2009 WI App 147
court of appeals of
published opinion
Case No.: |
2008AP1795 |
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Complete Title of Case: |
†Petition for Review Filed |
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Town of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. 164 of
Defendant-Appellant.† |
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Opinion Filed: |
September 16, 2009 |
Submitted on Briefs: |
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Oral Argument: |
August 12, 2009 |
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JUDGES: |
Brown, C.J., Anderson and Snyder, JJ. |
Concurred: |
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Dissented: |
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Appellant |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was
submitted on the briefs of Alan H.
Marcuvitz and Susan M. Sager of Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, |
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Respondent |
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ATTORNEYS: |
On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was
submitted on the brief of James W. Hammes of Cramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, A nonparty brief was filed by Carol B. Nawrocki of Wisconsin
Towns Association of |
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2009 WI App 147
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 16, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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NOTICE |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
2008AP1795 |
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STATE OF |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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Town of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. 164 of
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
Before Brown, C.J., Anderson and Snyder, JJ.
¶1 SNYDER, J. The 164 of
Waukesha Limited Partnership (the Developer) appeals from a judgment in favor
of the Town of
BACKGROUND
¶2 In 2005, the Developer contacted the
¶3 At the town plan commission meeting on October 13, 2005, the Developer submitted its conceptual plan and again indicated that it would agree to waive the right to petition for annexation to the city. The plan commission voted to recommend approval of the plan to the town board, subject to the development “meeting all the requirements for a CSM [certified survey map], Site Plan and Plan of Operation approval and any other governmental entity requirements.”
¶4 In a letter dated August 14, 2006, the Developer sent a
revised concept plan to the Town. In the
cover letter, the Developer sought a meeting to discuss “any need to amend the
zoning code,” “potential extraterritorial rights of the City of
¶5 On October 12, 2006, the town board met and approved the
amended setback requirement of the zoning ordinance; however, the board tabled
the approval of the plan commission’s recommendation until a memorandum of understanding
was signed to address the Town’s concern about future annexation of the
property to the city. A document titled
“Agreement to Waive or Relinquish Right to Petition or Participate in
Annexation Proceedings” was signed by the Developer on October 18, 2006. Under the terms of the agreement, the
Developer consented to pay $250,000 in liquidated damages in the event it filed
a petition for annexation with the city of
¶6 On November 9, 2006, the town board again took up the plan commission’s recommendation for approval of the Developer’s project. The board voted to accept the plan commission’s recommendation, subject to certain conditions. An amended statement of the conditions, dated November 29, recited several actions to be completed in conjunction with the CSM approval. For example, the Town required the Developer to submit road and stormwater management plans before building permits would issue and it required the Developer to submit a letter of credit and to reimburse the Town for fees paid for technical assistance during the review process. The amended conditions of CSM approval also referred to the agreement, signed October 18, that the Developer would not petition for annexation to the city.
¶7 In a letter dated December 7, 2006,
¶8 By correspondence dated July 5, 2007, the Developer
acknowledged receipt of the Town’s development agreement for limited site
improvements “as it was approved by the Town Board,” but explained that its
“intention at this time is to annex this project into the City of
Waukesha.” By letter dated September 17,
2007, the Developer petitioned the mayor and common council of the city of
DISCUSSION
¶9 The Developer challenges the Town’s authority to enter into a contract such as the Agreement to Waive or Reliquish Right to Petition or Participate in Annexation Proceedings,[2] which limits a property owner’s statutory right to petition for annexation. It further argues that, even if the Town did have such authority, the annexation waiver here was not supported by consideration and is therefore unenforceable.
¶10 We review summary judgments do novo, using the same methodology
as the trial court. Young v.
¶11 When, as here, both parties move for summary judgment, a court
may generally accept that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Millen
v. Thomas, 201
Town’s Authority to Request
Annexation Waiver
¶12 The Developer offers two arguments in support of its position that the Town exceeded its authority when it required the annexation waiver. First, the Developer asserts that the relevant statutes prohibit such actions. Specifically, it argues that the annexation waiver allows the Town to maneuver around a clear statutory prohibition of its power to influence annexations. Second, it contends that the annexation waiver is the product of coercion by the Town.
¶13 We begin with the question of whether a town has the statutory
authority to require an applicant to enter into a collateral, binding agreement
to do something not required by ordinance in order to facilitate the town’s
approval of and participation in a development project. The Developer correctly observes that
municipalities are created by and derive their authority from the legislature. See
Haug
v.
¶14 The Developer essentially argues that because there is no express grant of authority for a Town to request an annexation waiver from a property owner, the authority does not exist. The Town responds that there is no express prohibition of this type of agreement either, and thus it falls within the broad corporate powers of the Town. We agree with the Town.
¶15 Our review of the relevant statutes and case law leads us to
conclude that there is nothing to prevent the Town from entering into a
collateral agreement such as an annexation waiver with a developer. Under Wis.
Stat. § 60.01(2)(c), the Town has the authority to enter into
agreements that are necessary to the exercise of its corporate powers. Furthermore, a town board, exercising village
powers, has the authority to act for its own commercial benefit. See
Wis. Stat. §§ 60.22(3),
60.10(2)(c), and 61.34. A recent article
explained the economic concerns facing
¶16 According to the undisputed facts, the Town previously experienced a substantial loss of anticipated tax revenue when the Town cooperated with a developer who subsequently petitioned for annexation of its property to the city. In its brief, the Wisconsin Towns Association points out, “In addition to losing territory and tax base, [when an annexation occurs] towns often lose infrastructure.”[5] Thus, the Town’s pursuit of the annexation waiver was based on actual past experience and the resolve to use its corporate powers to protect its economic interests. We are persuaded that the Town had the authority, in the exercise of its corporate power, to seek an annexation waiver to protect the interests of the Town.
