COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED April 27, 2010 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT I |
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State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dantrell M. Curtis, Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Dantrell M. Curtis appeals
from a judgment of conviction, entered upon his guilty plea, on one count of
first-degree reckless homicide, and from an order denying his motion for resentencing.[1] Curtis asserts the sentencing court erroneously
exercised its discretion by failing to consider probation as a first
alternative to imprisonment. We conclude
that, although it did not explicitly say so, the court determined probation was
inappropriate under the standard adopted in Bastian v. State, 54
¶2 On July 31, 2007, Curtis and a codefendant killed Romero Stokes during a carjacking outside a sandwich shop. Stokes died from exsanguination following twenty-one gunshot wounds. Curtis, who was sixteen years old at the time, was charged with first-degree intentional homicide, armed robbery with the use of force, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, all as party to a crime. Curtis eventually pled guilty to one amended count of first-degree reckless homicide, as party to a crime. The armed robbery count was dismissed and read in.[2] The court sentenced Curtis to twenty years’ initial confinement and ten years’ extended supervision.
¶3 Curtis moved for resentencing. He asserted, in part, that the circuit court “did not indicate why probation is not appropriate[.]” The court reviewed the sentencing transcript, concluded discretion had been properly exercised, and denied Curtis’s motion without a hearing. Curtis now appeals, with the sole claim that the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing direction when it “overlooked probation as the first alternative.”
¶4 It is well-settled that we expect a circuit court to exercise
discretion at sentencing. State
v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270
¶5 Likewise, it is well-established that we expect a sentencing
court exercising discretion to consider the objectives of a sentence, the facts
of the case relevant to those objectives, and various factors that might influence
the sentence. See id., 270
¶6 In Bastian, the supreme court expressly
adopted Standard 1.3, from the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to Probation (Approved Draft 1970). See
Bastian,
54
“(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or
“(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
“(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense if a sentence of probation were imposed.[”]
¶7 Here, the sentencing court never expressly made a ruling
prefaced with the phrase “probation is inappropriate because …,” or some
variation thereof. As a general rule,
however, we do not require the circuit court to recite any particular “magic
words” in the decision-making process. See Gallion,
270
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion shall not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5. (2007-08).
[1] The Honorable John A. Franke imposed sentence and entered the judgment of conviction. The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen entered the order denying the postconviction motion.
[2] After Curtis withdrew a motion for a reverse waiver into juvenile court, the State filed an Information that charged only the homicide and robbery counts.