COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
October 6, 2009
David
R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT I
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State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Donta Jackson,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: Jeffrey
A. Wagner, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Donta Jackson appeals a judgment
of conviction, entered upon a jury’s verdict, for one count of first-degree
intentional homicide while armed. Jackson also appeals an
order denying his postconviction motion.
He alleges there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict
and that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an interlocutory appeal
of the bindover decision. We reject Jackson’s arguments and
affirm.
¶2 The criminal complaint alleged that, on January 24, 2007, witness
Amber Works and her boyfriend, Regis Trammell, were walking to Angel Food Mart
on the corner of 26th and Nash Streets in Milwaukee.
As Jackson
drove past them, Trammell pointed him out to Works. Jackson
then made a U-turn. As Works and
Trammell entered the store, Jackson
shouted something at Trammell, Trammell stood at the door and argued back
before entering the store completely. At
the preliminary hearing, Works testified the men were swearing at each
other. Jackson entered the store shortly after
Trammell. He approached Trammell, and they
argued further before leaving the store.
¶3 After Jackson left, Trammell and Works exited the store. When Trammell spotted Jackson a block away, he and Works went back
inside the store. Jackson,
along with another individual, returned to the store, and Jackson again argued with Trammell. Jackson
then displayed a gun, but told Trammell everything was okay and it was safe to
go outside. After Jackson
left the store the second time, Trammell told Works to stay inside the store
while he went out to see if Jackson
had left. Approximately twenty seconds
later, Works heard gunshots. She found
Trammell on the ground, bleeding from the head, and she called for help. The medical examiner confirmed that Trammell
died from a gunshot wound to the head.
¶4 At the preliminary hearing, the State presented testimony
from Works and one of the responding officers.
Jackson
moved to dismiss the charge, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support
a bindover. The court commissioner denied
the motion, found probable cause, and bound Jackson over for trial. Jackson
later filed a pretrial motion to dismiss with the circuit court, again challenging
the probable cause determination. The
court denied the motion.
¶5 Jackson
was convicted following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment, with
the possibility of extended supervision after thirty years. Jackson
appealed, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal to pursue a postconviction motion
in which he alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue an interlocutory
appeal of the denials of the motions to dismiss. The circuit court denied this motion. It concluded sufficient evidence had been elicited
at the preliminary hearing, so an appeal would have been meritless. Therefore, the court concluded, there had
been no prejudice, so counsel was not ineffective. Jackson
appeals.
¶6 Jackson
first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. This court may not reverse a
conviction “unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the
conviction, is so insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said
as a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d
493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).
¶7 Here, the evidence against Jackson was circumstantial, but it is
well-established that a determination of guilt “may rest upon evidence that is
entirely circumstantial[.]” See id. Often, circumstantial evidence is stronger
and more satisfactory than direct evidence.
See id. at 501. The standard of review is the same,
regardless of whether the evidence supporting the conviction is direct or
circumstantial. See id. at 503.
¶8 Jackson
details all of the evidence the State did not present against him—there was no
eyewitness to the actual shooting, no gun, no fingerprints, and no DNA
evidence. Our standard of review,
however, is unconcerned with evidence that was not submitted for the fact-finder’s
consideration. Instead, we examine only
whether the evidence actually presented at trial supports the verdict. See
generally id.
¶9 The jury heard testimony from Works, which established a
long-standing, acrimonious relationship between Jackson and Trammell. Works told the jury about Jackson driving past them, executing a U-turn
and following them into the store. She testified
about how Jackson
argued with Trammell, showing off a firearm at least once, yet reassuring Trammell
it was safe to exit the store.
¶10 The jury heard testimony from witness Christian Brooks, who
stated that Trammell was concerned Jackson
was “riding around looking for him.”
Brooks further testified that when he left the store, he observed Jackson between the store
and the adjacent house, where someone leaving the store would be unable to see
him.
¶11 The jury also heard from one of the detectives, who testified
that he took a statement from Jackson’s
sister, Aisha Jackson. According to the
detective, Aisha reported that Jackson had
called and told her he was heading to Illinois
because he had “gotten into it on 26th Street” and she should watch
the news. Aisha later denied giving
police such a statement.
¶12 It is the jury’s function to decide which evidence is credible
and how conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved. See id. at 503. The jury is permitted to take into account
“matters of common knowledge and experience in the affairs of life.” Id.
at 508-09. While evidence may, in fact,
support multiple inferences of what actually happened, we are bound to “accept
and follow the inference drawn by the trier of fact” unless the evidence upon
which the inference is based is incredible as a matter of law. Id.
at 506-07.
