COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED February 2, 2010 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
Appeal No. |
|
|||
STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
|
DISTRICT I |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Roberto I. Lopez, Defendant-Appellant. |
||||
|
|
|||
APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Roberto I. Lopez appeals pro se from a circuit court order denying his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2007-08).[1] Lopez contends that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The circuit court concluded that Lopez’s claims fail on their merits, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The State charged Lopez in a criminal complaint with two
counts of first-degree intentional homicide and one count of armed robbery, all
as party to a crime. In an amended
information, the State added a second count of armed robbery, also as party to
a crime. The State alleged that Lopez
and several
co-actors robbed two occupants of a
¶3 The criminal complaint includes the statement of Joel Alvarado. Alvarado told a police detective that he was in a tavern on July 29, 2001, when he and four other men, Roberto Lopez, Luis Davila-Diaz, Jose Vargas, and Jose Dotel, agreed to rob another tavern patron, Juan Alex Delasantos. Alvarado described watching with Lopez while Davila-Diaz, Vargas, and Dotel forced Delasantos and his companion, Carmen Hernandez, into a car at gun point. Alvarado further stated that he and Lopez next drove together to Delasantos’s home. According to the complaint:
Mr. Alvarado stated that he then walked up some stairs to the second floor where Alex Delasantos lived. Mr. Alvarado then saw Alex Delasantos sitting on the floor of the bedroom with his hands tied behind his back. Alex Delasantos’ feet were also tied with some cord ....
Jose Dotel and Jose Vargas then stated that they would kill Delasantos if he did not tell them where the drugs were hidden. Alex Delasantos finally told Jose Vargas and Jose Dotel that the drugs were hidden in a ceiling above the bed. Mr. Alvarado and Jose Vargas then stood on the bed and found two clear, plastic bags containing powder cocaine and crack cocaine. Jose Vargas, Jose Dotel and Luis Davila-Diaz then asked Alex Delasantos if he had any money. Alex Delasantos then took out his wallet from his pants and handed it to Joel Alvarado. Mr. Alvarado took out all the money, which was about $300.
Mr.
Alvarado gave the money and the cocaine to Roberto Lopez, who was present in
the apartment of Alex Delasantos at
(Some paragraph breaks added.)
¶4 Lopez eventually pled guilty to two counts of felony murder. He moved to withdraw his pleas both before and after sentencing, but the circuit court denied his motions. Lopez appealed his convictions with the assistance of appointed counsel, and this court affirmed.
¶5 Lopez next filed the pro
se postconviction motion that underlies this appeal. He asserted that his trial counsel performed
ineffectively in two ways:
(1) by failing to claim that the criminal complaint was insufficient; and (2)
by permitting Lopez to plead guilty to amended charges when the State lacked
sufficient evidence to prove that he was guilty of the offenses charged in the
complaint. Lopez asserted that his
postconviction counsel performed ineffectively in turn by failing to challenge
trial counsel’s effectiveness. The
circuit court denied Lopez’s claims, and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶6 All grounds for relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06, must, as a rule, be raised in a
defendant’s original, supplemental, or amended postconviction motion.
¶7 The familiar two-pronged test for claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel requires a defendant to prove both that counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the
deficiency. Strickland v.
¶8 Lopez first asserts that his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to challenge the criminal complaint in which the State alleged that he committed first-degree intentional homicide and armed robbery as a party to the crimes. According to Lopez, the criminal complaint “was insufficient to show probable cause that “he” was party to a “crime” on July 29, or July 30, 2001.” (Punctuation as in original.)
¶9 A challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint presents a
question of law that we review de novo. See
(2) What is the person charged with?; (3) When and where did the alleged
offense take place?; (4) Why is this particular person being charged?; and (5)
Who says so? or how reliable is the informant?’”
¶10 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a),
a person commits first-degree intentional homicide by causing the death of
another human being with intent to kill.
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.32(1)(a)
and 943.32(2), a person commits armed robbery by taking property from another
human being, by force, with intent to steal, and while using or threatening to
use a dangerous weapon. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 939.05, the State may
charge and convict a person as a party to a crime when the person is concerned
in the commission of a crime without directly committing it. A person is concerned in the commission of a
crime when the person intentionally aids or abets the commission of the crime
or conspires with another to commit it. See § 939.05(2)(b)-(c). Further, liability as a party to a crime
“extends to the natural and probable consequence of the intended acts, as well
as any other crime which, under the circumstances, was a natural and probable
consequence of the intended crime.” State
v. Hecht, 116
¶11 The complaint in this case sets forth sufficient facts to
permit the conclusion that Lopez probably committed first-degree intentional
homicide and armed robbery as a party to the crimes. The complaint includes a description of the
crimes and shows that they were committed on or about July 29, 2001, and
July 30, 2001, in the apartment of one of the victims. The complaint reflects that Alvarado, a
participant in the crimes, gave statements implicating Lopez: according to Alvarado, Lopez participated in
planning the armed robbery, he received the stolen money and cocaine at the
crime scene, and he supplied the duct tape used as a murder weapon. Alvarado’s statements are reliable because
they are against Alvarado’s penal interests and reflect Alvarado’s personal
knowledge and observations.
¶12 A motion challenging the sufficiency of the complaint would
have lacked arguable merit. Accordingly,
Lopez’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to pursue such a
claim. An attorney’s performance is not ineffective
for failing to make meritless arguments.
¶13 Lopez next contends that his trial attorney performed ineffectively by advising him to plead guilty because the State lacked the necessary proof to convict him. According to Lopez: “(1) there was no evidence that Lopez’ [sic] gave a statement to [investigating officers] that he planned to do a robbery and not a murder on July 29 or July 30, 2001, [and] (2) there was no evidence that Lopez’ [sic] was “aware” that a robbery was committed on July 29 or July 30, 2001.” (Punctuation as in original.) Based on these assertions, Lopez argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of being party to the crime of either first‑degree intentional homicide or armed robbery.
¶14 Lopez appears to argue that the State could not have prevailed
at trial because he did not confess.
Lopez is not correct. The State
need not offer a confession to prove guilt.
Indeed, “[i]t is well established that a finding of guilt may rest upon
evidence that is entirely circumstantial.”
State v. Poellinger, 153
¶15 As to Lopez’s assertion that the State could not have proved at
trial that he “was ‘aware’ that a robbery was committed,” Lopez fails to
explain the basis for this claim. Although
Lopez’s guilty plea obviated the need for testimony, the complaint contains
Alvarado’s statement that Lopez planned the robbery, took possession of the
stolen goods, and supplied the duct tape used to murder the victims. Thus, the State had a witness whose testimony,
if believed, could support a jury’s reasonable inference that Lopez intended to
commit both armed robbery and homicide.[2]
Direct evidence of intent is not
required; a jury may infer a defendant’s intent from the circumstances. Jacobs v. State, 50
¶16 A postconviction motion must include “sufficient material facts
that, if true, would entitle the movant to relief.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶13,
274
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] During Lopez’s sentencing hearing, the State summarized some of the testimony offered at the co-actors’ trials. According to the State, the testimony at those trials showed that Lopez brought the duct tape to the murder scene, that he possessed the cocaine and some of the money during the armed robbery, and that he was “the person that was at least at some point kind of in charge of what was going on.” Both the State and Lopez’s trial counsel confirmed that Alvarado testified at one of the trials.