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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
July 14, 2009
David R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT I
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State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Robert J. Dietrich,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL
from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: william w.
brash, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J.,
Fine and Kessler, JJ.
¶1 FINE, J. Robert J. Dietrich
appeals a judgment entered after he pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault
of a child. See Wis.
Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) (2005–06).
He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion. Dietrich claims that the circuit court: (1) erred when it denied his motion to
suppress his confession;
(2) violated his due-process rights when it allowed the victim’s treating
therapist to address the circuit court at sentencing; and (3) erroneously
exercised its sentencing discretion. We
affirm.
I.
¶2 Dietrich was charged with one count of repeatedly sexually
assaulting a child and two counts of intimidating a child victim after B.T.
told the police in July of 2006 that Dietrich, a family friend, had sexually assaulted
her several times between June 1, 2004, and August 22, 2004, when she was twelve
years old. Dietrich confessed to the
police that he had engaged in one sexual act with B.T. According to the complaint, after Dietrich
confessed, he wrote an apology letter to B.T., and a letter to the district
attorney’s office saying that he was sorry and willing to get counseling.
¶3 In a pretrial motion, Dietrich
sought an in camera review of B.T.’s
mental health records regarding an April of 2006 suicide attempt. His theory of defense was that B.T. fabricated the assaults to “deflect” police
attention away from an unrelated incident with her boyfriend and onto Dietrich. He claimed
that B.T.’s mental health records were material to his defense because they
would show that B.T. had not mentioned
during therapy the sexual assaults by Dietrich. In support, Dietrich
attached to the motion a St. Francis Police Department report that
recounted that B.T. told the police
that she had attempted suicide because her friends at school were being mean to
her and had accused her of making a bomb threat. He claimed that the police report supported his
defense because “the failure to mention an event under circumstances where it
would be natural to mention it is very relevant to whether the claim was recently
fabricated.”
¶4 The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Dietrich
had not met his burden under State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶34, 253
Wis. 2d 356, 381, 646 N.W.2d 298, 310, to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood
that B.T.’s mental health records contained relevant information necessary to a
determination of his guilt or innocence.
See also State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 608–610, 499
N.W.2d 719, 723 (Ct. App.
1993).
¶5 Dietrich also sought to suppress
his confession, claiming that the police violated his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966). The circuit court held
an evidentiary hearing on Dietrich’s motion. Milwaukee Police Detective Victor Wong
testified that in July of 2006, he and Detective Justin Carloni interviewed Dietrich about the assaults.
According to Wong, after he went through a personal-information form
with Dietrich, he read to Dietrich his Miranda rights, including the right
to consult with a lawyer. Wong
testified that Dietrich told him that he understood
and would waive his rights. According to
Wong, Dietrich did not
ask to talk to a lawyer at any point in the interview.
¶6 Wong testified that he did not
audio or video record the interview because at the time of the interview it was
not required by department policy. According
to Wong, Dietrich did not ask to make any telephone calls before the interview,
and it was not department policy to allow defendants to make telephone calls “to
family members” before questioning.
¶7 On cross-examination, Wong told
the circuit court that while he would sometimes write in a defendant’s
statement that the defendant had agreed to talk to the detectives without a
lawyer, he did not do so in this case:
Q So
that’s your handwriting on the so-called statement. Right?
A Yes.
Q Was it
you who decided what got written down?
A Yes.
Q So you
decided if it’s important, write it down.
If you didn’t think it was important, you didn’t write it down. Right?
A That’s
correct.
Q And
we’ve already established -- well, if something is not written down, it
probably either didn’t happen or it’s not important. Right?
A That
could be, yes.
Q And no
where [sic] in your statement did you
write that Mr. Dietrich asked for an attorney. Right?
A That’s
correct.
Q That’s
the sole reason for testifying he didn’t ask for a lawyer?
A Yes.
Q Okay. But you also didn’t write down that he waived
his right to an attorney. Did you?
A That is
correct. I did not write that down.
On
redirect-examination, Wong testified that if a
defendant asked for a lawyer during an interview, he would write that down and
stop the interview.
