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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 2, 2010 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
¶1 BRUNNER, J.[1] Anne
R. appeals an order extending her outpatient commitment to
BACKGROUND
¶2 On August 28, 2006, Anne was ordered committed due to mental illness. Her commitment was extended on February 19, 2007, and again on February 6, 2008, and February 5, 2009.[4] Anne suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and has been treated throughout her commitment with psychotropic medication. Anne was found not competent to refuse medication at her initial commitment and at each extension.
¶3 Doctor John Coates, the sole expert for the County, was the only witness to testify at the February 5, 2009, recommitment hearing. Based on his testimony and a review of other records not introduced into evidence, the circuit court ordered Anne’s commitment extended for an additional twelve months.
DISCUSSION
¶4
¶5 An individual is dangerous if he or she meets any of five
alternative criteria set forth in Wis.
Stat. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e.[5] Each criterion requires evidence of a recent
overt act, attempt or threat to act, or a pattern of recent acts or
omissions. However, in cases such as
this, where the County seeks extension of an already-existing commitment order,
the County need only show there is “a substantial likelihood, based on the
subject individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper
subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am). This subsection was enacted to “avoid the
‘revolving door’ phenomenon whereby there must be proof of a recent overt act
to extend the commitment but because the patient was still under treatment, no
overt acts occurred and the patient was released from treatment only to commit
a dangerous act and be recommitted.” State
v. W.R.B., 140
¶6 “The burden of proof is upon the county department or other
person seeking commitment to establish evidence that the subject individual is
in need of continued commitment.” Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)3. The county must prove all required facts by
clear and convincing evidence. Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(e). On review, the circuit court’s factual findings
will be upheld if they are supported by any credible evidence or reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence. Estate
of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202
¶7 Although the circuit court considered documents not formally admitted into evidence, evidence properly admitted supports the circuit court’s recommitment order. Dr. Coates’ testimony at the recommitment hearing clearly and convincingly established that Anne would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. Coates stated Anne, whom he diagnosed and treated in the past, had a longstanding history of mental illness characterized by delusional thinking and emotional lability. When asked directly whether Anne would present a danger to herself or others if treatment were withdrawn, Coates noted such withdrawal previously led to hospitalization. He stated the psychotropic medications stabilized her condition, but noted her “history of noncompliance” and that “she doesn’t believe she is mentally ill and has shown no [insight] into her illness.” Finally, Coates opined that “if she discontinues those [medications], there is … pretty much a hundred percent chance that her symptoms would recur.” Coates’ testimony was sufficient to establish a substantial likelihood that Anne would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.[6]
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(b)(4).
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] Anne also argues a separate order
declaring her not competent to refuse medication should be reversed. That order was not identified in the notice
of appeal and we will not consider Anne’s arguments relating to it.
[3] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[4] The February 6, 2008, and February 5, 2009, commitments were both ordered on an outpatient basis.
[5] The five grounds for dangerousness set forth in these subsections are that the subject (a) poses a risk of physical harm to himself or herself; (b) poses a risk of physical harm to others; (c) suffers from impaired judgment that could lead to harm to self; (d) cannot fulfill the basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter, or safety; or (e) is incapable of giving informed consent about medication or treatment necessary to avoid suffering or severe mental, emotional, or physical harm.
[6] Anne
argues testimony suggesting the withdrawal of treatment would aggravate an
individual’s mental condition cannot by itself support a finding a future
dangerousness without risking indefinite commitment for those diagnosed with
chronic mental illness. In other words,
if we conclude the testimony in this case was sufficient, the County could
indefinitely commit any person whose mental illness would worsen without
treatment. She contends this result
would be unacceptable. See State
v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶28, 255
Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851 (“A mental health commitment provision is overly
broad … if by its terms it could reasonably be applied to commit mentally ill
persons who are not in any way dangerous to themselves or others.”). While her claim may have arguable merit, her
passing reference to Dennis H. does not reflect the type
of carefully developed argument contemplated by Wis. Stat. Rule 809.19(1)(e) that would be necessary for us
to declare Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am)
facially overbroad. We will not abandon
our neutrality to develop arguments. See M.C.I.,
Inc. v. Elbin, 146