COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 13, 2011 A. John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
Cir. Ct. No. 2008CF4093 |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ricco J. Craig, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: daniel l. konkol, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Ricco J. Craig appeals from a judgment, entered after a bench trial,
convicting him of armed robbery with use of force as a party to a crime. The sole issue he presents on appeal is
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 We
take the facts from the testimony at trial and from the findings of fact made
by the circuit court when considering its verdict. The State’s first witness, Harry Henke,
testified that his date of birth was August 24, 1925. On August 8, 2008, he stopped his Subaru in
front of his home on North 80th Street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. A small red car pulled up behind his. A clean-shaven, young African-American male
of average height with close-cropped hair approached Henke. The young man said that he was having car
trouble, and the two men discussed the location of an automotive repair shop in
the area. When Henke turned away, the
young man said “give me your keys,” then grabbed Henke and pulled him to the
ground. Henke saw that the young man was
holding a dark black revolver. The
assailant took Henke’s keys and drove away in Henke’s Subaru while someone else
drove the red car from the scene. The
police found Henke’s Subaru the next day.
Henke viewed a photographic lineup, but he was unable to identify the
person who robbed him.
¶3 Officer
Gary Inman testified that on August 10, 2008, he was patrolling with a partner
in a squad car. He saw a maroon Pontiac
Bonneville and determined that it had license plates corresponding to a car
reported stolen in an armed robbery. As
the officers approached the car, it sped away.
After a chase through city streets, the officers stopped the car and
determined that Craig was the driver.
When Inman searched the car, he found a BB gun that he testified “looks
like an authentic semiautomatic handgun.” The police arrested Craig.
¶4 Craig
gave several custodial statements, and the police made an audio recording of
each statement. The State played
excerpts from Craig’s statements during its case-in-chief. The circuit court summarized Craig’s
admissions when it denied Craig’s motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s
case: “Craig admitted to a detective
that he took keys from an old man. They
were keys to [the old man’s] Subaru.... [Craig]
drove off in the vehicle. That was a
statement he made on August 11th.” Craig
then testified on his own behalf. He
acknowledged giving a statement to police “about robbing the old man,” but he
claimed that everything he said in his August 11, 2008 statement was a lie
offered in the hope of receiving consideration from the police.
¶5 After
the parties gave closing arguments, the circuit court found that an assailant robbed
Henke at gun point and took his car keys and his Subaru. The circuit court also found that Henke’s
description of the robber “is consistent with [Craig’s] appearance in
court.” Before reaching a verdict,
however, the circuit court voiced concern about whether Craig’s admission that
he stole a Subaru from an elderly man constituted evidence that Craig stole
Henke’s Subaru on August 8, 2008. The
circuit court asked the State to replay portions of Craig’s August 11, 2008
statement. The circuit court then found:
“within just a couple days of the armed
robbery of Mr. Henke ... the defendant acknowledged that he had been on N. 80th
Street, took the keys from an older white gentleman and drove off in a Subaru
after having pulled up behind that [Subaru] in another car, that being a
Bonneville.” The circuit court also
found that two days after Henke was robbed, the police stopped Craig while he
was driving a Bonneville “and lo and behold there’s a gun between the console
and the driver’s seat.” The circuit
court found Craig guilty of committing the armed robbery. He appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶6 Craig
argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt because the
circuit court reached its verdict in substantial reliance on one of his
recorded statements, “some of which was so difficult to understand that the
State had to play it numerous times.” We
observe that the court reporter did not transcribe the statement when it was
played in the courtroom. Instead, the
circuit court accepted a transcript of the statement prepared by a member of
the prosecutor’s staff. Neither the
audio recording nor the transcript offered by the prosecutor is in the record on
appeal. “‘It is the appellant’s
responsibility to ensure completion of the appellate record and when an
appellate record is incomplete in connection with an issue raised by the
appellant, we must assume that the missing material supports the [circuit]
court’s ruling.’” State v. Bush, 2005 WI
103, ¶5 n.2, 283 Wis. 2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80 (citation omitted). This general rule is fully applicable where,
as here, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. See
State
v. Huff, 2009 WI App 92, ¶17, 319 Wis. 2d 258, 769 N.W.2d
154. We thus assume that Craig’s
admissions on August 11, 2008, are sufficient to support the guilty verdict in
this case.
¶7 Moreover,
the record before us reflects that the State presented ample evidence to
support the verdict. Before the
circuit court could find Craig guilty of armed robbery with use of force as a
party to a crime, the State was required to prove that, either directly or by
aiding and abetting someone else, Craig took and carried away property from
another person, that the other person owned the property, that Craig acted with
intent to steal, and that he acted forcibly while using or threatening to use a
dangerous weapon. See Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(2)
(2007-08); 939.05 (2007-08); see also
Wis JI—Criminal 1480; Wis JI—Criminal 400. We review
the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction using a highly deferential
standard:
in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the [S]tate and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If any possibility exists that the trier of fact could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it believes that the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence before it.
State v. Poellinger,
153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) (citations omitted). We apply the same standard whether the
evidence is direct or circumstantial. Id.
¶8 In
this case, Craig does not suggest that the circuit court improperly credited
Henke’s testimony that, on August 8, 2008, someone robbed Henke at gun point on
North 80th Street and took his car keys and Subaru. Craig does not deny his admissions to police
on August 11, 2008, that he was on North 80th Street when he approached an “old
man,” that he took the old man’s car keys and then drove off in the old man’s
Subaru. Further, Craig expressly
acknowledges that a defendant’s admissions are ordinarily strong evidence of
guilt. Nonetheless, he asserts that in
this case his admissions should be discounted.
In his view, he negated the strength of his admissions by testifying
that they were untrue and were made only because he expected to receive
“credit” from the officers in exchange for a confession.
¶9 Craig’s
effort to undermine his admissions was not successful. The circuit court rejected Craig’s trial
testimony, stating: “basically, I don’t
believe anything that the defendant testified about. The testimony, it’s pure poppycock.” We must defer to the circuit court’s credibility
assessment. “When the circuit court acts
as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given to each witness’s testimony.” State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc,
2002 WI App 207, ¶19, 257 Wis. 2d 421, 651 N.W.2d 345. Accordingly, Craig’s explanation for his
custodial admissions did not discredit them.
Those admissions, coupled with the remaining evidence, constitute abundant
support for the guilty verdict in this case.
We affirm.
By
the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5. (2009-10).