¶8 Dietrich testified that he was a Milwaukee County sheriff’s deputy when he was
arrested. He told the circuit court that
as a sheriff’s deputy he was aware of his Miranda rights, including the right
to a lawyer. According to Dietrich,
Wong read his Miranda rights to him at the
beginning of the interview and Dietrich “didn’t say
anything at that time.” Dietrich
testified that when Wong asked him how many times he had sex with B.T., Dietrich
became “very offended” and asked “to speak to an attorney.” Dietrich told the circuit
court that he asked to talk to a lawyer four times during the interview and
that each time the detectives ignored him.
He testified that he assumed his requests for a lawyer were being
recorded because he saw a sign on the wall which stated “video recording in
progress.”
¶9 Dietrich testified that he falsely
confessed because he “just needed that interrogation to be over.” He told the circuit court that he signed his
name “in a few places” on the statement and Wong
“snatched the paper from me.” Dietrich admitted on cross-examination that after he confessed
to Wong he wrote the letters to B.T.’s family and to
the district attorney’s office.
¶10 According to Dietrich, when the
interview was over, he called his father and told him that he had asked for a
lawyer, but was refused. Dietrich
was then taken to the Milwaukee County Jail, where he spoke with a representative
for the deputy sheriff’s union, David
Hutchins. Dietrich testified
that he told Hutchins that he had asked for a lawyer
several times but “they wouldn’t give one to me.” According to Dietrich,
the next morning a St. Francis police detective asked him if he
wanted to make a statement. Dietrich testified that he asked for a lawyer and the detective
left.
¶11 Dietrich’s father testified at the
suppression hearing that Dietrich called the night
he was arrested and told him “they wouldn’t let me go until I told them what I
did.” When asked by Dietrich’s
lawyer, Dietrich’s father said that Dietrich
told him the detectives “wouldn’t let him make a phone call, wouldn’t let him
call an attorney”:
Q Did Rob [Dietrich] ever say to
you that he had asked for a lawyer, and they wouldn’t let him have a lawyer?
A Yes.
Q What did
he say?
A Well, he
said he asked for a lawyer, and they wouldn’t let him make a phone call,
wouldn’t let him call an attorney.
¶12 Hutchins testified that on the night
of the arrest, Dietrich told him “they didn’t let me
make any phone calls.” Hutchins
told the circuit court he “assumed that to mean that he wasn’t able to contact
his family and/or lawyer.” Hutchins did not, however, recall Dietrich
ever telling him that the detectives would not let him talk to a lawyer.
¶13 In rebuttal, Carloni testified that Dietrich
did not ask to speak to a lawyer at any time during the interview. He told the circuit court that if Dietrich had asked for a lawyer, the detectives “would have
ceased the interview immediately.”
¶14 The circuit court orally denied Dietrich’s motion to suppress
his confession, concluding that the State had met its burden to show that he
was informed of and waived his Miranda rights. See
State
v. Young, 2009 WI App 22, ¶15, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___, 762 N.W.2d
736, 741 (State has burden to show defendant was informed of, understood, and
intelligently waived Miranda rights).
¶15 The case was plea bargained and, as we have seen, Dietrich pled guilty to one count of first-degree sexual
assault of a child. At the sentencing
hearing, the State called B.T.’s therapist, Mary Determan, to give her opinion
on how the assaults had affected B.T.
Dietrich objected, claiming that in light of his prior motion for an in camera inspection of B.T.’s mental
health records it was not “fair to rely on the privilege at that point and now
come in today without me never [sic] having
seen these health care records…. I have
no way to challenge it or to rebut it or do anything.” The circuit court overruled Dietrich’s
objection.
¶16 Determan told the circuit court that she had been B.T.’s
primary therapist since B.T. had in the summer of 2006 disclosed the sexual
abuse. She explained that B.T. had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder and experienced anxiety, nightmares, and daytime flashbacks. According to Determan, because B.T. personally knew and trusted the perpetrator, the
abuse “negatively affected her relationships with others in her life. She is fearful and questions whether or not
she will ever be able to trust anyone again.”
