COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED November 2, 2010 A.
John Voelker Acting Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT III |
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In re the marriage of: Joel T. Brunner,
Petitioner-Appellant, v. Christine A. Ciucci,
Respondent-Respondent. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before
¶1 PER CURIAM. Joel
Brunner appeals a divorce judgment. He
argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by ordering an
unequal division of the marital estate.
We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Joel
Brunner and Christine Ciucci were married in 1996. At the time of the divorce hearing, Brunner
was forty-six and Ciucci was forty-nine.
No minor children were born of the marriage. Brunner and Ciucci never entered into any
prenuptial or postnuptial agreement.
¶3 Brunner
and Ciucci had each been married once before.
When his first marriage ended in divorce, Brunner received various items
of personal property and was allocated various debts. Consequently, his net worth following his
first marriage was “very limited.” In
contrast, when Ciucci’s prior marriage ended in divorce, she received assets with
a net value of approximately $1.2 million.
¶4 As
part of the divorce judgment following her first marriage, Ciucci became the
sole shareholder of RiverShire Excavating Company. Shortly after Brunner and Ciucci married,
they liquidated RiverShire and used the proceeds to open Red River Ranch, Inc.,
a deer farm. Ciucci was the president of
the corporation, and Brunner was secretary.
Brunner tended to the animals, and Ciucci maintained the business’s
books. Red River Ranch, Inc., was forced
to liquidate all of its animals following a chronic wasting disease scare,
resulting in significant financial loss.
¶5 At
the divorce hearing, Brunner proposed an equal division of all property. He suggested that the marital residence be sold
and that, after the mortgage was satisfied, any remaining profit from the sale
should be split evenly between Ciucci and himself. He also proposed that the Red River Ranch
property be awarded to him, which would have required him to make an
equalization payment to Ciucci in the amount of $103,116.77.
¶6 Ciucci
proposed an unequal property division, allocating a net marital estate of
$238,153 to herself and a net marital estate of $11,135 to Brunner. She would receive the marital residence, the
mortgage debt on it, and the Red River Ranch property, while Brunner would
receive his tools and equipment.
¶7 The
circuit court adopted Ciucci’s proposal.
Brunner now appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶8 The
division of property at divorce rests within the sound discretion of the circuit
court. LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI
67, ¶13, 262
¶9
¶10 Brunner
argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by ordering an
unequal division of the marital estate without considering all the statutory
factors.[4] Brunner concedes the court discussed the
statutory factors during the divorce hearing, but he asserts it “made no
specific factual findings relative to those statutory factors or how they affected
[its] determination.” Brunner may be
correct that the circuit court’s decision was not a model exercise of
discretion in terms of linking the unequal property division to the statutory
factors. However, we conclude the record
supports the court’s property division. See
¶11 The
circuit court noted the parties had a long-term marriage of twelve years. See
Wis. Stat. § 767.61(3)(a). It noted the parties had contributed equally during
the marriage. See Wis. Stat. § 767.61(3)(d). It commented that the parties were about the
same age and had not complained of any health problems. See
Wis. Stat. § 767.61(3)(e). It also noted the parties had “close to
equal” earning capacities. See Wis.
Stat. § 767.61(3)(g).
¶12 However,
the court also noted that Ciucci had come into the marriage with substantially
greater assets than Brunner. See Wis.
Stat. § 767.61(3)(b), (h).
Specifically, the court found Ciucci brought property valued at $1.2
million into the marriage, while Brunner came into the marriage with a “negative
balance.”
¶13 The
court concluded the remaining statutory factors were not relevant. It found that: (1) neither party had substantial assets not
subject to division; (2) neither party contributed to the other’s education,
training, or increased earning power; (3) maintenance was not being awarded;
(4) neither party had relevant pension benefits or future interests; (5) there
were no relevant tax consequences; and (6) the parties had not made any written
agreements concerning property distribution.
See Wis. Stat. § 767.61(3)(c), (f), (i), (j), (k), (L); see also LeMere, 262
¶14 After
discussing the statutory factors, the court stated:
[T]he only factor in this case that I have heard noted that has a great deal of importance to me and a great deal of persuasion to me is what each party brought into the marriage. I never had a case quite this disproportional. I have had situations where people bring different amounts into the marriage … [a]nd those are probably easier to deal with than when you have one person bringing everything into the marriage and the other person bringing just some personal property into the marriage.
… I know it’s a tough call to say that he walks out of this with nothing other than what he has in personal property, but on the other hand, I am being asked to take away—give her roughly … going from [$1.2 million] to about probably $125,000.00. That doesn’t seem right either.…
I’m going with [Ciucci’s] argument.
¶15 Although not explicitly
stated in the court’s decision, it is implicit that the court determined one
statutory factor favoring unequal division—property brought into the marriage—was
so compelling as to outweigh other factors that would tend to favor equal
division. Particularly telling are the
court’s statements that it had never seen a case “quite this disproportional”
and that it “[didn’t] seem right” to leave Ciucci with only about ten percent of
her premarital assets. The court
apparently concluded the disparity between the parties’ assets at the time of
their marriage was so large that an unequal property division was the only way
to reach a fair result.
¶16 Brunner
argues it was unfair for the court to allocate ninety-five percent of the net
marital estate to Ciucci, leaving him with only five percent. However, Ciucci points out that under the
unequal division adopted by the court, she is leaving the marriage with less
than twenty percent of the assets she brought into it. She also notes that applying the presumption
of equal division would result in her walking away with only ten percent of her
premarital assets, while Brunner, who came into the marriage with a “negative
balance,” would walk away with about $125,000.
Ciucci contends, and the circuit court agreed, that such a result would
be more unfair than dividing the property unequally. The court’s decision was not an erroneous
exercise of discretion.
¶17 Brunner
also argues Ciucci’s circumstances are similar to those of the wife in Lang
v. Lang, 161
¶18 However,
that an equal division was a proper exercise of discretion in Lang
does not automatically mean that an unequal division was improper in this case. In Lang, the parties had been married
twenty years, whereas Brunner and Ciucci were only married twelve years. Also, while the Lang court found that the
wife brought “a significant amount of assets” into the marriage, it did not
precisely state the value of those assets.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] Wisconsin Stat. § 767.61(3) states:
The court shall presume that all property not described in sub. (2)(a) is to be divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to marital misconduct after considering all of the following:
(a) The length of the marriage.
(b) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(c) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to division by the court.
(d) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party’s contribution in homemaking and child care services.
(e) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(f) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other.
(g) The earning capacity of each party, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.
(h) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the party having physical placement for the greater period of time.
(i) The amount and duration of an order under s. 767.56 granting maintenance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support payments under s. 767.531 and whether the property division is in lieu of such payments.
(j) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits, vested or unvested, and future interests.
(k) The tax consequences to each party.
(L) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
(m) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.
[3] LeMere
v.
LeMere, 2003 WI 67 ¶17, 262
[4] Brunner’s
brief states that the circuit court “abused its discretion.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court changed the
terminology used in reviewing a circuit court’s discretionary act from “abuse
of discretion” to “erroneous exercise of discretion” in 1992.
We also note that Ciucci’s brief refers to the parties by their designations, rather than by their names. We remind counsel that Wis. Stat. Rule 809.19(1)(i) requires “[r]eference to the parties by name, rather than by party designation, throughout the argument section.”