COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 10, 2010 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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Brunswick Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sentry Insurance, a Mutual Company,
Defendant-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before Brown, C.J., Anderson and Reilly, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Brunswick Corporation appeals
from a judgment declaring that Sentry Insurance does not owe coverage for sums
¶2 In prior litigation, the parties stipulated that Brunswick had incurred costs and was obligated to incur costs pursuant to a governmental order to address environmental contamination relating to Cedar Creek as a result of manufacturing plants Brunswick operated in the city of Cedarburg and that there is no coverage under the Sentry policies for environmental cleanup costs incurred pursuant to governmental order.[1] The stipulation expressly did not apply to any losses or claims for coverage under the Sentry policies “involving non-governmental and/or private party claims or governmental natural resource damage claims, even if such claims overlap with the Government Claims.” The stipulation provided that Brunswick “reserved all rights” with respect to nongovernmental claims and acknowledged that “there is only one known potential claim at this time—that of the landowners at Hamilton Pond—and no such claims have been formally asserted, and the damages potentially at issue are undetermined and unknown at this time.”
¶3
¶4 Sentry moved for summary judgment. We review the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment using the same methodology as the circuit court. City
of Beaver Dam v. Cromheecke, 222
Wis. 2d 608,
613,
587
N.W.2d 923
(Ct.
App. 1998). There is no need to repeat the well-known
methodology; the controlling principal is that when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, summary judgment is appropriate.
¶5 It is undisputed that
¶6 After failure of the dam,
¶7 The investigations of property owners’ concerns and meetings
with property owners took place in the process of obtaining access agreements
and informing property owners of what work would be performed. It largely occurred before
¶8
¶9 We need not address other arguments for or against coverage.[5] See
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] The
stipulation made in April 2000 was in accordance with the then-current status
of Wisconsin law as set forth in City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co.,
184 Wis. 2d 750, 517 N.W.2d 463 (1994).
In 2003, City of Edgerton was reversed in Johnson Controls, Inc. v.
Employers Insurance of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶4-5, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665
N.W.2d 257.
[2] Sentry also asserted a plethora of affirmative defenses, including that the known loss and/or loss in progress doctrines barred coverage; that the claims do not arise out of an accident or occurrence as defined in the policies; that coverage was excluded by the terms, conditions, exclusions and limitations of the policies; and that occurrences giving rise to coverage took place before or after the effective dates of the policies.
[3] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[4]
[5]