Determan told the circuit court that B.T.’s self esteem “dramatically
changed” and that B.T. had been hospitalized
“for suicidal ideation and self-mutilization, which was directly related to
withholding trauma from others.” According
to Determan, B.T. failed her freshman
year in high school due to “psychological and behavioral problems stemming from
the unreported sexual abuse.” Determan
told the circuit court that B.T. was
very angry, felt alone and isolated, and “has missed out on the normal boy/girl
developmental stages.”
¶17 The circuit court also considered materials submitted on
Dietrich’s behalf, including a sentencing memorandum from Vicky Padway, a
licensed social worker, and a psychological examination of Dietrich by Michael
Kotkin, Ph.D. The circuit court sentenced
Dietrich to twenty years of imprisonment, with an initial confinement of
thirteen years, and seven years of extended supervision.
¶18 Dietrich filed a postconviction
motion seeking discovery of B.T.’s mental health records. He claimed that his due-process rights had
been violated because the circuit court relied on “apparently inaccurate
information [from Determan] concerning B[.T.]’s mental condition.” The circuit court denied the motion,
concluding that Dietrich had not met his burden to
show that he had been sentenced based on inaccurate information. See State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶26,
291 Wis. 2d 179, 192–193, 717 N.W.2d 1, 7 (defendant claiming sentencing court
relied on inaccurate information must show information was inaccurate and
sentencing court actually relied on inaccurate information).
II.
A. Motion to Suppress
¶19 A circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
presents a mixed question of fact and law.
State v. Casarez, 2008 WI App 166, ¶9, 314 Wis. 2d 661, 668, 762 N.W.2d 385, 388. We will not reverse the circuit court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Ibid.; Wis. Stat.
Rule 805.17(2) (made applicable to criminal proceedings by Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1)). Further the circuit court is the sole judge of
the credibility of the witnesses testifying before the circuit court. Rule 805.17(2). We review the application of constitutional
principles to those findings de novo. See
Casarez,
2008 WI App 166, ¶9, 314 Wis.
2d at 668, 762 N.W.2d at 388–389.
¶20 Dietrich claims that the circuit
court’s implicit finding that he did not invoke his right to counsel is
contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that the
detectives’ testimony that he did not ask for a lawyer is outweighed by “the
mountain of direct and circumstantial evidence that Dietrich did invoke his
right to counsel,” including that: the
detectives did not record the interview; Dietrich told his father that he was not
allowed to speak to a lawyer; Dietrich asked a union representative about
getting a lawyer; and Dietrich invoked his right to counsel when questioned by
a St. Francis detective. We
disagree.
¶21 “‘[T]he weight of the testimony and the credibility of the
witnesses are matters peculiarly within the province of the trial court acting
as the trier of fact.’” Young,
2009 WI App 22, ¶17, ___ Wis.
2d at ___, 762 N.W.2d at 741 (quoted source omitted). Accordingly, we will “‘not reweigh the
evidence or reassess the witnesses’ credibility, but will search the record for
evidence that supports findings the trial court made, not for findings it could
have made but did not.’” Ibid.
(quoted source omitted); see also State
v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d
653, 672, 499 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1993) (implicit finding of fact sufficient when
facts of Record support circuit court’s decision).
¶22 The circuit court made factual findings sufficient to support
its implicit determination that Dietrich did not
invoke his right to counsel. In its oral
ruling on Dietrich’s motion to suppress, the circuit court acknowledged the
conflict between Detectives Wong and Carloni’s testimony that Dietrich did not
ask for a lawyer and Dietrich’s testimony that he did:
Law enforcement contends that he [Dietrich]
never asked for an attorney and did a number of things in conformity with that,
which they contend supports that position.
Mr. Dietrich, however, indicates and argues
that that’s not what happened. That I
was talking to them, that we went through and I did supply them
information. We talked about the
pedigree, and I gave them that information, and we were talking.
