COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
July 7, 2009
David
R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT I
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State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Darrell Kenyatt Campbell,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: Jeffrey
a. wagner, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Curley, P.J., Fine and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Darrell
Kenyatt Campbell appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury convicted
him of first-degree intentional homicide while armed. Campbell
argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his
custodial statements. Because we
conclude that the circuit court properly denied the motion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The complaint in this case alleged that Campbell shot another man at close range
during a fight. The victim died at the
scene. Approximately two months later,
the police arrested Campbell
for the homicide. After taking Campbell into custody, the
police questioned him for a little less than sixteen hours during three interrogation
sessions spanning several days. During
questioning, Campbell
made inculpatory statements.
¶3 Campbell
filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statements on two grounds: (1) he was not given the warnings required by
Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
and (2) the statements were not voluntary.
The circuit court held a hearing, and the State presented the testimony
of three police officers involved in the interrogation sessions. Campbell
presented no testimony or other evidence on his own behalf.
¶4 The testimony at the hearing established that Campbell was arrested at
5:15 p.m. on February 24, 2005.
Detective Jason Smith testified that he and Detective Mark Walton
questioned Campbell
on that date from 9:24 p.m. until 11:46 p.m.
Campbell
did not appear impaired in any way.
Smith testified that he read Campbell the
Miranda
warnings before questioning began, and Campbell neither asked for an attorney nor
invoked his right to remain silent. The
detectives conducted the questioning in an interview room and did not use
restraints or handcuffs. During the session,
the detectives offered Campbell
food and beverages and afforded him two ten-minute breaks. The detectives made no threats or promises to
Campbell. According to Smith, Campbell did not make any incriminating
statements during the interrogation. The
session ended when Campbell
told the detectives that he was tired and wanted to sleep and to “think about
some things.” The detectives took Campbell to a private
cell with a bed, sink, and toilet.
¶5 Detective Timothy Heier testified that he read Campbell the Miranda
warnings on February 25, 2005, at 8:57 p.m.
Campbell
did not ask for an attorney or invoke his right to remain silent. Heier and his partner, Detective Erik
Gulbrandson, then interrogated Campbell
for approximately eight hours and forty-five minutes. During the session, Campbell was not restrained or
handcuffed. The detectives allowed Campbell four breaks during the questioning, and offered Campbell food, drink, and
cigarettes. During the questioning, Campbell admitted that he
shot the victim.
¶6 Heier testified that Campbell
narrated “the order of events several times” during the first six hours of the
interview session. Heier then asked Campbell to retell what
happened while Heier reduced the statement to writing. After repeating a portion of his statement, Campbell told the
detectives that he no longer wanted to repeat his statement “line by
line.” Heier testified that the
detectives left the interview room, and Heier wrote down a summary of Campbell’s statement. Heier then returned to the interview room and
read the summary back to Campbell. Heier testified that Campbell made a correction to the statement
and then said: “it’s cool and it’s all
the truth, I just don’t want to sign anything.”
The session ended at 5:45 a.m. on February 26, 2005.
¶7 Detective Michael Caballero testified that he read Campbell the Miranda
warnings at approximately 7:45 p.m. on February 26, 2005. Campbell
stated that he was willing to answer questions without an attorney
present. Caballero and his partner,
Detective Timothy Duffy, then questioned Campbell
for approximately four and one-half hours, interrupted by one forty-five minute
break. Caballero testified that Campbell was not handcuffed or restrained during the
interview and that the detectives did not threaten or promise Campbell anything to induce him to make a
statement. Campbell did not provide any additional
details about the homicide during this session.
¶8 The circuit court found that the detectives appropriately
advised Campbell
of his Miranda rights before questioning him and that Campbell agreed
to give a statement each time that he was interviewed. The circuit court concluded that the
statements were voluntary, and it denied Campbell’s
motion to suppress.
¶9 At trial, the State presented portions of Campbell’s statements. The jury found Campbell guilty of first-degree intentional
homicide, and the circuit court imposed a life sentence with eligibility for
extended supervision after fifty years.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶10 On appeal, Campbell
does not dispute the circuit court’s conclusion that he received appropriate Miranda
warnings. Rather, he alleges that “the
sheer length of the interrogation, and the relay method of interrogation, when
combined with the fact that the seminal portion of the confession was drafted
by the police outside the defendant’s presence, created a situation in which
the confession was produced by improper police coercion.” A statement that is not voluntary is inadmissible. State v. Agnello, 2004 WI App 2, ¶8,
269 Wis. 2d
260, 267, 674 N.W.2d 594, 598.
¶11 We analyze Campbell’s
claim using a mixed standard of review.
“We defer to the circuit court’s findings regarding the factual
circumstances surrounding the statement.
However, the application of constitutional principles to those facts
presents a question of law subject to independent appellate review.” State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105,
¶16, 283 Wis. 2d
145, 155, 699 N.W.2d 110, 115 (citations omitted).
¶12 A court assesses the voluntariness of a defendant’s statements
by determining if the statements “are the product of a free and unconstrained
will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a
conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on
the defendant by representatives of the State exceeded the defendant’s ability
to resist.” State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI
43, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d
294, 309, 661 N.W.2d 407, 414. The court
must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if a defendant’s
custodial statements were voluntarily made, balancing the personal
characteristics of the defendant against the pressures applied by the police. Agnello, 2004 WI App 2, ¶9, 269 Wis. 2d at 268, 674
N.W.2d at 598.