¶17 The Developer next directs us to Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan
Commission, 209
¶18 We have held that cooperative agreements between municipalities
and developers are within the powers conferred on villages by Wis. Stat.
§ 61.34(1). See Save Elkhart Lake, Inc. v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 181 Wis. 2d
778, 788, 512 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1993) (agreement between the village and the
developer); see also Town
of Brockway v. City of Black River Falls, 2005 WI App 174, ¶35, 285
Wis. 2d 708, 702 N.W.2d 418 (agreement between the city and the
developer). Furthermore, our supreme
court has concluded that a municipality may condition the extension of city
services on an annexation agreement. See Town of
¶19 It is clear from the record that the plan development and CSM approval process between the Town and the Developer was a fluid process, which stemmed from the Developer’s initial request for the Town’s consideration of its plan, to the Developer’s desire for accommodations from the Town, to the plan commission’s request for the annexation waiver, to the board’s acceptance of the commission’s recommendation for approval of the CSM, to further CSM and site plan revisions at the request of the Developer. The record lacks any indication that the Developer had any hesitation or complaint at the prospect of the annexation waiver. Furthermore, the facts of this case do not suggest that the Town was attempting to extract an agreement from a developer who was willing to comply with the Town’s existing ordinance requirements prohibiting the initiation of annexation proceedings.
Enforceability of
the Annexation Waiver
¶20 The Developer next argues that even if the Town had the authority to enter into a collateral agreement as a condition of project approval, the agreement here was nonetheless void because it was not supported by consideration. It contends that cooperation with a developer with regard to ordinance requirements is standard practice and therefore cannot serve as consideration for a collateral agreement.
¶21 Consideration, which must be bargained for, may
be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. McLellan v. Charly, 2008
WI App 126, ¶27, 313
¶22 In its summary judgment rationale, the circuit court noted that just “because the town is in the business of pursuing development or not pursuing development as the case may be, that that takes them out of the realm of being unable, if you will, to provide consideration to an account.” The court found that there was, in fact, consideration as a result of the Town’s negotiations with the Developer:
[I]t was clear the Town was willing to deal in a good faith manner to make this development a reality. It meant changes …. It meant making some bending of rules related to fill removal regarding partitioning of the property that wouldn’t directly be involved in the development [but rather] involved a sale to a bank…. [T]hat involved arguable amounts of time, effort and money on the part of the town.
¶23 The Town offers that examples of consideration here include
providing “waivers from strict code enforcement of the Town’s zoning and land
division codes, modification of the Town’s zoning code so as to enhance the
development of the [p]roperty, as well as the active assistance and
participation of Town officials when discussing the development of the
[p]roperty with potential purchasers.”
The Wisconsin Towns Association suggests that the consideration one may
receive for an annexation waiver could be “municipal support and cooperation in
the development process … [and/or] a willingness to contract away the right to
exercise some proprietary function.” We
agree that these are examples of adequate consideration for a freely and
voluntarily negotiated annexation waiver.
Because the Town’s accommodations were a benefit to the Developer as
well as a burden on the Town, the annexation waiver is supported by
consideration. See McLellan, 313
¶24 Finally, the Developer argues that a CSM was never approved by the town board; rather, it was conditionally approved. The Developer asserts that the annexation waiver cannot survive as a stand-alone agreement without the approved CSM. We dispense with this argument by noting that the annexation waiver makes no mention of a CSM. The Developer was free to bargain for such a provision in the annexation agreement, but it did not. When the Town engaged in activities to accommodate and advance the Developer’s plans, regardless of whether the CSM was ultimately approved, the Town lived up to its end of the bargain.
CONCLUSION
¶25 A Town has the authority to enter into contracts that are necessary for the exercise of its corporate powers. Wis. Stat. § 60.01(2)(c). Nothing in the relevant statutes prohibits a Town from seeking an annexation waiver in its negotiations with a property owner; furthermore, nothing prevents enforcement of such an agreement if it is made freely and voluntarily by the parties and is supported by consideration. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of the Town.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
[1] Before
any building could be constructed on a subdivided lot, the Town of
[2] For convenience, we will refer to this agreement as the annexation waiver.
[3] All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.
[4] It is also noteworthy that the power of a town board may be broadened by the exercise of village board powers under Wis. Stat. § 60.10(2)(c), which provides that the town may resolve to “exercise powers of a village board under [§] 60.22(3).” Such a resolution “is general and continuing.” Sec. 60.10(2)(c). Therefore, a specific resolution to exercise village powers when dealing with the Developer was not required. At oral argument, the Town asserted that its statutory authority to protect its interests was, in part, due to its ability to exercise of village powers. The Developer did not dispute this assertion. Village powers derive from Wis. Stat. ch. 61. Most importantly, villages have the broad power to act “for the government and good order of the village, for its commercial benefit and for the health, safety, welfare and convenience of the public, and may carry its powers into effect by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing, taxation, special assessment, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, and other necessary or convenient means.” Wis. Stat. § 61.34(1).
[5] At
our request, the Wisconsin Towns Association filed an amicus curiae brief. It directs us to International Paper Co. v. City
of Fond du Lac, 50