But at
the point when they asked about inappropriate contact with B[.T.], at that
point he contends is the first time that he exercised his right and informed
them as to the fact that he wanted to have an attorney present before going
forward or that he wanted to talk to an attorney.
In
assessing the credibility of this testimony, the circuit court acknowledged
that Wong had “varying normal [interview]
practices,” but found the detectives’ testimony that Dietrich
did not ask for a lawyer consistent with one another. In contrast, it determined that Dietrich’s testimony “appeared to have certain
inconsistencies,” noting that while Dietrich:
emphasiz[ed] the fact that he knew what his rights were
and that he wanted a lawyer … there seemed to be kind of a hundred and eighty
degree turn wherein he changes a position and just decides for whatever reason
to make a statement and not only make a statement to law enforcement, but
writes other letters on his own and almost takes on, if you will, kind of a
victim or victimization standpoint that I had asked for a lawyer, that they
just won’t give me one, so I’m just going to tell them something, anything to
get out of here.
But
that just doesn’t seem to jive with then making additional statements or
writing other documents. Because,
presumably, the detective or detectives had what they wanted at that point in
time. They had this confession. He signed off on it, even though he’s saying
they just stuck it in front of me. I
didn’t read it.
¶23 The circuit court also considered the evidence that Dietrich had asked for a lawyer when questioned by a St. Francis
detective and Hutchins’s testimony that Dietrich “wasn’t able to contact [a] lawyer,” but “put [this
evidence] in its appropriate position,” noting that Hutchins’s
“testimony was based on certain assumptions.
He assumed certain things.
Because there was never a statement or he never recorded that there was
a statement that Mr.
Dietrich was denied counsel.” The circuit court also noted that at the time
of Dietrich’s interview the detectives were not
required to record Dietrich’s statements. Cf. Wis. Stat. § 968.073(2)
(generally, “[i]t is the policy of this state to make an audio or audio and visual
recording of a custodial interrogation of a person suspected of committing a
felony”); 2005 Wis. Act 60, § 51(2) (Section 968.073 effective January 1, 2007). Finally, the circuit court found that Dietrich’s father was not “very credible,” explaining that
“only after additional questioning by counsel did he indicate that … he [Dietrich] asked for a lawyer.”
¶24 After considering all of the evidence, the circuit court
concluded that:
the State has met [its] burden with regards to the Miranda aspect; that is, that
clearly Mr. Dietrich is in custody; clearly he was
being interrogated; clearly his rights were given to him. And based upon all of the evidence the Court
has before it, I do believe he waived his rights and made a statement both to
Detectives Wong and Carloni.
(Italics
and underlining in original.) The
circuit court’s findings that Dietrich was informed
of, understood, and waived his Miranda rights, including his right
to consult with a lawyer, are not clearly erroneous. See
Young,
2009 WI App 22, ¶¶20–21, ___ Wis. 2d
at ___, 762 N.W.2d at 742 (circuit court’s implicit finding that defendant did
not request counsel sufficient where supported by Record). Accordingly, it properly denied Dietrich’s motion to suppress his confession.
B. Due Process
¶25 Dietrich claims that the circuit court violated his due-process
rights at sentencing because he contends that he did not have notice that
Determan would address the circuit court or an opportunity to rebut her opinion
that the sexual abuse caused B.T.’s psychological problems. We disagree.
¶26 A defendant has a due-process right to be sentenced on correct
information. See State v. Spears, 227 Wis. 2d 495, 508, 596 N.W.2d 375, 380
(1999). “As part of the guarantee that
he or she be sentenced on reliable information, a defendant has the right to
rebut evidence that is admitted by a sentencing court.” Ibid.; see also State v. Damaske, 212 Wis. 2d 169, 196, 567
N.W.2d 905, 917 (Ct. App. 1997) (cross-examination of those presenting evidence
to sentencing court not required as long as defendant has opportunity to rebut
evidence). Whether a defendant has been
denied the right to due process is a question of law that we review de novo.
Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d at 185, 717 N.W.2d at 3.