¶13 Here, the evidence adequately supports an inference that Jackson killed
Trammell. There was a history of
conflict between Jackson and Trammell.
The men had no interaction that night until Jackson turned his vehicle around and
followed Trammell into the store. Jackson argued with
Trammell and displayed a firearm.
Although Jackson
also assured Trammell’s safety, a reasonable jury could infer that an individual
sincere in those reassurances does not also brandish a gun and, therefore, the
gun was a threat and the reassurances nothing more than a lure.
¶14 Works had also testified about how she and Trammell had exited the
store once, but had gone back inside when Trammell saw Jackson on a nearby corner. It is reasonable to infer Jackson saw them re-enter upon noticing him
on the corner, given that he followed Trammell back into the store. Works’ testimony, the inference that Jackson saw Trammell balk upon seeing him, and Brooks’
testimony about Jackson’s hidden location,
permit the jury to infer that Jackson
took up the hidden position to draw Trammell outside.
¶15 Given that Jackson was the only
individual in an altercation with Trammell that evening, and the only one who
had displayed a firearm prior to the shooting, a jury could infer that Jackson was the individual
who killed Trammell. A jury, choosing to
believe the detective’s testimony over Aisha’s denial, could infer that Jackson
did, in fact, tell his sister he had “gotten into it” with Trammell, accepting
this as a confession. These inferences
are not incredible as a matter of law; the verdict is adequately
supported.
¶16 Jackson’s
challenge to trial counsel’s performance likewise fails. He attempted to get the charge against him
dismissed by arguing there was insufficient evidence to support bindover. The court commissioner, and later the circuit
court, rejected this challenge. However,
a defendant claiming error at a preliminary hearing can only obtain relief
before the trial; a fair and errorless trial essentially cures any defect in
the preliminary hearing. See State v. Webb, 160 Wis. 2d 622, 628, 467 N.W.2d 108
(1991). Jackson’s postconviction motion therefore
claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an interlocutory review of
the orders rejecting his challenge to the bindover.
¶17 To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show deficient performance and prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. See
Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). Failing to adequately
prove either of the prongs defeats the entire claim. See
id.
at 697.
¶18 A preliminary examination is “intended to be a summary
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant committed a felony and thus ‘a substantial basis
for bringing the prosecution and further denying the accused his right to
liberty.’” See State v. Hooper, 101 Wis. 2d
517, 544-45, 305 N.W.2d 110 (1981) (quoting State ex rel. Huser v. Rasmussen,
84 Wis. 2d
600, 606, 267 N.W.2d 285 (1978)).
¶19 A preliminary hearing is not a preliminary trial or a full
evidentiary trial on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 396, 359 N.W.2d 151
(1984). The hearing’s focus is “whether
the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support the conclusion
that the defendant probably committed a felony.” Id.
at 397-98. The hearing is not the forum
for choosing between competing facts or inferences, nor is it the forum for weighing
the State’s evidence against evidence favorable to the defendant. Id.
at 398. All that must be established to
support the bindover is a believable account of the defendant’s commission of a
felony. See State v. Cotton,
2003 WI App 154, ¶12, 266 Wis. 2d
308, 668 N.W.2d 346.
¶20 Here, the State relied primarily on Works’ testimony at the preliminary
hearing. Her testimony was essentially
the same as what she told police and what she testified to at trial. She and Trammell walked to the store, saw Jackson driving the car,
and observed the car make a U-turn. As she
and Trammell went into the store, Trammell argued with Jackson.
Trammell told her he had argued with Jackson in the past. Jackson
came into the store, showed off his gun, and told Trammell he was “all
right.” Jackson
left the store, and when Trammell and Works exited, they saw Jackson a block away. Trammell and Works returned to the store, as
did Jackson, who again mentioned his gun and told Trammell it was okay to come
outside. About ten seconds after Jackson left, Trammell went out to see if Jackson was still
outside. Works then heard gunshots and
saw Trammell fall to the ground.
¶21 This testimony adequately supports, for purposes of a bindover,
a believable inference that Jackson
probably committed a felony. Any appellate
challenge by counsel would have been meritless.
Counsel is not ineffective for failing to bring a meritless challenge. See State v.
Toliver, 187 Wis. 2d
346, 360, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1994).
By the Court.—Judgment and order
affirmed.
This
opinion shall not be published. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5. (2007-08).