COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 22, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
|
NOTICE |
|
|
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
|
Appeal No. |
|
|||
STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
|||
|
DISTRICT I |
|||
|
|
|||
|
|
|||
State of Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Tanesheah Verdice Ross, Defendant-Appellant. |
||||
|
|
|||
APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Following a court trial, Tanesheah Verdice Ross was convicted of one count of endangering safety by use of a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(2)(a) (2007-08).[1] She was sentenced to thirty-two months’ initial confinement and forty-eight month’ extended supervision—eighty months’ imprisonment out of a possible total 120-month sentence. She moved for resentencing, but the court denied her motion. On appeal, Ross only argues that the court failed to appropriately exercise its sentencing discretion. We reject Ross’s contention and affirm the judgment and order.
¶2 Karitta Phillips alleged that Ross came to her home, looking for Phillip’s cousin, Michael Fair. When Phillips told Ross she did not know where Fair was, Ross became agitated. As Phillips closed the door on Ross, Ross shot a small handgun into the home. Neither Phillips nor two other individuals in the home were injured. A spent shell casing was found outside the home, and a bullet was found inside. Ross testified in her own defense, denying that she knew Fair and asserting that she was being framed. The court rejected Ross’s testimony, convicted her, and sentenced her. Ross moved for resentencing, arguing the trial court had erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. The court denied the motion and Ross appeals.
¶3 It is well-settled that sentencing is committed to the
circuit court’s discretion. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17,
270
¶4 In exercising its sentencing discretion, a circuit court is
to specify, on the record, the sentencing objectives it deems relevant. See id.,
¶40. These objectives generally include the
protection of the public, punishment or rehabilitation of the defendant, and
deterrence to others, and the court should identify the objective or objectives
of greatest importance.
¶5 Here, the court determined that each of the sentencing objectives needed to be considered. It concluded that the community needed to be protected, as it had a right to be free from behavior like Ross’s; that there should be both a punishment and deterrent component to the sentence; and that Ross had some rehabilitative needs, including drug and mental health issues, that should be addressed.
¶6 The court then discussed multiple aggravating and mitigating factors. It noted that Ross did have employment and that she had cooperated with counsel. However, it also observed that even after its verdict, Ross continued to deny responsibility for the offense. The court also considered that Ross had discharged a firearm in the direction of another person, that other individuals were also in the home, and that the home had sustained property damage. The court characterized Ross’s behavior as “aggravated” and “egregious” and commented that she was lucky no one was injured by her actions.[2] The court also observed Ross’s criminal record.
¶7 Ross asserts the circuit court failed to appropriately exercise its discretion because the reasons the court gave for its sentence “were not so clearly explained, not linked to relevant facts, and do not appear to be the product of a process of reasoning ….” Further, she contends, “specific reasons for that length of time are stated nowhere in the record.” In short, Ross asserts that the length of her sentence is not appropriately linked to the sentencing factors and objectives.
¶8 The difficulty with Ross’s argument is that “the exercise of
discretion does not lend itself to mathematical precision.”
¶9 Ross’s sentence is “not ‘so excessive and unusual and so
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and
violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper
under the circumstances.’” Taylor,
289
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion shall not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.
[1] Wisconsin Stat. § 941.20(2)(a)
provides that whoever “[i]ntentionally discharges a firearm into a vehicle or
building under circumstances in which he or she should realize there might be a
human being present therein” is guilty of a Class G felony. When the court delivered its verdict, it
stated it was finding Ross guilty of “endangering safety by reckless use of a firearm.” (Emphasis added.) However, the complaint appropriately charged
Ross; the court reviewed the appropriate jury instruction,
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[2] For
this reason, the court concluded probation was inappropriate and some
confinement was necessary to protect the public. See
State
v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶44, 270