¶27 Contrary to Dietrich’s assertion, he
was on notice that Determan would address the circuit court at sentencing. The presentence investigation report noted that
B.T.’s therapist planned on speaking at Dietrich’s
sentencing. Significantly, Dietrich’s
lawyer told the circuit court at the sentencing hearing that both he and Dietrich had reviewed the presentence investigation report. Moreover, Dietrich was
permitted to, and actually did, present information that B.T.’s psychological
problems were caused by things other than the assaults. The sentencing memorandum from Padway described
many problems B.T. had before the assaults, including that: B.T. had problems in school and did not have
any “real friends”; B.T. felt rejected by her biological father; B.T.’s mother
could be “cruel and ruthless”; and B.T.’s mother’s boyfriend physically abused B.T. In sum, Dietrich’s
due-process rights were not violated at sentencing.
¶28 In a related claim, Dietrich
contends that the circuit court violated his due-process rights when it denied
his postconviction motion seeking discovery of B.T.’s mental health records. He claims that the records are material to his
sentence because they “probably” contain information showing the “true cause of B[.T.]’s emotional problems.”
(Italics in original.) See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (due-process right to disclosure of favorable evidence material to guilt
or punishment). Again, we disagree.
¶29 The postconviction discovery of mental health records is
governed by State v. Robertson, 2003 WI App 84, 263 Wis. 2d 349, 661 N.W.2d
105. See
id., 2003 WI App 84, ¶22, 263 Wis. 2d at 362, 661
N.W.2d at 111 (“defendant requesting confidential records during postconviction
discovery should be required to meet the preliminary Shiffra-Green burden”).
Under Robertson,
a defendant must set forth a specific factual basis
demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the records contain relevant
information that is necessary to a determination of guilt or innocence and not
merely cumulative to evidence already available to the defendant. Mere speculation or conjecture as to what
information is in the records is not sufficient. The Shiffra-Green
test essentially requires the court to look at the existing evidence in light
of the request for an in camera review and to determine “whether the records
will likely contain evidence that is independently probative to the defense.”
Robertson, 2003 WI App 84, ¶26, 263 Wis. 2d at 365, 661 N.W.2d at 113 (citations
and quoted source omitted). Whether a
defendant made a preliminary showing sufficient for an in camera review is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.,
2003 WI App 84, ¶24, 263 Wis.
2d at 364, 661 N.W.2d at 112.
¶30 In his postconviction motion, Dietrich
claimed that he was entitled to the discovery of B.T.’s mental health records
because:
[T]here is substantial reason to believe that many of
B[.T.]’s emotional problems were entirely unrelated to Dietrich. It is a virtual certainty that B[.T.]’s
extensive health-care records from only two months before contain no mention of
Dietrich having sex with her. Doctors are mandatory reporters of claims by
children that they have been sexually assault[ed]. In the case of B[.T.], no such disclosure was
reported by a doctor. Moreover, when the
St. Francis
police interviewed her in April, 2006, concerning attempts to harm herself she
made no mention of being sexually assaulted by Dietrich. Instead, she told police she was depressed
about the fact that her friends at school thought she had been involved in a
bomb threat.
Dietrich did not provide a sufficient factual basis for an in camera review of B.T.’s mental health
records. His claim that the records would
show that the cause of B.T.’s psychological problems was “entirely unrelated”
to the assaults is pure speculation. The
mere fact that B.T. may not have
reported the assaults to doctors or the police after her April of 2006 suicide
attempt does not show that her problems were solely caused by things other than
the assaults. See Green, 2002 WI 68,
¶37, 253 Wis.
2d at 382–383, 646 N.W.2d at 310–311 (mere assertion that counseling records
may contain statements inconsistent with other reports insufficient to compel in camera review). Moreover, Dietrich did not show that B.T.’s
mental health records contained non-cumulative information. As we have seen, Dietrich attached to his
pretrial motion for an in camera
review of B.T.’s records a report by the St. Francis Police Department
that asserted that B.T. attempted suicide because her friends at school were
being mean to her and accused her of making a bomb threat. Additionally, Padway’s sentencing memorandum gave
several alternate explanations for B.T.’s psychological problems. The circuit court did not violate Dietrich’s due-process rights when it denied Dietrich’s
postconviction request for B.T.’s mental health records.
