COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED June 17, 2009 David
R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals |
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This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62. |
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Appeal No. |
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STATE OF WISCONSIN |
IN COURT OF APPEALS |
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DISTRICT II |
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State of
Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Adam H. Westenberger,
Defendant-Appellant. |
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APPEAL
from a judgment of the circuit court for
¶1 SNYDER, J.[1] Adam H. Westenberger appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, third offense. He contends that the circuit court improperly held that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Consequently, he argues, all of the evidence obtained from the investigation should have been suppressed. We disagree and affirm.
¶2 On February 17, 2008, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Sheboygan Police Officer Michael Beringer received a dispatch that there had been a complaint of “an erratic driver in a golden-colored Mercury.” The complainant provided a license number as well. Beringer positioned himself in the vicinity and made visual identification of the vehicle, which he later learned was driven by Westenberger. Beringer pulled his squad car behind Westenberger’s car and began to follow. Dispatch contacted Beringer to confirm the caller saw the squad car and that it was following the correct vehicle. Beringer followed Westenberger to “get some observations of [his] own.”
¶3 At the intersection of
¶4 The State charged Westenberger with operating while intoxicated and operating with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration, as third offenses. Westenberger moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, along with the results of the chemical test for blood alcohol content, on grounds that Beringer did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop and did not have probable cause for the arrest. The circuit court held a hearing on May 23, 2008, and in an oral ruling denied the motion to suppress. Westenberger then entered a plea of no contest and judgment on the charge of OWI, third offense, was entered accordingly. Westenberger now appeals, renewing his argument that the investigative stop of his vehicle was illegal.
¶5 Investigative stops are considered seizures within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, the stop must be based on a
reasonable suspicion in order to pass constitutional muster. State v. Harris, 206
¶6 The relevant facts are undisputed, and the record indicates
nothing to suggest the court’s factual findings are erroneous. Thus, our review is limited to whether the
traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, in light of the totality of
the circumstances. See State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶22, 241
¶7
¶8 Police often rely on citizen informants for effective law
enforcement, and when officers receive a tip from an informant that they are
reasonably justified in believing to be truthful, officers may rely on the tip
to provide reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Rutzinski, 241
¶9 Westenberger argues that the tip from the informant did not have the necessary indicia of reliability because the report of “erratic” driving was subjective and non specific, and because the informant did not identify himself until after Beringer arrested Westenberger. He asserts that the veracity and knowledge source of the informant were unknown to Beringer at the time. He further argues that Beringer’s own observations revealed Westenberger’s “normal driving behavior when the weather and driving conditions are taken into account.”
¶10 The State counters that the informant called with a tip about
an erratic driver that included specific information about the vehicle,
including a license plate number. Also,
the informant stayed on the line and when Beringer pulled in behind
Westenberger, the informant told the dispatcher that he had seen the squad car
and it was following the correct vehicle.
This also added to the reliability of the tip, because the informant
demonstrated his proximity and ability to observe Westenberger’s driving. See
Kolk,
298
¶11 Beringer did not rely on the anonymous tip alone. He followed Westenberger in order to personally observe his driving and corroborate the tipster’s information. Beringer testified that he had watched other vehicles navigate the intersection without incident and only Westenberger swerved into a snowbank and curb. Although Beringer confirmed that driving conditions February 17 were bad and becoming worse, he was not required to eliminate all other possible causes of Westenberger’s swerving before initiating an investigatory stop. See State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, ¶46, 241 Wis.2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106 (“[I]f any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the right to temporarily detain the individual for the purpose of inquiry.” (citation omitted)).
¶12 Here, Beringer presented specific and articulable factors that led to his decision to investigate further. We conclude that he had reasonable suspicion sufficient to support an investigatory traffic stop. Accordingly, Westenberger’s motion to suppress was properly denied.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809. 23(1)(b)4.
[1] This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2007-08). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted.