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COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATED AND FILED
June 16, 2009
David
R. Schanker
Clerk of Court of Appeals
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NOTICE
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This opinion is subject to
further editing. If published, the
official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official
Reports.
A party may file with the
Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of
Appeals. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 and Rule 809.62.
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Appeal No.
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STATE OF WISCONSIN
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IN COURT OF
APPEALS
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DISTRICT I
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State of Wisconsin
ex rel. Melvin Shelton,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
John Husz, Warden, Milwaukee
Secure Detention Facility,
Respondent-Respondent.
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APPEAL
from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: timothy
g. dugan, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Fine, Kessler and Brennan, JJ.
¶1 PER CURIAM. In 1987, Melvin Shelton was
convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child. See
Wis. Stat. § 940.225(1)(d)
(1985-86). Shelton’s
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
State v. Shelton, No. 88-1441-CRNM, unpublished slip op. (Wis.
Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1999). Since that time,
Shelton has
filed numerous postconviction motions in the circuit court, and he has appealed
at least four previous times. See State v. Shelton,
No.
99-1624, unpublished slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1999).
¶2 On March 4, 2008, Shelton
filed a “petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”
Because Shelton was arguing that the
Department of Corrections was holding him beyond his maximum discharge date,
the circuit court construed the petition as seeking certiorari review of the
revocation of Shelton’s
parole. The court then dismissed the
petition as duplicative of another petition already filed in the circuit
court. Shelton appeals.
¶3 On appeal, Shelton
does not take issue with the circuit court’s construction of his petition as a
certiorari petition nor does he argue that the court’s dismissal of the
petition as duplicative was improper.
Rather, his sole argument travels back to his arrest which he contends
was illegal because he was arrested in his house in the absence of either a
warrant or exigent circumstances.
¶4 Shelton’s
argument is procedurally barred. Shelton has had both a
direct appeal and numerous postconviction proceedings. Issues that have been finally adjudicated,
waived, or not raised in a prior postconviction motion or appeal cannot be
raised in a Wis. Stat.
§ 974.06 motion unless there is “sufficient reason” for failing to raise
them in the original motion. See State v.
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d
168, 185, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). A
defendant must “raise all grounds regarding postconviction relief in his or her
original, supplemental or amended motion.”
Id.;
see also Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4)
(“Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily
and intelligently waived … in any other proceeding the person has taken to
secure relief may not be the basis for a subsequent motion,” absent sufficient
reason.).
¶5 In State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶33, 273 Wis. 2d
192, 682 N.W.2d 784, overruled on other
grounds by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry,
2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900, our supreme court further
explained the implications of Escalona-Naranjo, declaring the
rule set forth in Escalona-Naranjo is designed to ensure finality
in criminal litigation and to “‘compel[] a [defendant] to raise all grounds
regarding postconviction relief in his or her original, supplemental or amended
motion. Successive motions and appeals,
which all could have been brought at the same time, run counter to the design
and purpose of the legislation.’” Evans,
273 Wis. 2d
192, ¶33 (citation omitted) (first set of brackets supposed by Evans).
¶6 This court need not address the substantive portion of Shelton’s appeal because
under Escalona-Naranjo, he is procedurally barred from raising
the issue. Shelton’s conviction was affirmed on direct
appeal, and all of his previous motions for relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 have been
unsuccessful. Because the current issue
was not previously raised in any of Shelton’s
previous postconviction litigation or appeals, the issue is barred under Escalona-Naranjo. Shelton
has not provided the court with any reason, let alone a sufficient reason, why
he could not have raised this issue previously.
“[D]ue process for a convicted defendant permits him or her a single
appeal of [a] conviction and a single opportunity to raise claims of error .…” State ex rel. Macemon v. Christie,
216 Wis. 2d
337, 343, 576 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1998). Shelton
has already had more than that single opportunity—in both his direct appeal and
in his subsequent § 974.06
motions. Therefore, he is procedurally
barred from attempting to raise this additional claim in this latest
proceeding.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This
opinion will not be published. See Wis.
Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.