the intent and purposes of the chapter. I realize my reconciliation of the statutes
may not be entirely satisfactory because it keeps WHEDA in a
"watch-dog" position after a mortgage has been retired and its
agreement with an entity has expired;
however, my construction does not require that we engage in judicial
amendment of the statutes.
For
these reasons I respectfully dissent.
[2] See also, e.g., Jones v.
Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 226 Wis. 423, 426, 275 N.W. 897, 898
(1938); Von Uhl v. Trempealeau County Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis.2d
32, 38, 146 N.W.2d 516, 520 (1966). See
also Goossen v. Estate of Standaert, 189 Wis.2d 237, 248, 525
N.W.2d 314, 319 (Ct. App. 1994), quoting Gordie Boucher
Lincoln-Mercury of Madison v. J&H Landfill, 172 Wis.2d 333, 340,
493 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Where the state's public policy is
expressed in legislative acts, `the statutory provisions step in and control and
regulate the mutual rights and obligations of the parties to a contract
relating to the subject matter of the statute.'").
[3] Section 990.01(1), Stats., requires "technical words and phrases and others
having a peculiar meaning in the law" to be construed according to such
meaning. An exception exists when the
construction "would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the legislature." Section
990.01. We conclude the exception
applies here.
[4] Section 234.07(2), Stats., contains an exception, allowing a maximum of twelve
percent of its equity in a project on a cumulative basis if the entity agrees
to provide housing for low income and moderate income persons until the end of
the maximum term of the mortgage that it gave to the authority. The exception has not been shown to apply to
Bay Shore or Flagship.
[5] Bay Shore and Flagship refer to this as a
so-called the "Phantom Income" problem. They assert that the partners must report the amounts deposited
in the replacement reserves and the income earned on such reserves as taxable
income since HUD and the tenants paid these revenues to the partnerships and
the partnerships own the revenue, but WHEDA will not allow them to receive
those funds. They assert that the
investors' income problem becomes more acute every year because of reportable
taxable income increases as tenant payments in Section (8) subsidy increase and
depreciation and interest deductions decrease, yet they never receive more than
the permitted percentage annual distribution.
WHEDA replies that the partnerships have the cart before the horse, that
ownership determines taxation, not vice versa.
See generally United States v. Maryland Jockey Club of
Baltimore County, 210 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1954) (funds spent from
reserve account under state control prior to reversion to state belong to owner
and are taxable); Stendig v. United States, 843 F.2d 163 (4th
Cir. 1988) (funds placed in reserve account under state control but which
revert to owners are taxable). We
cannot resolve the tax issue. Section
234.07(1), Stats., controls
regardless of the tax consequences.