2011 WI App 60
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2010AP84 |
|
Complete Title of Case: |
|
Opinion Filed: |
April 26, 2011 |
Submitted on Briefs: |
February 22, 2011 |
|
|
|
|
JUDGES: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Appellant |
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the respondent-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Chad R. Gendreau of DeWitt Ross & Stevens S.C., Madison. |
|
|
Respondent |
|
ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the petitioner-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Brian J. Desmond, corporation counsel, Rhinelander. |
|
|
2011 WI App 60
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 26, 2011 A. John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
Appeal No. |
|
|||
STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
Petitioner-Respondent, v. Collins Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Respondent-Appellant, Michael A. Wilmoth, Carl J. Cinkus and Nancy E. Cinkus, Respondents. |
||||
|
|
|||
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before
¶1
BACKGROUND
¶2 In the spring of 2003, Collins began investigating the
possibility of erecting a billboard sign on a business’s premises on the west
side of State Highway 17 in the Town of
¶3 Collins’ employee, Keith Carson, obtained a lease from the
proposed location’s landowners. He then
obtained the Sugar Camp town foreman’s signature on a form indicating the
property was unzoned. After submitting a
Department of Transportation permit application, that department informed
¶4
¶5 Based upon her review of the zoning map and aerial
photographs, Kennedy told
¶6 Collins erected the sign in July 2003. In late October, the County’s zoning office
sent a letter stating there had been complaints and asserting the sign was
illegally constructed in a zoned area.
After Collins’ counsel responded, the County replied with another letter
in November, referencing the “large wetland complex that is attached” to
¶7 Years later, in September 2006, the County replied. The County asserted it had conducted another
ordinary high water mark determination for
¶8 In August 2008, the County filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief and damages. Both parties filed summary judgment motions. In late 2009, the circuit court denied Collins’ motion and granted the County’s, reasoning as follows:
I think the key to the analysis is a term used by both counsel here, and that is burden[. T]he burden to know the law and to make sure one is complying with the law has to be on the builder in a zoning case. I think that is just a basic consideration. If you think about it, it can be no other way, especially on the facts of this case.
If someone was right on the edge of the gray area that surrounds each of the lakes in the county and decided on whatever basis that he or she didn’t need to get a permit because the area wasn’t zoned, the structure would be built and would probably never be discovered. The county certainly doesn’t have the resources ... to constantly patrol the area around all the lakes in the county to make sure no construction is commenced that needs a permit ....
So you could be in a situation where there’s an invitation to wholesale violation if you are on the edge of the gray area. All you need to do is look at the map with the idea that later you can claim a good faith belief that you were in an unzoned area and didn’t need a permit and you would have a defense.
....
Now, whose job is it to establish the proper measurement? Again, I think that job has to be that of the builder or the land owner. Otherwise, whenever there is a question as to how far something is from the ordinary high water mark, the county would have to send out some official continuously to do that.
The court ordered Collins to remove the sign, remediate the property, and pay over $25,000 in forfeitures. Collins appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Collins argues that, at the time the sign was erected, the
County’s official zoning map identified
¶10 The state requires counties to adopt and enforce shoreland
zoning district ordinances. See Wis.
Stat. § 59.692(1m), (6); Wis.
Admin. Code §§ NR 115.01, 115.05(1), (4).[4] “‘Shorelands’ means lands within the
following distances from the ordinary high-water mark of navigable waters: 1,000 feet from a lake[.]” Wis.
Admin. Code § NR 115.03(8); see Wis. Stat. § 59.692(1)(b). The ordinary high water mark is defined, in
pertinent part, as “the point on the bank
or shore up to which the presence and action of surface water is so
continuous as to leave a distinctive mark such as by erosion, destruction or prevention of terrestrial
vegetation, predominance of aquatic vegetation, or other easily recognized
characteristic.” Wis. Admin. Code § NR 115.03(6) (emphasis added); see also State v. Kelley, 2001 WI
84, ¶15, 244
¶11 Every county’s shoreland zoning ordinance must include “[m]apped zoning districts and the recording, on an official copy of such map, of all district boundary amendments.” Wis. Admin. Code § NR 115.05(4)(i). Further, a county must give the DNR notice of any “appeal for a map … interpretation [or] amendment” and of any decision on such matters. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 115.05(4)(h), (hm).
¶12
¶13 The Sugar Camp Zoning map, which
Information depicted on this map was interpreted from aerial photography and various other public land records. An attempt was made to accurately represent the information shown hereon, however, recent changes in the physical and cultural landscape may not be represented. This map is intended for planning and general use only, please refer to the original source documents for detailed information. Please contact the Oneida County Land Information Office if you discover any discrepancies on this map.