The personal characteristics to be considered may
include the defendant’s age, education and intelligence, physical and emotional
condition, and prior experience with police.
These must be balanced against police pressures and tactics used to
induce admission, such as the duration of the questioning, the general
conditions under which the confession took place, any excessive physical or
psychological pressure brought to bear on the [defendant], any inducements,
threats, or other methods used to compel a response, and whether the defendant
was informed of his right to counsel and right against self-incrimination.
Id.,
2004 WI App 2, ¶9, 269 Wis. 2d
at 268–269, 674 N.W.2d at
598–599 (citations omitted).
¶13 In his appellate brief, Campbell
admits that his personal characteristics are “unremarkable.” He acknowledges that, at the time of the
interrogation, he was thirty-six years old and had a high school equivalency
degree. He further acknowledges that he
did not suffer from any mental disease or defect and that he had undergone
police interrogation in the past.
Nothing suggests, and Campbell
does not contend, that he was particularly susceptible to police pressures.
¶14 Balanced against Campbell’s
lack of vulnerability are the circuit court’s findings regarding the factual
circumstances of the interrogation. The
circuit court determined that the detectives offered Campbell
food, beverages, cigarettes, and breaks during each interrogation session and
that Campbell
was not restrained or handcuffed during the questioning. The circuit court found that Campbell was neither threatened
nor promised anything to induce his answers, and the detectives stopped
questioning him when he said he was tired.
Further, the circuit court found that a detective read Campbell
the Miranda
warnings before each interview, and Campbell
agreed to make a statement on each occasion.
These findings are supported by the detectives’ unrefuted testimony, and
Campbell does
not challenge them on appeal.
¶15 Instead, Campbell
asserts that “the sheer length” of the interrogation rendered his statements
involuntary. Campbell is incorrect. “[T]he supreme court [has] declined to adopt a
rule that custody and/or interrogation of a given length is inherently
coercive.” State v. Markwardt, 2007
WI App 242, ¶45, 306 Wis. 2d
420, 443, 742 N.W.2d 546, 558. In the
instant case, Campbell
was questioned for a significant period of time, but this factor alone does not
demonstrate improper pressure or coercive tactics when the questioning was
accompanied by breaks and appropriate opportunities to eat and sleep. See State v.
Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d
222, 239, 401 N.W.2d 759, 767 (1987).
¶16 Campbell disagrees, citing Briggs
v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 313, 251
N.W.2d 12 (1977), and State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217
N.W.2d 359 (1974). His citations are
inapt. Briggs and Estrada
discuss “sew-up confessions,” that is, confessions made during an unreasonably
long detention following an arrest. See Briggs, 76 Wis. 2d at 323, 251 N.W.2d at 16. Police may not detain an accused for
an unreasonably long period of time in order to extract a confession that will
“sew up” the case. Id.,
76 Wis. 2d
at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 16. “‘Any
statement, even if voluntarily given by an accused, will be held inadmissible
if made during a period of unreasonably long detention.’” Id., 76 Wis. 2d at 324, 251
N.W.2d at 17 (citation and one set of quotation marks omitted). The issue “‘revolves solely on the point
whether the [charging] delay was inordinate and the detention illegal.’” Id., 76 Wis. 2d at 324, 251
N.W.2d at 16–17 (citation and one set of quotation marks omitted).
¶17 Campbell
did not move the circuit court to suppress his statements on the basis that he
gave a “sew up” confession during an illegal period of detention. To the extent that his citations to Briggs
and Estrada are an attempt to raise such a claim for the first time
on appeal, we reject his effort to do so.
See Jackson v.
Benson, 218 Wis. 2d
835, 901, 578 N.W.2d 602, 630 (1998).
¶18 We also reject Campbell’s
contention that, because different detectives questioned Campbell during each of the three
interrogation sessions, the detectives engaged in “relay” questioning. “‘Relay’ questioning implies that different
interrogators relieve each other in an effort to put unremitting pressure on a
suspect.” Agnello, 2004 WI App 2,
¶21, 269 Wis. 2d
at 275, 674 N.W.2d at 602. Campbell does not dispute that the questioning in this
case was punctuated by breaks, and Campbell
had the opportunity to sleep between sessions in a private cell with a bed. This method of questioning does not reflect
“unremitting pressure” using “relay-team tactics.” See
ibid.
¶19 Last, Campbell
asserts that the police coerced his confession by reducing it to writing
outside of his presence. He contends
that the detectives’ conduct in this regard was “inexcusable” and improper. Campbell’s
position is perplexing. He offers no
authority, and we know of none, to support the proposition that summarizing a
custodial statement outside of the declarant’s presence renders the statement
involuntary. We conclude that his
argument on this point is inadequately briefed. Accordingly, we will not address it. See State v.
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d
627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Ct. App. 1992).
¶20 The Record fully supports the circuit court’s conclusion that
the detectives did not exert improper pressure in questioning Campbell.
This case involves none of the conduct identified by the supreme court
as inherently coercive. See Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d at 239, 401 N.W.2d at 767
(listing inherently coercive interrogation tactics). Campbell
was afforded breaks between and during questioning sessions and allowed to eat
and rest. He was not threatened or
promised anything, and the questioning was not relentlessly persistent. See ibid. Moreover, nothing suggests that Campbell was mentally
frail or otherwise vulnerable as a result of any personal characteristic. Accordingly, we agree with the circuit
court’s conclusion that Campbell’s
statements were voluntary. See id., 136 Wis.
2d at 235, 401 N.W.2d at 765. For the
foregoing reasons, we affirm.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.