C. Sentencing Discretion
¶31 Dietrich claims that the circuit
court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion because he contends that
it did not set out in detail the nexus between the sentencing factors and the
length of the sentence. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶43,
270 Wis. 2d
535, 558, 678 N.W.2d 197, 207 (sentencing court must “identify
the factors that were considered in arriving at the sentence and indicate how
those factors fit the objectives and influence the decision”). We disagree.
¶32 Sentencing is within the discretion of the circuit court, and
our review is limited to determining whether the circuit court erroneously
exercised that discretion. McCleary
v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277–278, 182
N.W.2d 512, 519–520 (1971); see also Gallion,
2004 WI 42, ¶68, 270 Wis.
2d at 569, 678 N.W.2d at 212 (“circuit court possesses wide discretion in
determining what factors are relevant to its sentencing decision”). The three
primary factors a sentencing court must consider are the gravity of the
offense, the character of the defendant, and the need to protect the
public. State v. Harris,
119 Wis. 2d
612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633, 639 (1984).
The circuit court may also consider the following factors:
“(1) Past record of criminal
offenses; (2) history of undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant’s
personality, character and social traits; (4) result of presentence
investigation; (5) vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the
defendant’s culpability; (7) defendant’s demeanor at trial; (8)
defendant’s age, educational background and employment record;
(9) defendant’s remorse, repentance and cooperativeness; (10) defendant’s
need for close rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; and
(12) the length of pretrial detention.”
Id., 119 Wis. 2d
at 623–624, 350 N.W.2d at 639 (quoted source omitted); see also Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶¶59–62, 270 Wis. 2d at 565–566, 678
N.W.2d at 211 (applying the main McCleary factors—the seriousness of
the crime, the defendant’s character, and the need to protect the public—to
Gallion’s sentencing). The weight given
to each of these factors is within the circuit court’s discretion. Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185,
233 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1975).
¶33 The circuit court considered the gravity of Dietrich’s
crime, noting that “both victims and families” of a sexual assault experience
“unbelievable” frustration that goes “way beyond pain, way beyond hurt.” It also considered Dietrich’s
character, including his age, education, “generally continuous” employment,
lack of a criminal record, and supportive family. It found significant that Dietrich
did not take full responsibility for his conduct and determined that he had
rehabilitative needs “with regards to psychological issues that need to be
pursued and explored”:
[C]learly from this court’s reading of certain
documents that have been submitted I think there are some psychological issues
that manifest themselves in the test results….
[Dr. Kotkin’s report] reflect[s] … problems in
intimate relationships.
….
In
reference to the sexual contact with the 13-year-old [sic—she was twelve] girl he does place a certain amount of
responsibility on her. He indicates that
the offense wouldn’t have happened had the child not been overly affectionate,
promiscuous, encouraging and curious and interested in sex, and that talks
about the perspective which is one of the aspects that I focused in on.
….
Conversely
I have a 12-year-old who reports inappropriate sexual contact that ultimately
culminated in sexual intercourse in various forms as defined by the law over a
two-and-a-half month period of time, not just reflecting one moment or instant
in time.
The
circuit court also reflected that Dietrich had
violated not only the trust of the community through his position as a law
enforcement officer, but also the trust of B.T. and her family.
¶34 Finally, the circuit court found that “the public needs to be
safe from this kind of behavior occurring”:
“[T]he victim[ has a] continued need for protection not just for her …
but for other children similarly situated.”
It explained, based on all of the factors, that probation was not
warranted and that the goals of its sentence included punishment and
deterrence, to “send[] a message to you and other members of the community that
this is not acceptable.” The circuit
court fully explained why it sentenced Dietrich as
it did; it did not erroneously exercise its discretion.
By
the Court.—Judgment and
order affirmed.
Publication in the official reports is not recommended.