Zoning districts represented on this map were provided
by
In the event of a conflict between the boundaries of the Zoning Districts contained in the Master Zoning District Document and the Oneida County Zoning Map, the boundaries contained in the Master Zoning District Document shall govern and prevail.
¶14 Relying on the map’s disclaimer, the County argues it was
unreasonable for
¶15 First and foremost, the County’s argument begs the question: Measure 1,000 feet from where?
¶16 Second, the argument is illogical because the County asserts on the one hand that Carson properly measured from the shoreline of lake 34-16, but assumes that such a measurement from Jennie Webber Lake’s shoreline would have been erroneous.
¶17 Third, had
¶18 Fourth, the County’s argument charges a nonriparian landowner with knowledge of the shoreline’s physical characteristics and may require him or her to traverse swaths of private property to identify the ordinary high water mark.[5]
¶19 Fifth,
[Kennedy] looked at this map. We also went and looked at an aerial
photograph that was a little bit more closer up, and she got out her scaled
ruler and measured from
Then she went to the unnamed lake and measured it. She goes, you’re going to be really close. My suggestion is either contact a surveyor or use a GPS unit and measure from that unnamed lake ....
¶20 Sixth, there is no apparent conflict between the zoning map and
the “Master Zoning District Document”—presumably, the zoning ordinance. The ordinance states that the zoning
authority extends 1,000 feet from the ordinary high water mark. In most cases, the ordinary high water mark
of a natural lake will be located at or near the shoreline identified on
official maps or visible on aerial photographs.
Indeed, here, the map shades an area around
¶21 While the County attempts to shift the inquiry to measurements of the 1,000 foot line, the proper focus rests on identification of the ordinary high water mark. We reject the notion that a property owner is properly tasked with measuring 1,000 feet from nowhere. When Collins’ sign was erected, the County identified the ordinary high water mark as being at or near the lake’s established shoreline.[6] Consequently, if Collins’ sign was more than 1,000 feet from the shoreline, it was beyond the County’s shoreline zoning jurisdiction.
¶22 Before the sign was built, Kennedy, a zoning department permit
specialist, concluded the sign was 1,200 feet from
¶23 We say that the County “has” no authority because this case was decided on summary judgment. Collins never conceded the County’s ordinary high water mark determination was correct. Rather, it argued that the determination was immaterial because it was not made until long after the sign was erected, and that the map established the ordinary high water mark at least until that time. See Kelley, 244 Wis. 2d 777, ¶26 n.9 (“[D]ifferent legal issues raise different issues of material facts for purposes of summary judgment in the context of reciprocal motions for summary judgment and … an issue of fact that was … material under one legal theory might [not] be material to another legal theory.”). Collins further argues that the ordinary high water mark is still at the shoreline, because the County never updated the zoning map. The County, however, does not dispute that the sign would be legal as an existing nonconforming structure. Thus, whether the County accurately determined the ordinary high water mark in 2005 is immaterial, and we need not determine the implication of the County’s failure to update the map.[8]
By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.
[1] Collins
also presents an equitable estoppel argument, which we need not reach because
we reverse on other grounds.
[2] According to the County, the DNR refused to certify its ordinary high water mark determination as “official.”
[3] We accept the County’s assertion that the ordinary high water mark might vary by a matter of a few feet or inches over time or require on-site measurements in the case of a close call. This case does not, however, involve a dispute regarding merely a few feet, and it is undisputed that the sign is more than 1,000 feet from the lakeshore.
[4] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009-10 version unless otherwise noted. All references to Wis. Admin. Code ch. NR 115 are to the January 2010 version.
[5] While our premise stands true regardless of whether, here, the land between the highway and the lake is privately owned, we take notice that public records indicate this land is privately owned. See Oneida County GIS Mapping, http://ocgis.co.oneida.wi.us/oneida/main.do (last visited Apr. 19, 2011); Oneida County Property Tax Application, http://octax.co.oneida.wi.us/ONCTax/Taxrtr, search parcel number SU-497 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). “Oneida County Land Records System is a web-based application that allows users to navigate, query, and report on spatial and non-spatial information, through the use of simple data queries, a pan/zoom interface and other advanced GIS functions. Information is viewable in map and database formats.” Welcome to Oneida County Land Records System, http://www.co.oneida.wi.gov/section.asp?linkid=1802&locid=135 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
[6] Not
only was the shoreline established by the official zoning map and aerial
photographs, but the shoreline’s general location appears to be
long-standing. We take notice of the
DNR’s 1967 lake survey map of
[7] On both exhibits, the lake side of the shoreline is identified as “open water,” while the inland side of the shoreline is identified as “veg. lakebed.”
[8] We
highlight another implication of the County’s identification of the lake’s
ordinary high water mark. The County’s
new determination would effectively redraw