COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 27, 2010 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jevell M. Williams, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Jevell M. Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea to one count of possessing heroin.[1] He challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police found during an investigatory stop of his vehicle. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On April 5, 2008, police stopped a vehicle operated by Williams and discovered twenty-five packets of heroin in Williams’s pocket. The State charged Williams with one count of possession of heroin with intent to deliver. Williams moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, claiming that the police lacked a constitutionally sufficient basis for stopping his vehicle.
¶3 Three police officers testified at the suppression hearing, and
their descriptions of the events of April 5, 2008, are not disputed on
appeal. Officer Wardell Dodds testified
that he received a telephone call from a confidential informant who stated that
she knew someone with a “jab” of heroin.
Dodds explained that a “jab” is twenty-five packages of heroin with a
street value of $250. The informant told
Dodds that the drug dealer was “a black guy driving a gray Buick.” Additionally, the informant described the
drug dealer’s hair (“short”), age (“thirty to thirty-four years old”), weight
(“approximately 170 or 175 [pounds]”), and height (“5’10” to 5’11”). The informant stated that the drug dealer
would be “on
¶4 Officer Zebdee Wilson testified that he and his partner, Dodds, received a telephone call from a confidential informant who “knew a drug dealer that can deliver some heroin to her.” Further, “the suspected drug dealer told [the informant] that he would be in the 2400 block of North 44th Street, and that he would be driving a gray four-door Buick.” The informant described the drug dealer to the police and stated that the transaction would take place within a half an hour.
¶5 Fifteen minutes after receiving the informant’s call, Dodd and Wilson arrived at the location described by the informant and discovered a gray four-door Buick “mid block.” Soon thereafter, the officers saw a black male matching the informant’s description of the drug dealer get into the Buick and drive away.
¶6
¶7 Officer John Bryda testified that he received radio transmissions and cell phone calls from Wilson on April 5, 2008, advising that a suspect believed to be carrying heroin was driving northbound on North 44th Street in a gray four-door Buick. Bryda described following the vehicle and conducting an investigatory stop with the assistance of other officers in the area. Williams was driving the Buick. In his pocket, the police found a baggie containing twenty-five packages of heroin.
¶8 The State presented no other witnesses. Williams elected not to testify or to call any witnesses on his behalf.
¶9 The circuit court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Williams, and it refused to suppress the evidence that the officers found in his pocket. Williams entered into a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to one count of possessing heroin. The circuit court imposed a three-year term of imprisonment, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶10 The sole issue that Williams presents on appeal is whether the police lawfully stopped his vehicle.[2] He argues that the stop violated his right to be free from unreasonable seizures guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.[3]
¶11 “An investigatory stop is constitutional if the police have
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is
about to be committed.” State
v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶20, 294
¶12 Information in a tip to police may support an investigatory
stop under appropriate circumstances. State
v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, ¶17, 241
In assessing the reliability of a tip, due weight must be given to: (1) the informant’s veracity; and (2) the informant’s basis of knowledge. These considerations should be viewed in light of the “totality of the circumstances,” and not as discrete elements of a more rigid test: “[A] deficiency in one [consideration] may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”
¶13 Reliability of a tip is not determined by reference to a per se rule. See id.
Rather, the relevant considerations identified in Rutzinski “outline a
general spectrum of potential types of tips that … can give rise to a
reasonable suspicion.”
¶14 Williams relies on decisions that discuss the necessary quantum of corroboration necessary when the police receive information from an anonymous informant, and he argues that the police in this case acted on the informant’s tip without sufficiently corroborating the information. Williams’s cited authorities do not aid him, however, because his case involves a known informant, not an anonymous one.
¶15 The police do not have an obligation to corroborate information
obtained from a known and reliable informant.
See
¶16 Moreover, were we to conclude in this case that the confidential
informant’s prior relationship with law enforcement provided insufficient
assurance of the informant’s veracity, we would nonetheless hold that the
police took more than adequate steps to determine the reliability of the
information before effecting an investigatory stop. The informant called police and described a
drug dealer in a grey four-door Buick who would be in a specific area to
deliver twenty-five packages of heroin within half an hour of the call. Approximately fifteen minutes later, the police
discovered a man matching the description of the drug dealer in the area
specified by the informant, and the police observed the man get into a gray
four-door Buick. “‘When significant
aspects of the caller’s predictions [are] verified, there [is] reason to
believe not only that the caller [is] honest but also that he [or she is] well
informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.’” Williams, 241
¶17 Williams complains that the police stopped him after verifying
only elements of the information’s tip that, standing alone, are not
incriminating. In fact, the law is
well-settled that corroboration of the innocent details of a tip may support a
finding of reasonable suspicion, even under circumstances where the police
receive the tip from a wholly anonymous source.
¶18 Here, the police began their investigation based on a tip from a source that had provided invariably accurate information on numerous prior occasions, and the police independently corroborated many details supplied by the informant. The totality of the circumstances fully justified the investigatory stop.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5. (2007-08).
[1] The transcript of Williams’s guilty plea is not in the record.
[2] Williams does not suggest that police acted improperly during the stop nor does he contend that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him based on the information obtained during the stop.
[3] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.